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ABSTRACT 
'1'h8 theais purports to examtne a movement of political dissenters -
the Australian peace movement - fran the time of the November 1959 
Melbourne Peace Congreaa to approximately one year after the November 1966
Federal elections. After a definition and exploration of basic texms and
concepts u•ed throughout the text, the study is divided into three major
sections. 
The first section briefly reviews the history of the Australian
peace movment prior to the 1959 Melbourne Conqreaa, before delving into 
a detailed account of that Congress - an event that laid the foundation 
for the formal, organised movement that •er9ed. 
The second part undertakes to describe and analyse the organisational 
framework, policia• and actiYitiea of the mov•ent in two states, Western 
Auatralia and Queensland. The modus optazeandi of the qroupa in these two
states are viewed as two distinct prototypes of organisational pattern• 
exiatin9 in other states.
Finally, the thuia depicts the broad developnental pattern of the 
AWltralia-wide movement during the first eight years of the paat decade. 
In this respect, the main thane concentrates on the orqanic nature of an 
evolving mov•ent where chanqes were r99istered in iseue-orientation, 
types of 4isaentera, sources of financial support, degree of social 
control encountered frca the macro-society, and in the militancy of the
tactics and outlook of the movement's participants. Thi• description
oum analysis centres mainly on events that occurred in New south wales 
and Victoria. It concludes with an account of the schi• affecting the 
entire movement that followed in the wake of the 1966 election d8nouement.
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INTRODUCTION 
From the time of the Australian & New Zealand Conqress for 
International cooperation & Disarmament, held in Melbourne durinq the 
week of 7-14th November, 1959, to the aftermath of the Australian Labor 
Party's decisive electoral defeat on 26th November, 1966, the Australian 
peace movement experienced what might be called a moderate rate of 
growth and deqree of success - although its strength was frequently 
exagqerated by friends and foes alike, and it never directly effected a 
single change in policy . Yet its close relationship with an important 
section of the ALP meant that it always possessed the potential to 
influence policy making, moreover, it is probably unfair to evaluate the 
movement in terms of empirically verifiable achievements, since most of 
its activities were directed towards affecting the society's values and 
attitudes - that is in fulfilling a long term educative fWlction. It 
miqht also be asked if success should be judged solely on the basis of 
the movement ' s  'outputs' into the political system. Instead, an equally 
important component of success is the effect that the movement has had 
l on the personal lives of the participants themselves. 
Since neither of these last two components of success can be 
adequately meaaured, it is not the intention of this dissertation to 
l. such a view to gain saliency need not be carried to Sorelian
extremes where true change is seen as caning from the victory
that each individual in consort with others achieves in the
exercise of his will, this transfiguration beinq idealised
above all else. (See George Sorel, Reflections on Vio'Lence
(1905) Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1950.)
(1j} 
render any sort of 'box score' analysi• of the movement's efficacy, 
rather the central aim will be to trace and explain the peace movement's 
developnents and changes over the first seven years of the past decade, 
by stressing: (1) the distinct cateqories of persons who supported the 
movement1 (2) the projects undertalcen1 (3) the movement's issue 
orientation, (4) the types of tactics employec!1 and (5) the orqaniaational 
framework by which the movement operated. With reqard to the first point, 
the participants are classified as either pacifists or pacificists, with 
a further subdivision into class dissenters, intellectual dissenters, 
humanitarian dissenters, religious dissenters, and youth dissenters. 
While the individual supporter may be categorised as more than one type 
of dissenter - indeed, a few may even fall into all five categories -
the typology is useful in analysinq chanqes in the movement's constituent 
parts. No detailed examination of the categories peze se, however, will 
be attempted other than to explain briefly their meaning in Chapter I. 
The description own analysis of the movement's developnents will be 
set out in the following way:-
The whole of Chapter I will be devoted to the definition and 
exploration of basic terms and concepts involved in the study. Terms 
such as 'dissenter', 'pacifist', 'pacificist', 'attitudinal group', 
'movement' , 'sectarian' , 'militant• , sto. will be examined and prepared 
for their usage in the main body of the text. As well, certain general 
characteristics of peace movements will be introduced to help clarify the 
collective behaviour subsequently attributed to the Australian movement. 
(111) 
Chapter II will beqin with a review of the background and history
of the Australian movement prior to the period under examination. This 
will be done to place the subject in historical p erspective, to show it 
as a continuous movement, and to depict the origins and d evelopments of 
some of the peace groups that continued to operate in the 1960's. The 
main part of the chapter, thouqh, will delve into a detailed account of 
the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress, an event that is important not only 
because it s erves as the starting point of this study, but because it 
laid the foundation for the formal, organised movement that emerged. 
The Congress is the only peace project that will be microscopically 
analysed, and, as such, constitutes a model of the type of problems that 
the movement encountered. 
In the next chapter it ia proposed to analyse broadly the movement's 
organisational structure as it existed throughout Australia, and to 
provide a specific descriptive analysis of the West Australian peace 
groups, participants, and activities - viewed as the organisational 
prototype of a state where no 'core group' dominated peace activities. 
Chapter IV will be linked closely to the preceding on e. It will 
seek to examine systematically the peace groups, participants, and
activities in Queensland within an organisational framework that serves
as a prototype of a state where a 'core group' did dominate peace 
activities. 
(iv) 
The next three chapters (Chapters V, VI and VII) will undertake to 
denote the broad developmental pattern of the movement between the
Melbourne Congress and the period immediately following the 1966 
elections . Most of the references cited will pertain to events that
occurred in New South Wales and Victoria . The three chapters will look 
at the peace groups as forming a dynamic, evolving movement where changes 
occurred in the nature of issues pursued, in the number of groups and 
types of dissenters comprising the movement , and in the militancy of 
tactics and outlook . Chapter v will deal with the movement in the period 
after the Melbourne Congress and extend into the period of Chapter VI 
(no clear demarcation) which will treat the events leadinq up to the
denouement of the 1966 elections . In this chapter it is intended to
outline the factors that precipitated a more dynamic movement , and 
describe the movement's role in the 1966 election campaiqn - emphasising 
the increasing militancy in tactics and the risinq expectations of many 
of the participants . Chapter VII will examine how the movement reacted 
to the overwhelming election defeat it suffered and to the society' s 
hostility which was expressed in countless forms . It is at this point 
that the movement bifurcates into two distinct factions. 
The final chapter will dr aw out and bring toqether the main points 
that h ave been made, and , at the very end, suggest an endemic problem
that every peace movement must resolve in order to maintain its 
philosophical integrity and perhaps its structural unity. 
(v) 
A persistent problem that has dogqed this study from the beqinning 
is how to determine what persons and groups should actually be included 
in the movement. The difficulty stems from the fact that the appeal of 
peace is almost universal, not delimited to a clearly defined segment 
of the community. Almost everyone says he is fo:tt peace. Defining the 
Australian movement's constituency is further canplicated by the loose 
nature of its structure. For instance, official rules are not prescribed 
as a basis for belonging; membership is not restricted to a particular 
class of p ersons; nor is it possible, in all cases, to determine the 
supporters from membership lists, since most of the groups do not offer 
formal membership, and - even if they did - the basis of a group's
support cannot be reduced to the names in an office filing cabinet.
The constituency problem contains two parts: Who are the individuals 
that belonq? And what orqanisations should be included in the movement? 
With regard to the first question, it has been decided that an individual 
belongs to the movement if he participates reqularly in the activities 
of one or more of the peace groups. While such a definition constitutes 
a form of question beqqing - since participation is left undefined - the 
words 'participates' and 'reqularly' are meant to imply a positive 
commitment and sense of identification with the organisation. Thus more 
is required from an individual than the mere signing of a protest 
petition or the attendinq of a meeting. 
Despite the imprecision of such a definition it at least provides 
guidelines that conform to the way the peace groups themselves as sess 
(Vi) 
their aupporters. The more difficult question - leading on fran the 
firat - i• to detexmine which of the organisations cane within the ambit 
of the peace movement. The problan has been resolved here on the basis 
of four criteria, some of which a group must satisfy to a significant 
d99ree. The first two criteria pertain to what a group specifies as its 
objectives and the type of solutions it proposes, while the third and 
fourth pertain to outside evaluations made about the group. 
The first criterion involves the checking of an organisation' s 
stated objectives. If resolution of international conflict by peaceful 
means appears high among its list of priorities, then the group 
qualifies, providing it is not rejected by any of the subsequent 
criteria. The Wanen' s International League for Peace (WILPF) is an 
example of an organisation that clearly meets this criterion. It asserts 
that it• principal objective is to bring "together women of different 
political and philosophical tendencies • • •  to study, make known and help 
abolish the political, social, econaaic and psychological causes of war, 
2and to work for a constructive peace". While this statanent has been 
taken fraa the official aims of the international body, the Australian 
Federal Secretary of WILPF explains the objectives of the local body in 
a similar vein: "°'1r policy has always been to seek an end to all wars 
through neqotiation and mediation and, because we believe that war is 
outmoded by more humane and intelligent methods of ending disputes, we 
2 .  International Congress of WILPF, Aims� &inciples and Po1:loies,
1965. 
(v11) 
urge our countries and their government& to implement these methods and
3 to eliminate those conditions which create wars." Another quite
different type of organisation (different in the sense of its composition 
and activities), the ANZ Conqress in Melbourne, also qualifies under the
first criterion since its basic tenets placed a hiqh priority upon the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes. Stated its charter: 
" • • • the objective of all nations should be total disarmament • • •  tha first
steps towards this should be taken at once • • •  we urge the inmediata 
banning of nuclear tests • • • •  we deplore any breach of international peace, 
and affirm that there are no differences between peoples which cannot be 
4settled by neqotiation." 
WILPF and the ANZ Congress are or have been organisations with
general peace objectives. If an organisation's objectives were more 
limited or it was formed on an ad 'hoo basis to contest a specific issue, 
a second criterion has been applied. Does the orqanisation's primary 
objective centre on a fundamental aspsot of war and peace, and does the 
organisation in question reveal a pacific bias in its approach to the 
problem? For example, the Save Our Sons group (SOS) was formally only
concerned with a single issue, "oppos [ in9 ] conscription of youth into
the armed services to serve in overseas wars", and its objections were 
5 based "either on humanitarian, religious or pacifist grounds". In other 
3. Lorraine Moseley, Australian Federal Secretary of WILPF, quoted in
ThB AustJtaZ.i.an, 14 October, 1966.
4. ANZ Congress, DBO'/,am.tion of Hope, November 1959. See Appendix A.
5 .  StatlllflBnt of Aitne of SOS, N.s.w.' "· 1965.
(vJ.i1) 
words , the opposition to the single issue of conscription for overseas 
duty was based on a pacific philosophy and not on some grounds like 
ztaison d'etat or improvement of the economy. Neither did SOS propose 
that the strains it perceived in the society should be resolved by such 
policies as building up the nation ' s armaments or 'negotiating from 
strength'. Amnesty International is an example of a more permanent group 
dealing with a limited aspect of war and peace from a pacific bias. If 
either of these groups also qualifies under the third and fourth criteria , 
they are considered to come within the scope of the study . 
The third criterion asks the question as to whether the organisation 
leans towards the politic• of left win9 dissent on issues of international 
affairs . Unlike the peace politics prevalent in some other countries, in 
Australia "peace as a concept • • •  is something reserved for 'conchies', for 
6 parsons, for 'commies'", i . e . , the idealistic left. It is an 
abstraction traditionally shunned by the right wing and establishment 
oriented groups when formulating their foreign policy objectives. Thus 
no right wing group is seen as qualifying for membership in the peace 
movement. As an example, the League of Nations Union (the League), which 
operated in Australia between the two World Wars, was considered to be a 
part of the peace movement, because it tended to adopt so-called 
6 . Dennis Altman, 'Australia and V.1etnam: Some Preliminary 
Speaula�ons', 1.'he Austztali.an QuazttBZ'ty, Vol. 42, No . 2, June 
1970, p .  63 . 
(1%) 
7 
progrusive-leftist, peace diasenting policies, whereas its successor, 
the United Nations Association of Australia (UNAA), controlled by 
moderate conservative and even DLP personnel, has seldom (if ever) 
8 
att•pted to undercut eatablisbnent aims and principlea. All of the 
7. Althouqh the League proclaimed aim• and principles to which the
Australian Government was already vSJ'ba'tty camitted and 
attracted citizens of high status, its policies and actions 
were progresaive in terms of the nation's thinking as a whole 
and the actions of the Government. 
The League initially anphasiaed the issue of disaxmament, playing 
an instrumental rSle in stiaulating Auatralian interest in the 
1932 International Declaration on World Disarmament. However, 
during the middle thirties it shifted its ground to advocate 
atronq use of collective security, includinq military force 
when necesaary, as a means of arresting the growing' number of 
outbreaks of aqqression. In the deqree and type of force that 
it was condoning it came closer to the international policy of 
the soviet tJnion than it did to that of the Australian 
Government. Indeed, in 1936 at Brussels, the Leaque and the 
camauniats joined forces in a world-wide movement called the
International Peace campaign (IPC). Although a number of
absolute paaif iat• in Australia withdrew their support from the
new movaDent, because of ita advocacy of the use of military 
force throuqh international collective security, the IPC was 
still considered a part of the peace movement by a larqe majority 
of the other peace groups. 
Another case where the League fostered a more 'advanced' line than 
the prnailinq national mood can be seen by the protests it 
organised ag'ainst the excesses of the 'hate campaiqn' being 
conducted in the press and on the radio against the Japanese in 
1941. The League was also active in holding national conferencu 
during the war years - which were aimed at preparing the nation 
for a radically different world after World War II. 
Thus by adoptinq policies that ran the gamut frcm disarmament to 
support for the Atlantic Olarter that •phasised Australia's 
abliqationa, the League was never labelled - even by the most 
radical of dissenters - as a tool for the implanentation of 
eatablial'aent policies. 
B. Cf. the following raaark by George Cook, an official of the UNAAa
"Th• attitude of UNAA • • •  is that • • •  as far as disarmament i• concerned, 
UN documents show that the consistent use of the veto by Russia on 
u.s. proposals over the past ten years is the reason why more 
progreaa has not been made towards this goal." (Obssz.rJae, Sydney, 
6 February, 1960 , p. 39 . )  
(%) 
organisations previously mentioned - WILPF , ANZ Congress, SOS , and 
Amnesty International - have opposed important establishment policies 
from a position left of centre. These qroups also meet the condition set 
down in the final, closely allied criterion. 
This fourth and final criterion concerns the attitude that the 
orqanisations have to one another. Is a particular organisation 
generally recognised by the other peace qroups as a part of the movement? 
Or ,  obversely, does the particular qroup want·to be identified with th.e 
peace movement? The Quaker Peace Committee, while in typical Quaker 
fashion not attacking or condemning the UNAA, does not regard it as a 
9 part of the peace movement. Yet many non-pacifist groups are accepted 
by the Quakers and other pacifists. The pacifists are inclined to reqard 
as their colleagues (and vice vsrsa) the supporters of such organisations 
as SOS , the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament 
(AICD), the Youth Cmnpaiqn Aqainat Conscription (YCAC), the Vietnam 
Action Committee (VAC) , eto. - thouqh none of these groups advocated 
pacifism (instead, falling into a cateqory called pacificism. to be 
discussed in the first chapter). 
Again , returning to the example of the old League of Nations Union, 
it is interesting to compare WILPF ' s reaction to that body with its 
attitude to the UNA.A. While it diaaqreed with some of the League's 
policies , it was still willing to become an affiliate of that body. Yet 
9. Mrs . Jean Richards, Convenor, Australian Friends Peace Committee,
in interview with writer, 20 January , 1966.
(x1.) 
it has never aouqht to form an association with the current UNAA. 
lO 
Similarly, the UNAA is not interested in joining the peace movement, 
whereas the old League c learly was . 
In conclusion, an organiaation will pass under the review of this 
study, if it or one of its sub-groups manifests to a significant degree 
some of the characteristics specified in the above criteria. There are 
a few groups or committees, however, that do meet the condition• of the
criteria, yet have been excluded because they were too small, inactive, 
or ephemeral to warrant serious attention . Also excluded, on the basi• 
of definition, though they may be mentioned in terms of their 
relationship to the peace movement, are those organisations with broader 
or different objectives that ally themselves from time to time with the 
peace organisations or that delve independently into activities 
paralleling the endeavours of the peace movement - e.g., the ALP, the
CPA , the Fabian Society, the Lambrakis Youth League, the Australian 
Council of Churches, the Humanist Society, et at.. 
The main organisations that formed the movement durinq the years 
of this study have been listed in Appendix B. 
10. Cf. the response of the UNAA to one of the peace movanent's major
projectes "Money" , maintained apokesman George Cook, "spent on
sending delegates to ANZ [ the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress ]
would have been better spent on UNAA's International World
Refugee Year Appeal." (Cook, op.cit. )
CHAPTER I 
PEACE MOVEMENT CONCEPTS AND TERM I NOLOGY 
This chapter explains same of the basi c terms and concepts contained 
in the main body of the text as well as in some of the scholarly 
literature on peace movements qua social movements.
Peace 
In its most literal sense the term 'peace movanent' is a misnomer. 
Most of the groups and individuals within the movement do not subscribe 
to strictly pacifist principles, nor in some cases do they even assume 
peaceable attitudes. For axaaple, sane of the supporters have openly 
expressed hopes of a National Liberation Front victory in Vietnam and 
have openly applauded its victories which cane from force of arms. 
Similarly, voices have been raised within the movement advocating the 
overthrow, by military means, of the snith Govermnent in Rhodesia. And 
in one small but influential quarter of the movEment the world ' s chief 
exponent of querrilla warfare, the late Che Guevara, has been practically 
lionised as patron saint , and an orqanisation was even formed to raise 
military aid for the NLP .  
Ye t all the above persons, according to comnon usage, generically 
belong to the peace movement (thouqh the super militants are certainly 
pressing the movemen t's outer limits). More precisely , these people 
constitute the supporters of a disaentinq movement prof easing a strong 
pacific doctrine. In common, they display a propensity for thinking 
1. 
2. 
that man fundamentally desires and is able to create a peaceful, co­
operative world community, and that it is a highly worthwhile endeavour 
to work towards the achievement of this qoal. Although in the immediate 
•ituation they are inclined to set a low valuation on the use of force
in international affairs, and conversely to place a high valuation on 
the reasonableness of men to reach accommodation tbrouqh negotiations, 
they are capable of qualifying this attitude - depending on the 
individual and the occasion - by stipulating that certain structural and 
valuative changes muat precede such a possibility. With the exception 
of the absolute pacifist, every peace dissenter, if provoked, has a 
threshold of violence, despite his initial pacific outlook. In terms 
of the types of dissenters to be discussed shortly (class, intellectual, 
youth, humanitarian, and religious), the threshold of counter violence 
tends to be lowest with the youth and class dissenters and highest with 
the humanitarian and religious dissenters. 
During the first seven years of the past decade all categories of 
peace dissenters invariably stood united in their call for neqotiations, 
disarmament, qreater influence for the United Nations, cultural and 
scientific exchanges, nuclear free zones, and increased economic aid to 
underdeveloped nations without benefits accruing to the donor nations. 
Moreover, with only a few exceptions they endorsed the principle of 
national self-determination, the dismantlinq of all overseas military 
3. 
bases , and a non-alignment policy for Australia conjoined with an active 
A l non-military role for her in South-east Asia.
Movement 
The term 'movement' is used to encompass all groups and individuals 
2 
engaqed in collective behaviour in the name of a generalised belief . 
In the case of the peace movement that generalised belief constitutes a 
direct challenge to the established Australian and Western 'free world' 
foreign policy , because it seeks a revision based upon the principle of 
little or no use or threat of force in the conduct of international 
affairs. An element of potential challenge is contained in all 
collective behaviour , for it only arises in situations of perceived 
dislocation, which may lead to the disruption of the usual , routinised 
norms of behaviour, causing the development of new norms and new 
3 values. When collective behaviour is "functioning as an organised mass 
l. As a supporter of the peace movement approaches the centres of
political power , he is inclined to qualify or refine sane of the
qaneral policies . Thus the prominent peace activist , Dr. J . F .
Cairns, MHR ,  despite his sometimes bitter denunciation of
American foreiqn policy, still lodges his criticisms from within
the American-Australian alliance . (See J. F .  cairns, Eoonomios
and Fozteign Potioy, Victorian Fabian Society Pamphlet No. 12 ,
Melbourne , 1966.) That Dr .  Cairns can be considered as belonging
to the Australian peace movement is confirmed by his lonq record
of association with peace qroups (he was a charter member of the
Australian Peace Council) , as well as his own statement: "I do
consider myself a part of the peace movement • • •• " (Letter to
author , 14 January, 1966.)
2 .  See Neil J .  Smelser, 1!hsoey of Cotteotive Bs1uzv1,oiat, Routledge ai
lCeqan Paul , London , 1962, pp. 8 & 382; pp. 79ff. for meaning of
'collective behaviour' and 'qeneraliaed belief ' .  
J. see Ralph H. Turner & Lewis M. Killian (eds.) , Cotleotive Behavi.oUzt, 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J . , 1957, pp. 3-11. 
4. 
effort directed toward a change of established folkways or 
4 
institutione" , then a mov•ent ia born. Thia movement uwally involves
large numbers. Its generaliaed belief need not require a qualitative 
break in the continuity of the society' s  developaent , that is be 
revolutionary. Still , much of the tension• , both within and outside a
mov•ent , tends to centre on the probl• as to whether a movement' a
vmeralieed belief baa revolutionary implications. To sua up s a
mov•ent is usually characteri8ed by large numbers or the masses1 it 
entails oqani•ad collective behaviour involving •the less etable, less
5 predictable , l••• formal aapecta of qroup 1J1e"1 and it receive•
direction fran a generalised belief, perhaps never explicitly formulated . 
While movanent politics tend to manifest a syndrome of many common
modes of behaviour , the following constitute sane of the more salient 
characteristics. The adherents , in their pronouncements and activities ,
are inclined to replace the canpraniaes and machinations of ' realpolitik'
with a faithfulness t.o principle .  Lonq term considerations prevail over 
short term. •pediencies . The societal strains posited by the qeneralised
belief are articul ated with a sense of catastrophic urgency demandinC) 
inaediate solution. Nevertheless ,  far more emphasis is characteristically 
placed upon the danqer of the exiatinq situation than on studying how to 
resolve the probl• or on how to reach a utopian goal. It ia as if the
4. Theodore Abel , Jlhy Hit'Unt Came Into POlJHl'l', Prentice-Hall , N . Y . ,
1938, p .  348.
s. Martin Oppenheimer, Urban Gus?tl'itla, Penguin , Harmondsworth ,
Bngland , 1970, P• 17.
5 .  
mean• will appear not because saneone envisaqea them o r  deduces them on 
the basis of abstract principle1 but because they are necessary. At the 
ri9ht moment the supporters will know and decide what to do. 
Pinally, irrespective of whether a mov•ent's objectives are of a 
revitaliatic or innov'ative nature , a mov•ent is uaually considered to 
pursue one of two courses of action. It is either revolutionary or 
reformist. However, in moat Englillh speaking countriea there is a 
tradition which the author sees as incorporatin9 both of these types -
via. , the mildly tolerated dissentinq movement. It is fran the pre­
analytical aaBU1Dption of a diasentinq movement that this study of the 
Australian movement has been conducted. 
Dissent 
A.J.P. Taylor defines the dissenter aa saneone who does more than 
merely diaaqree with Establishment policies. In the context of the 
Church of England he sees the dissenter as the type who advocates that 
biahopa should not exist, whereas the confozainq manber would never qo 
beyond the point of mild disagreement with the bishop•. 
"And so", explains Taylor , "it has been with foreign policy in this 
country (Great Britain) - and also in the United Statesa dissent is a 
quality peculiar t.o Enqliah speaking peoples. A man can disagree with a 
particular line of British foreiqn policy, while still acceptinq it s 
6 .  
general asaumptions. The Dissenter repudiates its aims, its methods, 
6 
its principles." 
In other words, the dissenter is opposed to every aspect of the 
foreign policy, save one - via. , the right of the Government to actually 
make foreign policy, though he may challenge the leqitimacy of a 
particular group to dominate the Foreign Office. Similarly, from within
the Church of England, he may call for the overthrow of the bishops, but 
he does not reject the Church's fundamental thaoloqical beliefs, as he 
has interpreted them. In this respect he is closer to beinq a reformist 
(albeit an extreme one) than a revolutionist, yet in the sense that he 
is not averse to changing the power structure he is actinq in a 
revolutionary manner. The interesting point ia that the society or 
institution, for the moat part, tolerates the dissenter, may even boast
about his presence, and does not reqard him as a threat to its fabric of 
social order and the natural evolution of its norms, as long as he does 
not seek to forcibly impose his views. 
Taylor proceeds to describe some of the characteristics of the 
dissenter : " • • •  he claims to know better and to promote hiqher causes; 
he asserts a superiority, moral or intellectual. Sometimes the 
Dissenters have accused the Foreign secretary and his ad visers of 
ignorance, sometimes of corruption - usually class-selfishness rather 
than personal diahoneaty. The Dissenters have differed widely in their 
6. A.J.P. Taylor, 'l'he '1'1.'ouble Makers, Hamish Hamilton, London, 
1957, P• 13. 
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practical conclusions. They have advocated everythinq from complete 
non-intervention to universal interference . But they have all been 
7 contenptuous of those in authority. " The point to underscore about the 
dissenter ia his sense of morality and the necessity to act forthriqhtly 
in accordance with his convictions (of. reliqioua sectarian) .  Since he 
tends to experience reality throuqh the internal impulse of conscience , 
he takes his standpoint as a self-determininq human protaqonist rather 
than as a recipient of an impinging environment . He speaks the lanquaqe 
of personal effort, responsibility and commitment. 
While dissenters tend to display the syndrome of above 
characteristics, not all dissenters, naturally enouqh , gravitate towards 
the peace qroups. 
8 Sane appear in the opposite camp - in qroups like 
the Defend Australia COmmittee whose members John Playford has referred 
9 to as "Australia's own latter day Anabaptists". Or they may appear in 
7. Ibid. Cf. the remark of J. F. cairns 1 "I don' t believe the
Government ia for peace at all. Like all Tories, fundamentally,
they meet serious challenges by force." (Letter to author,
14 January , 1966.)
8. For an excellent composite account of the peace movement's
opponents on the riqht, see R.W. Connell & Florence Gould,
Potltics of tM E:tzt61fle Rtght, 'ilaztztingah 1 966, Sydney University
Press, Sydney, 1967, Chap. 4 passim. Also helpful are: K.D.
Gott, Voloes of Bats, Melbourne, 19651 The Butl•tin, 15 October,
19661 I. Leibler, 'Austral.ta ' s Rad1.cal Right ' , Quadl'ant, March­
April 1966; and J. D. Playford, 'The RacU.cal Right and the
Rhodesia Lobbg', OutZook, Auqust 1966.
9 .  J.D. Playford , 'The Defenders ' ,  Disssnt, No. 18, Sprinq 1966.
Unlike Playford, Connell and Gould do not consider DAC "an
expression of the extreme Riqht movement" (op. oit. , p .  47),
thouqh thia, of course, does not exclude the Committee as a
dis•an1:inq body.
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the right-wing migrant aocietiea, 10 the Auetralian branch of the 
ll 
Christian Anti-commWlism Crusade (CACC) , or Eric Butler ' s League of 
12 Rights. Other dissenters, with right-wing or left-w ing proclivitiea, 
lO. These include such qroups as The croatian Liberation Movement, the
Croatian National council, Lithuanian Infoz:mation Alliance, and the 
Anti-Bolshevic Bloc: of Nations. The migrant organisations have been 
highly vocal opponents of the peace movement, countering th e  "peace 
propaganda" with proj ects like Captive Nations Week. 
ll. Although CACC in Australia does not operate on the grand scale of 
the parent body in the United States, its fundamentalist, anti­
conmunist ideoloqy canes frcm the leader of the U.S. organisation, 
Dr. Fred Schwarz, who was born, reared and educated in Australia.
For a sociological analysis of the kinda of people that participate 
in the Crusade, see .Raymond E. WOlfinger et a'L. , 'America.'s Radical 
R.tght: PolJ. t1as and Ideology' , D. E. Apter (Bd. ) , Ideo Zogy and
Disoontsnt, Free Press, Glencoe, N.Y., 1964, pp. 262-288. Probably 
the most detailed descriptive account of Dr. Schwarz and the 
Crusade (though largely outdated by now) can be found in the Anti­
Defamation Leaque's publication called Faots, November-December 
1962. The CACC has been written about in almost every American 
national magazine, and books on the radical right usually devote 
at least a chapter to its activities. 
l2. For accoWlts of Mr. Butler's activities, see Nation, 26 September,
1959; Obs"weze, l October, 1960 and 26 November, 19601 TM Bu'tl"tin , 
7 October, 1961, 16 June, 1962 and 15 October, 1966; Gott, op.oit.1 
and Connell & Gould, op.oit. Butler was once a leading Douqlas
Creditor. Today, he and the League of Rights are probably
Auatralia's most outstanding champion& of anti-semitiam and racism 
(excluding the Australian Nazi Party). Their views are expressed 
editorially through the NtlllJ f'im•B and at one time also appeared in 
the now defunct AustJtatian and Intsmational NtlllJB ReviefJJ. This 
latter journal was distributed fran the public newstanda. While it 
adopted an extremely anti-communist stance, it never want to the
extremes of some of the u.s. rightist organisations, and accuaed 
the Federal Government of being headed by camnunists and pro­
camnunists who were operating a conspiracy against the nation and
ita people. It did , however, pranulqate an extreme racist posture -
particularly in its support of South African 'Apartheid' • And its 
moat praninent editorial writer, Sir Raphael Cilento, once stated 
that Australia is in greater danger from " foreign germs from 
Indoneaia than fran foreign arms". It• racism went in tandem with 
an extreme form of anti-semitism. Ths But'Letin (15 October, 1966) 
reported that Dr. Frank Knopfelmacher was considered a "good anti­
communist until it discovered that he was a Jew • • •  " . The AINR's 
attack on Dr. ICnopfelmacher prcmpted severe criticism from another 
anti-camunist journal, Mr .  B.A. Santamaria's Nswa WeskZy. 
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may be uninterested in the issues of world peace and foreiqn policy, and
concentrate their energies upon the problems of education, fluoridation, 
equal opportunity for Aboriqinal.tl, free speech, eta. However , the type 
of dissenter examined in this dissertation is the one who ia concerned 
with the prohl•s of international relations and who analyses than and 
acta upon than in terms of either a doctrine of pacifism or pacific!•.
Pacifism and Pac1f1c1sm
The distinction between these two terms is explored, in part, by 
13 David Martin in a recently published work on pacifi•. The pacif iat 
believes that war (not necessarily physical force) under all 
circumstances is wronq and will admit of no exceptions, whereas the 
pacif iciat i• one who qualif ie• hi• oppo•ition to war and under certain
conditions will take up u:ms. In fact, when he finally doea capitulate 
and 90 to war, the pacifici•t is apt to be quite zealous, elevatinCJ the
war above the level of common mival and into a crusade for the
apiritual salvation of mankind. Thus he readily responds to such 
rallyin9 cries as •aaJting the world safe for democracy", "the war to end 
all wars•, and "preserving the four freedoms". However, before he has
camnitted himself to war ,  the pacificist manifests a strong inclination 
and moral superiority for the ways of co-operation and peace rather than
conflict and violence, but his morality tends t.o be utilitarian in 
outlook. He values peace largely because it is an instrument of human 
lJ. David A. Martin, "Paoifiana An Bistol'ica.t and Sooio1,ogioa1, Study ,
Routledge & Kegan Paul , London, 1965, pp. 201-207. 
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survival. Consequently, it is conaiatent for him to apply one set of 
standards to the relations between the West and the Soviet Union, and 
another to questions of "colonial wars of liberation". When an 
ambivalence arises, forcing him to decide between the morality of his 
pacific doctrine or the pragmatism of survival, he usually resolves the 
dilemma by appealing to a higher morality. 
On the other hand, to the pacifist, peace is a moral good p•z- se, 
an imperative, not to be transgressed under any circumstances. He has 
no 'favourite' or 'just' wars, and he draws an absolute line against the 
use of physical force in the conducting of state affairs. Some 
pacifists even extend this proposition further. They subscribe to the 
belief that not only should formal warfare be renounced but all forms of 
violence rejected. They might be described as absolute pacifists. 
Categories of Dissenters 
The two doctrines of pacif i• and pacif icism are practised by all 
types of dissenters - that is by class dissenters, intellectual 
dissenters, youth dissenters, humanitarian dissenters and religious 
dissenters. Nevertheless, the pacifist is more apt to be found among 
the religious dissenters than in any of the other categories, while most 
of the class dissenters will be pacificiata. This dissenter typoloqy, 
though, is not meant to delineate different doctrinal approaches to 
peace politics, as much as it is to indicate the various sociological 
grouping• within the peace movement and how a change in these groupings 
affects the attitudes of the movement as a whole. Thus a movement 
11. 
dominated by youth can be expected to be predisposed to the more volatile 
foxma of protest activity, one weighted heavily with class dissenters 
will no doubt stress the econaaic aspects of war and the society ' s  power
structure , and etrateqiaally seek the involvement of the workers , the
trade uniona and possibly the ALP ;  one containing a large number of
reli9ioua diaaenters presumably will be concerned with the moral 
implications of war , as well as the broader que•tion of the role of the 
church in modern society, one caaposed largely of humanitarians will 
probably be projecting a middle class image that emphasises morality and 
perceive• social stratification in terms of a " consensus model• rather 
14 than a " conflict model" 1  and if the movement is dauinated by 
intellectuals presumably it will be anxious to research the issues , 
uplift the quality of debate , and perhaps develop cultural activities
around the movement . Therefore , what type or types of dissenters provide 
the movement with its impetus affects the broad pattern of its 
collective behaviour . The categories of supporters are not intended to
be mutually exclusive; indeed , many of the peace participants will fall 
into two or more groupings ,  it is even possible that a few may be 
classified into all five cateqories .  
l4 . See Ralf Dahrendorf I et.ass and Class Conftiot in Induatztiat
Sooisty , Routledge & Kagan Paul , London , 1959 . The models 
constitute two different ways in which people perceive the 
•truature of their society . In the case of the class-conflict
model a sharp dichotany is seen as existing between those who 
exercise power and those who are subjected to it . Little
opportunity exists for moving from one group to the other . The 
consensus-status model , on the other hand , envisages gradations 
of power in the social structure and an opportunity for the 
men\bers of the society to move up and down the hierarchy on the
basis of their skill , fortune and energy . 
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The class dissenter generally refers to the Marxist idealogue 
and/or the trade unioniat who perceives the i ssues of war and peace in 
terms of irreconcilable and enduring class conflict . The source of 
conflict - which in its extreme form may lead to war - lies in a class 
diohotaay where one class attempts to exploit the other . A corollary of 
this class dualiam is the sauetimee fierce competition that occurs 
amongst the oppre ssors for the right to do the exploiting . The only way , 
therefore, to abolish war ultimately is to remove the inherent class 
antagonisms which derive fran the wijust distribution of power and
resources that are as sociated with the pre sent econanic. and social 
system . 
With such a class-conflict analysis of society , the class dissenter ,
then , does not ex.,ect to alter the basic foreign policy of the 
' oppressive state ' through peace movement pi:oteat - at least not 
directly . He voices a peace protest , because he envisages the peace
movement as an instrument for exposing the malversations of the 
' oppressors ' and raiaing the class consciousness of the workers ,  thus 
increasing the potential for industrial militancy , the vital step 
towards victory in the class atruggle and the abolition of war . 
The class dissenter , in many cases , is also an intellectual 
diasenter . An intellectual stratum ' s  involvement appears to be e ssential 
to the success of a mass movement .  As Parkin indicates :  " Intellectuals 
are needed to foxmulate policie s and programme s  and to create
inapirational symbols and appeals . Without an intellectual elite to 
13 . 
offer leadership and a coherent aet of qoals , popular demands or general 
discontents are rarely able to translate themselves into effective 
l5 political mov•ents on a mass scale . " still , needing the intellectual 
does not ensure that he will be accepted into the movement , particularly 
in a leadership role . Yet it is more likely that he will be accepted 
into a movement such as the peace movanent which bas a eat of demands 
aimed at benefiting the whole of society rather than just a particular 
section , because it ia exactly this kind of altruistically oriented 
movement that ia usually open to universal participation and requires the 
inapirational articulation of its ideas . 
Obversely , the intellectual presumably is attracted to a dissenting 
mov•ent because it provides him with a forum for expreseing his critical 
views of the status quo. Why , though , the intellectual should be 
oriented , in the first place , towards diesent , especially left-wing 
dissent , is an unresolved question that has preoccupied a good many 
l6 social theorists . Perhaps he is more sensitive and cognitive of the 
society ' s  ills , but at the same time one would expect him to be more 
appreciative of the various nuances involved which would have an 
• immobilising effect ' • Parkin notes that in Britain the majority of
intellectuals are not dissenters - an observation that would appear to 
l 5 .  Frank Parkin , Middle C"La.ss Radioa1,ism , Melbourne University Press , 
Melbourne , 1968 , p .  93 . 
l6 . For example , Roberto Michela , Karl Mannheim, William Kornhauser ,
C .  wright Mills , Eric Hoffer , Edward Shils ,  Frank Knopfelmacher 
(a very mixed collection) .
be equally valid for Australia . Among the minority that becane 
14 . 
aueceptible to radical politics and mass movements , he finds that most of 
them can be classified as " socially unattached intellectuals" . By this 
texm he i• referring to "thoae who are not employed in cultural and 
educational institutions ,  but whose general econcmic position tends to 
be sanewhat marginal and precarious • • •  freelance journalists , writers , 
artiats , dramatists and others who are expected to sell their cultural 
products or services under market conditions , and who are expoaed to the
frequent inccapatibility between the aesthetic considerations of the 
seller and the commercial considerations of the buyer11 • 1 7 In the l930 ' s
the intellectual dissenters tended to be the poets and writers whose
creative efforts were unrecognised . "However" ,  notes Parkin , "when CND 
appeared on the scene some twenty-five years later , this earlier 
generation of dissenting intellectuals had themselves been integrated 
into cultural and other institutions , and consequently took no part in
lB this new wave of radical protest. "  The intellectuals recruited into 
CND were like their counterparts of the thirties drawn mainly from the 
stratum of the "socially unattached intelligentaia" .
19 
While no survey 
(that the writer ia aware of) has been conducted in Australia that would 
confixm these finding& with regard to the Australian peace movement ,  the 
writer ' •  own close obaervationa would lead to the hypothesis that 
l 7 . Parkin , op. oit. , pp . 97-98 .
1 8 .  Ibid. , P •  98 .
19 . Ibid. , PP• 99ff.
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&uetralia ' a intellectual peace diaaentera very definitely fell into the
ClOMly linked with 1:.U8 rol• of the iDtellec:tual diaeenter i• that
of tbe yCM&tA cU.uentu . The period of thia •tudy has witnessed - as
�ediateci by c .  w.right Kill.8 .t.n 1960 - the emergence of "new
generat.iona of int:ellecwala uound the world as real live agencies of 
20 hiator:ic oh&D9•· · The pheDcaenon of the ' yoath revolt ' affected
9ovumaeDt.a throuwnout tb.e WO&'l4 a in affluent. Western 90Cietiee , in 
Cclauniat. at.a-tea , and in the Wlds4evelo.t;4d nat.iona of � ' Third World ' .
While '1JY 1ntexA&tional eta.nclaxus AWltralian �io� �'1 were (a.nd •till are)
comparatively inactive in polltioa , tbair 1<>litical radicalia , 
especially in the wiiversiti .. , g1'ew to tl4e extent that they frequently 
captured headline• in the media , .became the aubj ect of many journal 
articlff and 'l'V c::onaw1tariea ,  anci p1:0Yoked the wrath of politiciana . 
Aftu the pJ:ec1pit&ting factor• of Vietnam and conscription , youth
diaaentu• flocked into the j,leace aaovement , and ,  u will be shown in 
the la� t section of tnis diaaertatio11, ,PZ'ofoWldly affected. the nature 
of it• develo...-ent .  unfortunately , iUUal inquiries into the souroea 
21 of the upsurge in youth involvement , as well as a detailed
ao . c .  w.r:ight Mills , ' rhe Nett Lezt ' , in Pawn� Po "Li:tica and hop ta ,
Oltfard university Press , N . Y . , 1963 , p. 259 .  
aJ. . For some of the theori•• offered to account for the fluctuationa 
in the political activity of youth , �e '-- : Idchei.rd Centers , rNI 
PllM01W'°'JJ1 of SooiaZ. Cl4a••• , Princ:•ton University Preaa , H . J . ,
l94i ; Rudolph Heberle , Sooia'L iio11"11ltmts , Appleton Century-croft• ,
N . Y . , 1951 1 a .  Berelaon et ai. , Voting , University of Chicavo Preas ,
[l'ootnote 2l continued Oil neJrt page] 
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22 exudnation of their qrievances and demands , must be anitted for 
reasons of space . 
The humanitarian dissenter denotes that type of individual whose 
opposition to governmental policy ia based upon a highly integrated set 
of secular moral values . Although these values may not contravene the 
values of the society , they are interpreted in such a way as to promote 
policies that deviate sharply fran establishment practices . The 
humanitarian dissenter usually presents himself as a reformer . He argues 
that the basic tenets of the society (particularly the democratic and 
humanistic ethos ) are not being fulfilled . He calls for normative 
changes that will pre serve or regain the threatened or lost values . Since 
a "diale.ctic of disorder"
23 
is arising fran a widening of the gap ( in  his 
[Footnote 2l cont.tnued from previous page] 
Ill . , 1954 ;  H . H .  Hyman , PoZiticaZ S��iaZiaation , Free Press of 
Glencoe , N . Y. , 1�59 ; s . M .  Lipset , ' Student O�posi t1on 1n the UnJ. ted 
States ' , Government and Opposition , Vol . I, No . 3 ,  April 1966 ;
s .  Putney & R .  Middleton , ' Some Factors Associa ted with Student 
Acceptance or Rejection o;f War ' , Ameztican Socio Zogioa.7, RsvisuJ , 
Vol . 27 , No . S ,  1962 ; Lewis s. Feuer , Th.e Conflict of Geneztations ,
Basic Books , N . Y. , 196 9 ;  ' Bringing Up Baby ' ,  NewBUJeek , 23 September , 
1966 ; Kenneth Keniston , Young Radica'Le : Notes on Committed :Youth , 
Harcourt , Brace & World ,  N . Y. ,  1968 ; and Raymond Aron , The Etuaive 
RevoZution : An Anatomy of Stud.ent Revo"Lt , Pall Mall , London , 1969. 
22 . Perhaps the best of many treatises here are Raymond Williams (ed . ) , 
May Day Nanifssto 1968 , Penguin , Harmondsworth , 1968 ; and Perry
Anderson 5 Robin Blackburn (eds . ) , TOliJal'ds Socia.Zism , Fontana , 
London , 1965 . This writer has canpiled a synthesis of ' New Left ' 
ideas in ' The New Left : Old Wine 1nto New Bottles Cont:roversg ' ,  
World RevietJ , Vol . 9 ,  No . 2 ,  Univer sity of Queensland Press , 
July 197 0 .  
23 . A term used by Arnold Kaufman in ' Where Shall Liberals Go? ' , 
Dissent , N . Y. , Vol .  XIII, No . 5 ,  September-OCtober 1966, 
pp . 553-624 1 and in The Rad:ioa.1, Liberat: New Man in Amel'ioan
Potitioa , Atherton Press , N . Y . , 1968. 
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opinion) between the rhetoric of the establishment and the reality of its 
actions , he joins the peace movment and appeals to all who will listen 
for a cloaing of that gap . 
He rejects out of hand the contention of the so-called ' liberal 
realist ' that concern for morality in political j udgment and action is 
"mere moralism" . In the words of Arnold Kaufman - a pleader for the 
narrowing of the gap - this "attitude [i. e . , that moral considerations 
are irrelevant to matters of policy because they require political , not 
moral judgment] leads to an identification of national security with 
any national interest , and then to identification of national. prestige
24 with national security" . 
Thus the humanitarian dissenter shows great disdain for the
pragmatic politician who sacrifices principle for the sake of power and 
position . At the opposite end of a moralist/opportunist continuum , he , 
himself , rej ects political camprcmise even when he knows that the 
advocacy of his morality at the expense of expediency may mean that his 
principles will never be implemented . 
Nevertlleless , such a failure to canpraniae and achieve concrete 
results does not mean that he is acting irrationally and is unable to
25 "maximise his utilities" in the Downsian sense . Althouqh his rewards 
24 . ' Where Shall Liberals Go? ' ,  p .  577 (parenthesis added) .
25 . Downs ' s  economic theory of democracy stipulates that rationality in 
the political as well as the econanic sphere "ref era solely to a 
man who moves toward his goals in a way which , to the best of his
knowledge , uses the least possible input of scarce resources per 
unit of valued output" . (Anthony Downs ,  An Eoonanio Phsozey of
DtlmOOZ'<lOJI , Harper & Row ,  N .  Y . , 1957 , p .  s . ) 
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from political activity are not received in econcmic , material or status 
benefits , he does achieve certain p•ychological satisfactions which may 
be important to his well-being . 26 Thus his political actions may provide 
quick rewards in " establishing his self-identity and confirminq his 
notion of the sort of person he sees himself to be" . 27 Parkin , who found 
much political behaviour in his surveys of middle class CND supporters 
motivated by these kinds of considerations , has labelled such behaviour 
"expreaaive politics " in contradistinction to "instrumental politics" 
28 
where the emphasis is on achieving concrete and apecific goals . 
The humanitarian dissenter can also be characterised by his tendency 
to examine each problem separately . He does not tend to relate it to 
sane doctrinal or all-t1Dbracin9 theory other than a vague corpus of liberal
humanitarianiam . The individual iaaue ia tasted against a pattern of
secular moral valu•• · 
Clo88ly allied to thi• selective and non-doctrinal approach to 
political iaaues is the fact that the humanitarian dissenter ' s  perception 
26 . For example , note thi s description by a frequent participant at 
Melbourne ' &  peace vigil• • "Sanetimes there ia a remarkable , 
almost indescribable atmosphere , depending on one ' s  mood • • • •  The 
vigil providea an excellent opportunity for meditation , prayer , 
ref lection , creative thinking . One can becane so immersed that 
one just doe sn ' t  notice the surroundings .  One ' s  paycholoqical
JROOds vary of course . Usually , however , participation proves 
essentially refreshing . "  (Geoff Forster , TM Peacemaks:r , Vol .  29 ,
Noa . 10 & 11 , October-Novanber 1967 . )
27 . Daniel Katz , ' �he Funatiooal Ap;proach to the Study or Att1 tudes ' ,
Pub Zia Opinion Quaztuztt'j/ , SUmmer 1960 , p .  173 , quoted in Parkin , 
op.oi't. , p .  34 .
28. Ibid. , Chap . 3 pasaim.
19. 
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of society tends to conform t:o the • oonaensua-atatus model" . He finds 
no need to construct elaborate doctrine• to replace the prevailing one 
when differences can be aettled and goals achieved within the exiatinq 
framework. In hi• conception of the political syatem it is not only
possible for the capable and induatrioua individual to register his views 
but also to have them impl•ented . The political ayste for him ia one 
of diffused power in the Western democracies , and ,  through an array of
YOluntary associations that reach a political apex in the nation' •  
parliament , he is able to influence decisions . 
Since it i• very difficult , if not imposaible , to reconcile such a 
perception of the political system to a atyle of " expressive politics• ,
the upholding of principle and a refusal to compraaiae , the humanitarian 
dissenter ia inwitably left with four poaaible courses of action if he 
hope• to resolve his dil- . On the positive aide , he can alter his 
atyle to " instrumental politics" , in which case he probably leaves the 
peace movement ; or he can adopt a " conflict-class" perception of society 
and aabrace a radical doctrine . Negatively, he can decide to retreat 
frcm political activi• into cynical apathy 1 or he can simply diamiaa the 
contradiction and confine his efforts so�Zy to the achieving of 
psychological rewards. 
The religious dissenter in Australia - a nation with relatively few 
non-Chri•tian churches - is almost invariably a person opposing 
29 .  See 8MpPa , p. 11, fn. 14 .
20 . 
establishment practices on the basis of a Christian doctrine . 30 If he 
join• the peace moveent ,  his canmitment will probably be based upon one 
of two maj or doctrinal arguments : either he will be rej ecting war 
3l 
totally in the long atanding tradition of Chriatian pacifima , a 
position that derives ita arguments chiefly fraa a literal interpretation 
of the •spirit of Christ" and the church ' s  primitive history; or he will 
be resorting to the theory of the "juat war" developed by st . Thanas 
Aquinas and others .
3� 
Two of the conditions for a war to be ' just ' are 
that it must hold out a clear cha.nee of victory , and it must distinguish 
between oanbatanta and innocent non-canbatants .  Since wars conducted 
with ABC weapons and a particular war like Vietnam fail , in the minds of 
some Christians , to meet these criteria ,
33 the post World War II period 
has seen the involvement in peace politics of many Christiana other than 
the traditional pacifista . 
30 . There are sane notable exceptions . Thus the joint editors of the 
pacifist j ournal TJua Peaoemakszt , Shirley and Vivienne Abraham , are
both Jews . The fODler told the author that she based her pacifism 
on the teachings of Judaism ( Interview , 22 August , 1966) . 
Jl . For an hiatorical analysis of the pacifist wing of the church ,  see
G . F . Nuttall , ChPistian Paaifism in History , Basil Blackwell ,
Oxford , 1958 . 
32 . For a history of the evolution of the " just war" theory , see R.H.
Bainton, Ch:Piatian Atti.tudss fobJaztd Waz- and Peaos , Hodder &
Stoughton , London, 1960.
33 . For example , an active supporter of the Auatralian peace movsent, 
the Rt . Bev . J . S .  Moyes , an Anglican bishop ,  declared in a sermon 
in early 1966 that Australia was fighting an "unjust war" in 
Vietnam l>ecauae a "He would be a bold man who prophesied that the 
succes• of the u . s .  armies in Vietnam was even likely , much leas 
assured" • • •  and "we are at best playing for safety for ourselves at 
dreadful cost to a tiny nation" . (Quoted in ThB Austzaatian ,
4 April , 1966 . )  
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On the other hand , some of the peace movement ' s  most bitter 
opposition comes fran the Christian church . same of the clergy and 
laity believe that society by tolerating the peace movement is 
encouraging pro-camunist and atheistic forces bent on destroying the 
ecclesiastical church and the spirit of evangelicalism , thus ultimately 
depriving the individual of the right to worship as he sees fit . 
Most churchmen , though , would appear to be unreaponsive to the 
appeal.a for political involvement frcm either contingent - preferrinq to 
concentrate on the pietistic Christian values of "individual salvation" ,
"right relationships" , "personal responsibility" , eto. For them , 
involving Christianity in contentious politics would undermine not only 
the unity within the churches ,  but the other institutions that stabilise 
the society as well . If they helped to create social instability , they 
would be acting , in many case s ,  against non-religious interests which 
they wish to preserve and pranote . 
Sectarianism 
Amongst all types of dissentexa one is apt to find some peace 
activiats who display the characteristics of the reli9ious sectarian .
If one might use the term these persona are secular sectarians . That 
is , their reaction against the society ' s  alleged betrayal of its values 
or of Western humanitarian ideals leads them to a position of "noxmative 
purism" . They strive to close canpletely the gap that they maintain 
exists between the prof eased ideals and the perversion of the 
implementing programmes - not just to narrow the gap .  
22 . 
Sectarianism in Christianity manifests the same phenomenon . The 
sects are not re jecting the religion of the ecclesiastical church ; on 
the contrary , they are seeking to restore it to its oriqinal , puri fied 
and spiritual fo:r:m from which it has fallen through canpromise with the 
secular world. "The sect" , explains Troelts ch ,  "appeals to the • • •
performance of the moral demands , which , at bottan , are founded only upon 
34 the Law and the Example of Olrist. " In contrast, " the world with all 
ita ordinances came to be regarded as a solid and unchangeable mass of
35 
evil , a system which could only be accepted or rejected en bloc" . 
Denaminationaliam , too, constitutes a reaction against the way in which
the ecclesiastical church has adapted God ' s  absolute law to the 
relativities and necessities of worldly concerns , including the politics 
of the atate1 yet the denanination ,  a.CJ shown by Niebuhr , is a stage 
removed fran the sect,  s ince its perfactiordst demands have been 
ameliorated , and aanpromises of sorts entered into with the temporal 
world .
36 
Like their religious counterparts , the peace denaninationalists and 
the peace sectarians are reacting against the practices of pc7t1er politics 
and ztai.aon d '•tat , wishinq to recapture the ' true ' spirit of Western
man and re-establish the society ' s higher , guiding humanitarian or 
34. Emst Troeltach , '1'hs Sooiat Teaohings of the Chztistian l'hta'ohes ,
Allen & unwin ,  London , 1931 , p .  3 34 .  
35 . Ibld. , p .  101 .
36 . See H . R. Niebuhr , 'l'he Sootat SOU!'oss of Denonrinationatism , 
Henry Holt ,  N . Y . , 1929. 
Judaic-christian principles - all, of course, as they have interpreted 
them. In the case of the peace sectarians, who are rejecting in toto 
the evil of the establishment and its practices, their inability to 
23. 
compromise the loqic of their position with the social realities of power 
and conflict confor.ma in many ways to what Karl Mannheim has described as 
"utopian thinking". That is, they become "ao strongly interested in the 
destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they 
unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate 
it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diaqnosinq an exiatinq 
condition of aociety • • • •  Their thought is never a diagnosis of the 
situation, it can be used only as a direction for action". 3
7 
If such a 
description seems particularly harsh, it at least accounts for the votte-
fao• of proclaimed pacifists like Lord Bertrand Russell and John Middleton 
Murry, who traversed from a • soft line' towards Germany in 1936, to -
when the A-bomb was monopolised by the u.s. and Great Britain after the 
war - advocating that the West threaten Russia with nuclear incineration 
if abe did not agree to the international control of atomic energy, 38 to 
returning to a 'soft line' of unilateral nuclear disarmament once the 
Russians had exploded their own bomb .  
Within the Australian peace movement the peace sectarians represent 
only a minority of the total number of supporters, yet it is generally 
37
. Karl Mannheim, Idsotogy and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth & Edward 
Shils, Harcourt, Brace & Co., N.Y., 1936, p. 40. 
38. Ru•sell and Murry were strongly condemned for taking this position
by the Australian pacifist journal The Peaoemaker (January 1949) • 
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the sectarians who occupy the positions of leaderehip . The hierarchical 
structures of moat peace qroups , especially the ad 'hoo and less durable 
qroups , are mobile enough to reward effort and talent with leadership 
responsibilities 1  and it is exactly those volunteers with clarity of 
vision , not beaet with doubts - i. e. , the sectarians - who usually have 
the greatest determination and motivation . 
Peace Movement Pressure Groups 
Within the peace movement the various peace organisations , whether 
they recognise it or not , are en9aqed in pressure qroup activity . In the 
capacity of non-partisan party orqanisations they ostensibly seek to 
influence a phase of public policy , yet they are "never themselves 
39 prepared to undertake the direct government of the country" . 
On the basis of a fairly recently adopted clas sification of pressure 
40 groups into two ideal types - interest groups and attitude groups - the 
peace bodies decidedly fal l within the ambit of the attitude qroup . The 
diatinction between the two types is drawn from obj ective criteria 
pertaining to an organisation ' s  aims , characteristics and modus opezeandi 
rather than its subj ective motives , i. e. , whether it is ' self regarding ' 
or • other reqarding • 1 ' self iah • or ' altruistic ' • The interest group 
39 . s .  Finer , Anonymous Empi:rtJ , Pall Mall Press , London , 1958 , p .  2 .  
40 .  Sae Harry Eckstein , Pl'sseuzee Gl'oup PoZi.tlos , Allen & Unwin ,
London , 1960 ; Allen Potter , Ol'ganieed Gl'oups in Bl'itish Potitios , 
Faber & Faber , London , 1961 1 and Francis G .  Castles , P.resBU!'e 
GJtoupa and Potitioa'L CUl:tul's , Routledge & Kagan Paul , London ,
1967 . 
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contrasts with the attitude group in that it is designed to protect and 
advance the shared interests of a clearly defined section of the camnunity 
- an occupational , econanic , racial , ethnic , eto. section . Its potential 
membership is delimited by the number of people actually belonginq to the 
section . Acting in the capacity of the section ' s  representative , it will 
continue in this r8le theoretically no matter what the outcane of a single 
issue . (Of course ,  this excludes the ad hoe interest group formed with 
only one obj ective in mind . ) A primary characteristic of the intere st 
group is that it measures success by tangible achievements rather than 
the upholding of moral principles or ideals . Thus it tends to concentrate 
its activities at those points of the power structure where immediate and 
decisive results can be obtained . It conforms , for the most part , to the 
norms of pluralist danocracy; the lobbyinq of legislative bodies , 
executive bureaucracies and political leaders ranks high among the order 
of its tactical operations . 
On the other hand , the attitude group is set up to achieve a 
specifically delimited obj ective or generally articulated cause defined 
in terms of its members ' shared attitudes . Since the source of support 
comes fran the common attitudes that people have and not from their 
sectional interest , the precise limits of the potential membership are 
difficult to fix . The attitude group is at best semi-permanent , in that 
it only exists as long as its Obj ective or cause is unattained . 
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While a variety of universal factors condition and influence the 
41 
course of eve:ry pressure group ' s activity , the attitude group qua 
attitude group still has its preferred methods of operation . For example , 
the group is not necessarily structured to function in accordance with 
the political institutions through which power is normally exercised in 
the society . Due to the unlimited nature of its potential constituency , 
the usually limited state of its wealth and expertise , the trans-aectional 
nature of its demands , sta. , the group is constrained to activate third 
parties on its behalf and to recruit additional supporters through the 
techniques of ' grass roots ' campaigning . Its activities tend to 
concentrate on feeding out information to both its own supporters and 
prospective converts rather than operating directly on the centres of 
power - the strategy being to effect a shift in public norms that will 
eventually be reflected in the decisions of the power holders .  
The attitude and the interest group are , of course , ideal types .
The particular peace group will manifest an admixture of both types ,  and 
there will be marked difference s of degree frau group to qroup. Yet 
despite the nuances all the peace bodies discussed throughout this thesis 
conform basically to the attitudinal type of pressure qroup . 
41 . For example , the sort of determinants smelser applies to collective 
behaviour : the society ' s  structural conduciveness , structural 
strains , the group ' s effectiveness at communicating its views , the 
appearance of precipitating factors that highlight structural 
strains ,  the ability of the group to mobilise its resources and 
exert presaure , and the social controls countered by the society . 
( Smelser , op. cit . ,  pp . 15-18 . )
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Prototypes of Mi l i tant and 1Vloderate Tact1 cs 42
This typology of political behaviour with reqard to tactics is 
adumbrated on the basis of three main characteristics . Piratly , the 
militant is reluctant to ccaprcaise or make quid pzeo quo deals , either 
with his fallow dissenters or with opponents outaide the movement . He 
persists in holding to a maximum set of demands , which he relates lnt11%' 
atia to integrity , principle , refinement of ideoloqical position , or 
analysis of the co-optive and vitiating devices at the canmand of the 
power structure . He tends to diabolise his opponents , resorting to the 
battle rhetoric of calling them ' enemie s ' ,  ' war-mongers ' ,  ' crypto-
fascists ' ,  or the like . At best they escape with the epithet of ' bloody 
opportunists ' • He sees them as united in their opposition to his cause , 
and deems them intractable and impervious to reason . By contrast ,  the 
moderate seeks incremental gains and is more apt to evaluate others in 
terms of gradations . He wants to concentrate his efforts on persuading 
the more tractable , influential members of the society. Assuming the 
role of bargainer , he is inclined to consider his opponent ,  not as an 
' enemy ' but as a ' counterpart ' merely expressing a different point of 
view . If this ' counterpart ' is fair-minded , he will respond to argument 
once the discrepancy between the establishment ' s  rhetoric and the reality 
of its actions is pointed out . 
42 .  The prototype s have been constructed , in part , frau James Q .  Wilson , 
NBgl'O Potitios - The Seazeoh fw Lsadeztship , Free Press , N . Y . , 1960 ,
pp . 214- 250 . See also Lawrence Grauman Jnr . ,  ' The Goals of Dissent ' ,
Nation (American) , 11 December , 1967 . 
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Secondly , consistent with the first characteristic of non-bargaining 
and the 'package deal ' , the tactical militant advocates confronting 
authority directly , instead of utiliainq the established intermediary 
institutions and abidinq by rules and mores devised (he claims ) by the 
manipulative power holders to thwart ' genuine ' change . Since his 
opponents compose an "undifferentiated bloc of corporate and political 
leaders who act largely in unison towards agreed goals out of essentially 
43 identical motives" , his radical demands will never penetrate thi s wall 
of opposition unless he is able to destroy the legitimacy of the regime .
Thus non-violently or violently he resorts to the counteraction of 
canpulsion , and to the threat of sanctions or deprivations . In 
contradistinction , the moderate , stressing the pliability of the system 
and displaying more faith in the amenability of men as well as in his own 
ability to persuade them , choose s the way of reconciliation and canpranise . 
When confronted with an is sue impasse ,  instead of calling for a mass 
assault upon the establishment ' s citadel , the moderate speaks the 
language of delay ,  reconsideration , conferences , fact-finding camnittee s 
and the like . 
The third aspect of the militant ' &  syndrane is that he undertake s 
actions designed to lead to the mobilisation of a mass movement .  He 
wants to proselytise aggres sively at the ' grass roots ' level , so that an 
incorruptible , VD.1: popu'Li,, Vo.1: Dsi , power base can be forged capable of 
43 .  Wilson , op. ci.t . , p .  226 . 
29 . 
effectively challenqing authority. If the politics of access is futile ,  
then the only alternative is to qenerate mass pressure from the ' rank and 
file ' below . The militant also ascribes an ennobling quality to the 
canmitment of large numbers of individuals to an idealistic cause . Not 
only does mass action have an intrinsic value all its own , but 
pragmatically it serves as a process for involving people in the movement 
- an important step in the building of the movement for the lon9 term 
struggle ahead . 
The moderate , on the other hand , is apt to regard mass action as 
dangerous , uncontrollable , even vulgar . Instead of mobilising aggressively 
at the ' grass roots ' level , he seeks entree into selective areas. The
peace movement moderates frequently directed their efforts at gaining the 
support of ALP parliamentarians and of church , university and other 
canmunity leaders . Securing the names of distinquished persons as 
sponsors ,  speakers and participants - it was thought - woold build the 
movanent ' a  prestige , hence bring more ' reapectables ' into it , and 
eventually provide the power necessary to bargain with. 
The militant is inclined to have great contempt for these ' genteel ' 
sort of tactics .  He insists that people must accept him as he is.  He 
has no intention of canpraniaing his principles or behaviour for the 
sake of winning a few converts , who , in the end , when the government 
applies counter-pressure , will only prove untrustworthy. In the polar 
terminology of Harold Lasswell who speaks about agitator and negotiator 
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types , the militant displays many of the characteristics Lasswell has 
aacribed to an agitator called "Mr . A• : 
"A leadJ.ng character1st1.c as moralist , soc1a11.st and 
pac1�1.•t has been h1• truculence in public. Mr. A 
spealcs rap1dly , wi th  grMt Eervour and earnCYtnas ,
and h:J.a discourse 1• studded with Abua1ve epi thets , 
sarcasti c jibes , and cu tting insinuations. He 
con£esses tha t he has taken an unm.1s'takable pleasure 
1n ' rubb..tng the :Luz the wrong way '  • He enjoys 
nothing better than accept.J.D; an 1nv1 tat1on to 
lecture on llOCial and economic subjects beEore 
conservative audiences , and scandal1s1ng them • • • •  ,, 44
Inaanuch as the militant is disposed towards behavin<J like "Mr. A• , 
it ia not too surpris inq that when peaceful and legal means have failed 
(such as after the 1966 Federal election) , the militant aaaet.imea feels 
justified in resorting to illegal methods and even using physical force 
and violence . The moderate , of course , continues to espouse the need 
for compranise and t.o maintain operations within the gamut of the law -
even when efforts in this direction appear doomed to repeated failure 
and there might be a fair measure of success throuqh the use of coercion. 
There are sane peace activists who enqage in militant tactics ,  yet 
do not fit ,  in many respects , the foregoing description of the militant 
prototype. Unlike "Mr . A" , the agitator , they are extranely docile. 
Moreover , they express love for their opponents .  They are not interested
in mobiliaing a people ' s  movement to challenge the legally constituted 
power structure. What they do share with other militants is a 
44. Harold Lasswell , Peychopat'ho togy and Poli.ties , Oniveraity of
Chicaqo Preas , Chicago , 1930 , p .  80 .
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reluctance to negotiate and oanprcaiae and a propensity for engaging in
&ota of civil disobedience and other fozms of direct confrontation . 
However , rather than their motive bain9 to challenge authority , they 
commit militant acts as an expression of personal conscience and as a 
means of bearing witness to the cause of peace . Their intention ia to 
define themselves through their actiona and to persuade others 
(includinq authority) through the example of their testament . Since the 
eff eot of this tactic - apart frca the motive - is to operate outside 
pluralist orthodoxy and to assert 'moral rightnea• ' above leqal 
authority , auch actions have the potential of weakening the existing 
political systan and undexmining its legitimacy . Hence they are 
basically militant . 
CHAPTER I I
THE 1959 MELBOURNE PEACE CONGRE SS
AND 
THE PEACE MOVEMENT THAT PRECEDED I T
Thrwghout this study it is advisable to bear in mind the distinction 
between the movement ' s  pacifist and pacificist wings . While these two 
sections shared a general peace ethos , agreed on many policies , and 
frequently co-operated in joint proj ects and campaigns , the differences 
in their credos on the use of physical force , as well as the differences 
in their historical origins and developnents , set them generically apart 
and assured their organisational and operational autonomy. 
l During the 1960 ' s  the pacifist wing continued to function in much 
2 
the same way as it had s ince the beqilllling of the century , and its 
numbers and political influence , if any , did not substantially alter . 
l . The pacifist orqanisations - many of which were co-ordinated by 
the Federal Pacifist Council ( the Australian Section of the War 
Resisters ' International ) - included the various independent state 
branches of the Peace Pledge Union , Fe llowship of Reconciliation, 
Quaker Peace Conmittee , Conscientious Obj ectors Advisory 
Committee , the Women ' s International League for Peace and Freedan
(though WILPF is not strictly speaking a pacifist group) , and the 
Victorian based Pacifist Movement . 
2 . For a personalised but thorough and fascinating account of the 
first fifty years of pacifist organisations in Australia ,  see 
Eleanor M. Moore , The Quest foza Psaoe - As I Have Knoim It i.n 
Au.stJta"Lia. ,  Wilke & Co . , Melbourne , 1949 . The two main pacifist
journals , Psaoswards (1915-1942) and The Peaoemakeri (1939 to 




The pacifists did manage to gain a few new recruits following the passage
of the 1964 Amendments to the National Service Act , when they set up 
Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committees in each of the six atates , 
the New England area , and the A . C . T . , but the major , long established
bodies generally remained static . On the other hand , the pac ificiat 
wing not only conatituted numerically and politically the main stream of 
the movement but underwent some far-reaching changes and rapid qrowth 
(to be discus sed in the final four chapters) . 
The origins of the pacificist winq of the 1960 ' s  are difficult to 
assess precisely , a factor which has aided greatly the conspiratorial 
arguments of the movement ' s  opponents . One critic , J .  Normington-
Rawling , has argued that a direct lineal ancestry can be traced as far
back as the years between the World Wars . In order to prove camnuniat 
control in the peac e movement of the early 1960 ' s ,  he has asserted that 
" the Australian Peace Council of these days ,  under whatever name it goes , 
derivea , in authentic apostolic succession from the League Against
3 
Imperiali• (IAI)  of thirty years ago 11 • This was an organisation which
he knew frcm personal involvement to be dominated by the camuunists . 
Norminqton-Rawlinq haa even proj ected the argument further back to an
antecedent of the LAI , a little known qroup operating in the 19 2 0 ' s
called The Hands Off India Ccmmittee . While the theory of direct lineal 
descent and its corollary of overlapping membership has formed the 
J. J. Normington-Rawling , 'Recollections 1.n Tranquilli ty ' , Quatbeant , 
Sydney , september 1961 . 
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central thmne in the anti-oa1111UDi•t attacks upon the pacif iciat •action 
4 
of the peace movE1Rent , few of these critics have traced the continuity-
line as far back as the 1920 ' • • What the movement ' s  opponents do
unifoxaly contend - nor is it generally diaputed by the movement ' s
prot.agoniata - is that most of the contemporary pacif iciat groups have 
link• of varying daqrees with the Australian Peace council (APC) , 
orqaniaed in Melbourne in 1949 . 
After a aerie• of peace congresses in the 19SO' a ,  the pacificist. 
qroupa that anergad at the beginning of the last decade consisted mainly 
of the varioua permanent state committees fo:r:med out of the 1959 
Melbourne Peace Congress ' state preparatory committees. Many of the 
4. Por sane of the many examples of this approach , see B.A.  Santamaria , 
T'htl Peao• Game, National Civic Council , Fitzroy , Vic . , Hovaber 
1959 1 R . G .  casey, &ess Stattlllltmt, External Affairs Department , 
16 J'Une , 19591 Garfield Baxwick, CPD� BR ,  Vol . 2 5 ,  6 October , 1959 ,
p. 17 50 ; also 27 October , 1959 , p. 2280 1 10 November , 1959 , 
pp . 2 524-28 & pp .  2530-31 1 17 November ,  1959 , p. 2784 1 and 24 
November , 1959 , p. 30591 R. G .  Menzies , CPD� HR ,  Vol . 25 , 27 OCtober , 
1959 , pp. 2345-46 1 Peter hl.ly , 'P•oe Movements 1n Auatral1a ' ,
!C"hs But'teti.n, 23 June , 1962 1 Denis Strangman , ' The Peace Movement' ,
Soaiat BuPv•g , XIII , October 1964 , pp .  261-263 1 also XIII , November 
1964 , pp . 293-29 5 1  and XIV , February 1965 , pp .  21-23 1 TM BuZZ.ti.n ,
7 November , 1964 1  Fred Wells , PM Peaos Raokst , Ambassador Presa ,
Sydney , 1964 1 Harold Crouch , James Jupp , Leon Glezer , Peter Samue l 
(eds. ) , 1!hs P.aoe Movfltnent, 2nd edition , Diaaent Pamphlet , Melbourne ,
1964 ( the lat edition of this pamphlet is described as "mainly the 
work of Harold crouch • • •  the 2nd edition is a oanposite work" ) 1
B . N. Snedden , CPD, BR ,  Vol .  43 , J Septmber , 1964 , pp .  969-972 1
J . P. Forrester , l'iftun reazes of P11aoe i'Jtonte , McHugh Printery , 
Sydney , o. 1966 1 Anon . , ' Who Are the Demonstrators? ' ,  !I'M Bult.tin,
26 March, 1966 1 H .  Holt ,  CPD, BR ,  Vol .  56 , 17 August , 1967 , 
pp .  241-243 1 Fred Wells ,  'A Comment on Mr. Guya tt '  s Chapter ' , Roy 
Forward G R. H . C. Reece (eds . ) ,  Consaztiption in Austztati.a, Univ. of 
Qld. Pres• , 1968 , Chap . 9 1  and P . T .  Findlay ,  f>ltotest Potitios and 
P8Nohotogioat Jlaztfflr'B - !!!he COfftUnist Ro'te in ths AnU-Vi.•tnam fiaJ' 
and Anti-Consa:ripti.on Mov111T11Jnt in AustzeaZia, Hawthorn Press , 
Melbourne , 1968 .  
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critics of this 1959 Congress claimed that the setting up of permanent 
continuinq committees was the chief aim of the Congress ' organisers from 
the very beqinninq . For instance , writing immediately aft.er the 
Conqress , Frank Knopfelmacher charqed : "Yet the main political obj ective 
of the Congress has been achieved : the setting up throughout Australia 
of a network of pexmanent ' Peace ' committee s controlled by the warlords 
in Moscow and Peking , through their agents in the World Peace Council 
5 
and supported by a significant section of the ALP . " Despite the unproven 
nature of these charqea about motives and manipulation , it is true that 
as a consequence of the Melbourne Congress , every state by mid-1960 , with 
6 the exceptions of Western Australia and Ta•ania , had established a 
7 
continuing canmittee . '!be bases of aupport of these canmittees reflected 
sane of the broader backing which had been secured at the 19 59 Melbourne 
5 .  F .  Knopfelmacher ,  'More Than A Stunt ' , Obsez-uszt , 2 8  November , 1959 .
See also Pltospect , Vol .  3 ,  No . 1 ,  Melbourne , 196 0 , which asserted 
that the aim " to set up a permanent peace movement to join the 
Asian movements in spreading communist propaganda throuqhout Asia" 
had been achieved 1 and Peter Kelly ' s statement in 2'he Butl.Btin , ,
2 3  JUne , 1962 , that " the main purpose of the Melbourne ANZ Congress 
has been achieved : the institution throu9hout Australia of a
network of permanent ' Peace ' conunittee s ,  controlled by Mowcow 
through their agents in the World Peace Council and supported by a 
section of the ALP" . (Note similarity with the comment of Dr . 
Knopf elmacher . ) 
6 .  Tasmania did have a qroup primarily interested in discussion called 
the Launceston Peace QUest Forum which maintained communicative 
l inks with the ANZ COnqress in Melbourne . We stern Australia 
continued its branch of the Australian Peace Council which quickly 
established ties with the new bodies on the Ea st Coast . 
7. In Victoria , the Australian and Victorian Peace Councils continued
to exist alonqaide the newly formed ANZ Congress and were not 
formally disbanded until 1967 .  Shortly thereafter , the ANZ Congress 
changed its name to the Congress for International Cooperation and 
Disarmament (CICD) . 
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Conqress beyond the traditional left-wing trade union support .  More 
clerical pacificists , ALP members , and intellectuals now endorsed the 
activities of the movement. Thus the 1959 Congress represented a 
milestone in the history of the peace movement in the sense that it 
•timulated the movement ' s  qrowth and qraatly influenced its form ,
character and direction during the first half of the 1960 ' s .  Even in 
the middle of the decade , when new peace groups proliferated in response 
to the Vietnam and conscription issues , the Congress ' continuing 
committees or their lineal descendants tended to daninate the peace 
scene . Not only were the new groups lacking in experience and resources , 
but most of them were linked through personnel and ' camnon cause '  to the 
scions of the Melbourne Congress . Moreover , among the few pacificist 
groups managing to operate outside the Congress ' orbit , sane could trace 
their oriqins to minority sentiment expressed at the Congress - e.g. , 
the Victorian Campaiqn for Nuclear Disarmament (VCND) and its offshoot , 
the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) . In one form or another the 1959 Congress 
stamped its mark on the movement of the 1960 ' s . 
The Congress was also important in its own right , for it represented 
one of the largest , most controversial , and best publicised proj ects that 
the peace movement had undertaken since the anti-conscription campaigns 
of world War I .  For all of these reasons it is worth examining in great 
detail , but first it is proposed to outline briefly a history of the 
Australian peace movanent , so that the Melbourne Conqress - indeed , the 
entire period of the study - might be seen in the form of an overview. 
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More specifically , a synopsis of the movement ' s  history will reveal the 
genesis of some of the current organisations (particularly ,  the pacifist 
bodies which seem to be more durable than their pacificist counterparta ) ,
and will accent the dichotany between the pacifists and pa.cificists as 
well as the difference between the class dissenters and bourgeois 
protesters , which traditionally has pervaded the movement . 
Synopsi s  of Peace Movement ' s  Pre- 1 59 Congress Hi story 
Under 19th Century conditions of an Austl'atian Feliz the need for a 
peace movement was not urgently felt . Although a few Quaker fami lies 
had emigrated to Australia and establi•hed in the capital city of each 
colony a Friends ' Meeting House , where they could practise the creed of 
" livinq in the spirit that taketh away the occasion of all war" , it 
actually took a war - the Boer War - before any real enthusiasm was
8 generated tor a peace movement . In addition to the Quakers , opposition 
to Joseph Chamberlain ' s  call to ' nnpire and Imperial Interests ' came 
B .  Not surprisingly ,  peace groups a nd  movements are more apt to thrive 
when the canmunity is either threatened by , engaged in ,  or suffering 
the after-effects of a war . Thus going back to the genesis of some 
of the early pacifist sects , the Quakers gained their strength while 
England was still in the divisive hatred of the Civil War 1 the 
Boheaian Brethren only qathered about Peter Czelcicky after the 
de•truction of their fortified hill of Tabor in 1453 (see G . F .  
Nuttall , ChM,atian Pacifism in Bi.stoey , Basil Blackwell , oxford , 
1958 , p .  26) ; and the Anabaptists in 1535 retreated to bear pacifist
witness under the leadership of Dutchman Menno Simons (hence 
becaning known as Mennonites ) only after having themselves camnitted 
holy slaughter at Munster with " an excess of fanaticism which 
shocked the civiliaed world" . (R. J .  Smithson , 'l!he Anabaptists , 
J .  Clarke ' Co . ,  London , 193 5 ,  p .  8 5 . ) And , in the present age , the 
Vietnam War has induced not only a spate of peace organisations but 
a pacific ethos that has permeated a large section of the society. 
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from a middle claa a orqaniaation called the Peace and HUmanity society , 
moat of whose manbers did not conaider thcselvea atrict paoif iats but 
9 
were inclined to reqard this particular war as unjust and inhumane , 
and from !l!hll Butt.tin , as well as from "a small qroup of parliamentarians
(Labor) and a fairly large qroup of unioni•ta (moat importantly the 
leaders of the A . w. u . ) " .10
'J.'he War ' s  conclusion brouqht about an early end to this first 
Australian peace protest. Nevertheleaa ,  in 1905 , Branches of the London 
Peace Society were fonned in both Sydney and Melbourne . While the Peace 
Society' s formal aims did not canpletely outrule military defence , the 
executive officers and more active member& consistently steered a 
pacifiat line . The President of the Melbourne Chapter , Rev . Dr .  Charles 
strong , a staunch pacifist , founded the small pacifist journal PBaOS1«a'ds 
in 1915 , which served as the main pacifist organ until his death in 1942.  
Its role wa s  subaeqwmtly assumed by the Federal Pacifist Council ' s  
ll publication , Ths PBaOemakszt .
I. Eleanor M. Moore , op. olt. , p .  19 . 
lO . Ian Turner , Industztiat JAbozt and Potitios - !the Dynanrlos of ths
IabOU'l' Movsment in FastBm AustJtatia� lS00-1 921 , A . N . u .  Preas ,
C&nberra , 1965 , p .  68. 
ll . In 1949 , the curator of the Swarthmore Colleqe Peace Collection in 
the u . s . A. deemed PeaoBIJJallds had the longe st life of any pacifist 
journal in the world (noted in Moore , op. oit. , p. 32) . PsaoBIJal'da • 
record as a continuous pacifist publication has , of course , now 
been surpassed by a number of journals , including its Australian 
successor , !'ha Peaofllllak6ze. This j ournal , which began in 1939 , 
was taken over , following the outbreak of World War II , by the 
Federal Pacifist Council of Australia , a co-ordinatin9 body for 
various pacifist groups . It is currently being published monthly 
in Sydney under the editorship of Vivienne Abraham , a Jewish 
pacif iat . 
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When the Cook Fusion Government in 1910 introduced canpul8ory 
ailitary training for schoolboys between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen , a qroup known ae the Australian Freedan Leaque arose to fiqht 
the ccxapilsory aspects of the new Defence Act, and to assist in court 
action as many boya aa possible who contested their involuntary 
l2 
enrolment . While the Freedan League ' s manifesto stated it was "not 
l 3  
opposed to a Defence Force enrolled upon the voluntary principle" , 
moat of it• leaders , as in the case of the London Peace Soaiety , were 
avowed pacif iata . They were axtr•ely succeaaful in buildinq up the 
1 4 League ' s  membership , which by 1914 numb ered sane 55 , 000 persons . 
However , the League was quickly disbanded at the outbreak of the War . 
The atmosphere in Australia ,  noted Jauncey , "was so stron9ly patriotic 
that members of the league felt that anything that thel' might do would 
be misunderatood" . 15 
While a few class dissenters hao rallied their support behind the 
Leaque , most of the ' political left' had endorsed the position of ALP 
leaders Mr .  Andrew Fiaher , Mr .  w.M. Hughes , and Mr . George Pearce , who 
l2. The Defence Act ' s  canpulsory clauses met stiff opposition . Between
January 1912 and JUne 1914 , 27 , 7 49 prosecutions were instituted for 
non-reqiatration. Most of these resulted in fines paid by the 
parents , but 5 , 732 youths were imprisoned in fortresse s and other 
military places or in civil prisons for failure to reqister . ( See 
L. c .  Jauncey , Phe stoey of Consonption in Austmtia , Allen &
Unwin , IA:>ndon , 193 5 ,  p .  53 . )
l3. Moore , loo. ait. , p .  24 .
l4.  see lC . S .  Inglis ,  'Conscr1pt10IJ 1 n  Peace and war , l9ll-l94S ' ,
Forward & Reece Cede . ) , op. cit. , p .  28 . 
15 . Jauncey , op. oi.t. , p .  103 . 
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were adamantly camnitted to the idea of a ' citizen army ' . such an army , 
it was argued , would provide the country with a democratic defence 
aystem and stem the growth of a professional 'military class ' .  For a 
time these parliamentarians were able to carry with them the industrial 
winq of the Party. It was only after the overseas conscription crisis 
of World War I that the ALP was led to renounce , in 1919 , all forms of 
compulsory military service . 'l'his was followed by an ALP requeet in 
the l9 20 ' s  to a Royal Camaission on the Federal Constitution that 
military conscription should be outlawed . Yet , when the Party reqained 
office in 1929 , Prime Minister J. B .  Scullin did not repeal conacription . 
He merely suspended it on econanic grounds .  
The greatest victory ever achieved by the Australian peace movement 
occurred durinq World War I over the two conscription referenda. The 
two campaigns against conscription for overseas service represent the 
only occasions when peace dissenters have confronted the Australian 
Establishment on matter s of major policy , and won. Since the history of 
l6 these campaigns has been well chronicled and is far too canplex to 
16 . For some of these accounts , see ibid. 1 Turner , op. oit. , pp . 97-121 ; 
Ingli s ,  op. oit. , pp . 29-45 1 J . P .  Fletcher & J . F .  Hills , Consaztiption 
lJndta' Camouf1,a,gB , Adelaide , 1919 1 Ernest Scott , 'Australia During
the war ' ,  Vol . XI of the Officia:t, Histocy of Aust?tatia in the Waia 
of 1914-191 8 ,  9th ed . ,  Angus & Robertson , Sydney , 1943 1 A . E .  Davie s  
(on behalf of the Anti-Conscription Jubi lee Committee) , The
Peaoemakn , Melbourne , October 1966; L. F .  Fitzhardinge , Wittiam
MoPZ'ia Hughes, A Po litical Biog:raphy , Vol . I :  That Fiezey Pal'ticZe , 
Angus & Robertson , Sydney , 1964 ; F . B .  smith , The Consaztiption
Pte'bisoitBS in Aust'Patia 1 91 6-191 ? ,  Victorian Historical Association , 
Melbourne , 1965 ; and Peter Heydon , Quist Decision, A study of 
Geo'l'(/e Foster Pea.roe ,  Melbourne Univ . Press , Carlton , Vic . , 1965 . 
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reconstruct here , only the base and peripheral support of the movement 
will be mentioned . The most important point is that although the
pacifists , the religious diss enters and the intellectual socialists were 
very active in the campaigns , they did not exercise a daninant rSle . 
The force of the ' anti ' movanent came fran the trade unions - that is , 
fraa a coalition between the militant class dissenters , which included 
1 7  
the I .w .w.  and the Victorian Socialist Party , and the conservative 
A . w . u . , whose leadership was still imbued with that union ' s  traditional
' spirit of nationalism ' and ' freedan from old world entanglements ' .  The
coalition took root in a power struqgle within the ALP between its
industrial and parliamentary wings . Important criticism also emanated 
fran a section of the Catholic Church. The Coadjutor Archbishop of 
Melbourne , Dr . Mannix ,  who was deeply critical of the wrongs inflicted 
upon the Ir ieh during the Easter Rising , led a condannation of thia
" aordid trade war " and the men who would call up Australian youth to fight 
it for them . And finally , as Turner points out , although the normally 
anti-ALP farmers never participated actively in the movement , their ' NO '
vote was a decisive factor in the outcane of the referenda . 1 8 To many of
these fanners a shortage of labour on the farms meant the loss of good 
seasons , so they were unwilling to support the conscription of more 
valuable labour . Besides , the farmers had a grievance against the 
Government for not beinq able to market their products abroad . On the 
l1. Turner , op. oit. , p .  99 .
lB. Ibid. , pp . 113-116 & p .  165 .
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other hand , the labourers ,  who worked on the farms and normally voted 
ALP, dieplayed less support for the 'NO' vote than did their counterparts 
in the cities , but the drift of their votes fran the anti-conscriptionist 
cause was more than offset by the votes of their employers .  When a 
' crisis ' vote took place fifty years later in the general elections of 
1966 , the ALP was unable to capitalise on the fortuitous defection of 
a rural vote . l 9
'lhe Great War had stimulated the fo:rmation of countless peace 
orqanisationa . These included the Melbourne based Australian Peace 
Alliance which eventually spread to all the mainland capitals except 
Sydney, the Australian Union of Democratic Control for the Avoidance of 
War which was located in Sydney and took its name and principles fran the 
Union of Democratic Control in England , the various Anti-Conscription 
Leagues , the No-Conscription Fellowship , the Watlen ' s  Peace Army , and the 
Sisterhood of International Peace. Only the last-named survived the War 
by more than a few yeare, and in 1920 it changed its name to the 
Australian section of the Women ' s  International League for Peace and 
Preedan. 20 The Australian WILPF is still active today with chapters in
all six states . 
l9 . An exception was the support the ALP received fran sane W.A . farmers 
over the failure of the Government to implement fully the Ord River 
Schane . 
20 . The Sisterhood also link.ad up for a short period with the World
Union of Women for International Concord , a body inauqurated in 
1919 in SWitzerland under the leadership of Madame Clara Guthrie 
D ' Arcia . 
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Following the s econd conscription referendum , the trade union• and 
the Labor Party were distracted from the immediate issues of war and 
peace , when they became increasingly involved in an intensified class 
rivalry between capitalists and workers . '!'he class dissenters were very 
suapiciowa of the newly foxaed League of Nation• Union (LNU) , which began 
with a sub sidy from the Governmmt and pro1>89ated a line to which the 
Government was at leaat officially camnitted . The LNU relied heavily 
upon the support of establishment f iC)Uraa and veteran middle claaa peace 
campaigners. In 1928 , this same coalition •pearheaded the formation of
the Australian section of the world Disarmament Movement (WDM) , which 
four years later (one year before its danise) sponsored a collection of 
over 100 ,000 signatures , including thoae of Sir John Monash and Prime 
Minister Scullin , as its part of the lonqest petition ever assembled in 
the world , for presentation to the world Disarmament Conference in 
21 Genna. 
Meanwhile , the ' political left ' had decided to set up its Orc)aniaation ,
the League Aqainst Imperiali• (LAI) , in Sydney , towards the end of 1930 . 
The LAI met with little success in gaining popular support , so that in 
1933 some of the more active left-wingers formed a Provisional National 
Anti-War COmnittee
22 
which convened a aeries of state conferences and a 
21 .  Moore , op. oit. , pp. 86-93 . 
22 . Included amonq the liat of members on the Provisional Comlittee
were Senator A .  Rae and E . J .  Ward MHR1 Rev . A. Rivett of the 
Conqreqational Church1 A. E. Chapnan , Secretary of the ARD 1  J . B .  
Steel of the ALP and Howard Prison Refoxm League , and E . M .  Higgins
of the COlllDUnist Party . 
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national conference. Out of theae conferences came the Movement Against 
war ,  with the word ' faaci• ' later appended to form the title MAWIC!' . 
This group , like it• predecessor , made little pretence at diBCJUi•inCJ its 
oppoaition to the ' entrenched ' class structure. The opening lines of 
each conference' •  reaolution would read z "The workers by hand and brain 
united in this conference • • • •  " '.there were constant admonition• about the 
perfidy of the capitalists : • • • •  the Conference warns the public against 
placing faith in Government institutions and especially the League of 
Nations , which functions at Geneva as the immediate mouthpiece of the 
23 Imperialist Powers . "
A few years later the MAW&F abruptly chanqe4 its attitude towards 
the League of Nations and the ' Imperiali•t Powers ' .  The vott.-faoe was 
connected with the riae of German militarism , and the deci•ion of Russia 
- the leader of a large section of the International Left - to join the 
League of Nationa - and to work for armed collective security. In 
Australia , aa throughout the world , the t-wo wings of the peace movement, 
the League of Nation• Union and the MAW&F , converged into a gigantic 
movement called the International Peace Campaiqn (IPC) , though the two 
founding organisations also retained their separate identities. The IPC 
had evolved out of an international peace congress convened in Septmber 
1936 at Bruasela by Pierre Cot, the Kini•ter for Air in the French 
Popular Front Government , and by LOrd Robert Cec:il , the President of the
23. guoted in Moore , op. oit. � p. 114 .
LNU in Great Britain and the Daninions . The congress was openly 
supported by the Canintern .
'rtle Brussels congress produced a document setting forth four
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cardinal points to be accepted by all affiliating bodie s .  The third of
these points , which , as Lord Cecil explained , sanctioned the use of
collective military action as a last resort , proved unacceptable to 
many pacifists , who therefore refused to join the IPC . Instead , nearly 
one thousand Australians took the famous pledqe of the Peace Pled9e 
Unions " I  am determined not to support any war , and will work for the
24 removal of the causes of war . " The leader of the Britiah Peace Pled9e 
Union , Canon ' Dick ' Sheppard , interpreted the pledge to mean a rej ection 
of "the internationalism of the Leaque of Nations and of collective 
security [which] is a larqer patriotiam • • • the tribal spirit maqnifiad , 
25 but unchanged in eaaence" . By accepting this interpretation the
Peace Pledge Union groups that apranq up in Melbourne (May , 1938) , in
Sydney (Beptmber , 1938) , and in .Adelaide (the following year) stood in 
direct opposition to the IPC .
Thus the IPC drove a breach into the lonq standinq alliance between
the pacifists and the non-class diasenting pacificists , whereas it 
cemented the alliance , which had fallen apart .at the end of the Great
war ,  among the various types of pacificist dissenters . However , despite
24. Ibid. , p. 127 .
25 . QUoted in ibid.
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the wide pacificiat endorsanent that the IPC received , it did fail to 
gain the support of a vital section of the trade union movement which 
rmained oppoaed to the concept of oollective security and the 
implementation of League of Nations ' sanctions , larqely for reasons of 
traditional nationali•. 
Meanwhile , an att•pt was made to revitalise the MAWGF by chanqinq 
its name to the League for Peace and Danocracy , but thia qroup did not 
survive the hectic events of 1939. Nor did the larger compoaite body 
of pacificista - that is , the IPC - continue after the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact and the expulsion of Russia from the Leaque of Nations for her 
invaaion of Finland. In fact, when the Second World war broke out ,
almoat the entire pacif iciat wing of the peace mov•ent disinteqratac!.
Only the oamauniau pursued a consistent policy of moderation in defence 
matters prior to the invasion of Rusaia , but . after June 1941 they became 
26 ardent supporter• of the war . 
Alienated from other qroupa and with few individual sympathisers ,  
the pacifi&t groups , which had proliferated in the years immediately 
27 preceding th8 War , persevered in their peace work . Yet the number of 
26 . Four thousand camnunists are reported to have served in the anlled
forces durinq the war , a much higher fiqure comparatively than from 
any of the other political parties .  (John D .  Playford , Doo1;Jeinal, 
and Btztat�io P.rto1)LllRB of t'M CPA, 1940-1962 , Ph. D .  Thesis ,  ANU ,
1962 , P• 22. ) 
27. Sane of the larqer pacifist groups , in addition to the Peace Pledge
Union , were the Christian Pacifist Movement , the Legion of
Christian Youth , the Christian Service Legion and the Goodwill
Service Fellowship .  All had reliqious roots.
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their own supporters even drastically declined as the war progresMd . 
The nation was engaged in what was generally considered a war of survival , 
and few peace-oriented issues arose around which to mobilise support for 
a doctrine of pacif im. The most potentially explosive issue - that of 
anti-conscription - was astutely muted by the Labor Prime Minister , John 
28 
curtin , who gained from ALP Conference approval for an extension of 
the perimeter in which conscripts could serve , thus isolating the 
opposition fran A . A .  Calwell and E . J .  Ward that operated within the 
Parliamentary party . The way in which curtin handled the aensitive issue 
of ccapulaory overseas service is contrasted by K. E .  Beazley with the 
procedures adopted by HUqhe s twenty-five years before : 
" Where Bugh•• had 1gnored the movement as a whole and had 
deal t onl '§J with the Parl1amentarg partg, Curt1n astJUJDBd 
that the ouu.1de movement could be won to h1s pol1c.1•• 
• • • •  The attaaks made on him 1n the Parliamentary partg 
were neutr..Z.tsed. !'here are , of oourse , d1Lferences of 
situation .tn the two World Wars . The battle-f.1eld• oL 
l9l 4-l8 were nmote, M l 94l-45 near . But the 
fundamental d1.fLerence ls that curt.in was profoundly 
trusted .1a the Labor movanent. •29 
Despite the blunting of the conscription issue (or perhaps on account of 
it) , the ostraci• and persecution of the pacifists never reached the 
intmulity that occurred durinq world War I .  While sane persons claimin<J 
28. Curtin possessed excellent credentials for divertinq the anti­
conscription attack within hia party , becauae durinq the World War 
I ' anti ' campaigns he had served as the Secretary of the Interstate 
Trade Onion Anti Conscription Congress , the key body throUCJh which 
the unions had mobilised their opposition. 
29 . K. E .  Beazley , Canbs1'1'tl Ti.mes ,  1 March , 1966 . 
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conscientious objection did go to gaol , a major victory for the pacifists 
was achieved in the •ending of the law relating to conscientious 
30 
obj ection. A second notable achievement, of an orqanisational nature , 
was the national consolidation of pacif iet activities through the 
establishment of the Federal Pacifist council (FPC) in June 194 2 .
In the years immediately followinq the war ' s  end , the peace movement
passed through a phase of relative quietism. Pacifist activity was 
limited to the usual round of conferences , letter writin9 to newspapers 
and politicians , and the publication of numerous pamphlets . The issues 
taken up by the pacifists extended over a wide range , and inclu4ed a 
condanninq the use and manufacture of atomic bombs , protestin9 the 
establishment of the Woomera Rocket Range in Central Australia , exposing
the scandal of the Yoizuki (the little ship in which the Australian 
Gover1111ent crammed 1185 Japanese internees for their voyage bane) ,
criticisinq the creation of NATO , prais ing the United Nations and the 
principle of world government, and campaiqninq for the establishment in 
Aus tralia of a Ministry for Peace. 
The other strand of the peace movanent , the pacificists ,  was almost 
non-axistent and certainly undirected . The left wing of the ALP had 
little time or inclination to align itself with the peace societies , 
since it was chiefly preoccupied with praaotin9 and implanenting Chifley ' s 
30. This fight was led mainly by the newly fo:rmed Christian Pacifist
Movanent and Federal parliamentarian Maurice Blackburn. In 
addition , the pacifists could always count on a fair hearing frca 
parliamentarians Dr . w. Maloney (MHR, Melbourne) and Frank
Brennan (MHR, Ba man) • 
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danestic proqrannes and Evatt ' s  foreign policies , which emphasised world 
security throuqh a strong United Nations Organisation . Similarly, the 
enerqiea of the canmunists were channelled in other directions : initially 
in electing their members to Parliament , and than in renouncing the 
Browder policy of ' class . collaboration ' and ambaz'kinq on very militant 
tactics in the trade union movement as well as waging unremitting war 
against tha ALP . 
However , by 1950 , both the communist and non-canmuniat left beqan 
drifting back into the peace movement. The re asons for this reversion 
of strategy are multifarious and canplex, but buically they can be 
traced to the series of severe set-backs suffered by the entire political 
left, as the Cold War heated up. The canmuni sts had been routed in a 
number of strikes, culminating in the dis aster of the June to August 1949 
coal s trike in New South Wales . Aa well , three of the CPA ' s officials ,
inoludinq the General Secretary L .L . Sharkey , had been prosecuted under 
the Crimes Act and given prison sentences , and the Party itself had been 
banned in the Conmnmist Disaoluticn Bill of 1950 , thouqh this waa 
subsequently invalidated by the High Court and then rejected in a 
constitutional referendum by the Australian people .
The class and intellectual dissenters in the ALP were also beset 
with their special tribulations . '!be ALP had loat the 1949 election , 
cutting off an important avenue for affeatinq peace policies , while 
inside the Party a polarisaticm of ideoloqies had developed between 
' Groupers ' and ' Leftists ' that frustrated any prcmulqation of pacificiat 
so . 
ideas . Purthexmore , outside the Party , the Evatt policy of a forceful 
role for the small nations in the United Nationa had been shattered by 
the complete dcminance of the Great Powers acting through the Security 
Council , or - what was considered worse - acting unilaterally outside the 
United Nations . 
As the political left retreated into the attitude groups of the 
peace mov•ent , they were -joined by a contingent of reli9ioua pacificists , 
clergy and laity , who discerned a discrepancy between their Christian 
morality and the society ' s  political immorality reflected in the condonin<J 
of the atanic testing on the Monte Bello Islands , in the serious 
contanplation of an attack on the Chinese mainland , and in the West ' s  
inflexibility at the disarmament table . 
The renascence of the pacificist winq of the Australian mov•ent was 
linked tO a series of international peace congresses ard orqanisationa -
most significantly , to the World Peace Congress in Paris during April 
20-25 , 1949 , which set up a continuinq camnittee that eventually became 
known as the World Peace Council (WPC) . The first fomal step in the
inauguration of an Australian section of the WPC was taken on July 1 ,  
1949 at a meeting held in the Melbourne home of Unitarian minister Rev . 
Victor James . Apparently , the only persons present at this meeting , 
beside• Rev .  James , were a Presbyterian minister and a Methodist 
31 minister , the Rev . A.M. Dickie and the Rev . F . J. Hartley , respectively . 
Jl . Asserted by Brian Fitzpatrick in letter to the Filitor , !'M Bullsttn ,
7 July , 1962 . Mr .  Fitzpatrick was replying to an article by Peter 
ICelly in the June 23rd issue , which had inferred that he 
(Pitspatrick) had attended the initial meeting . Mr .  F itzpatrick ' s 
information was obtained after a check with Rev . James . 
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These three men , subsequently to be dubbed the ' three peace par sons ' ,
32 announced a list of twenty-four ' original or foundation members ' of 
the Australian Peace Counci l  {APC) , toqether with a six man national
33 executive elected therefrom . Rev . Dickie was listed as Chairman and 
Hon . Treasurer , and Rev . J•es and Rev. Hartley as Joint Hon . S ecretaries . 
In October , 1949 , a N . s . w. Branch of the APC was formed with Lady 
Jessie Street appointed as Chairman , and Miss Nell Simpson of the ALP as 
Hon. Secretary. Similar type branches were set up in QUeensland and 
South Australia , and eventually in We stern Australia . The national 
34 executive was expanded to ten , and included Ian Turner of the CPA , who
became the first national orqanisinq secretary . 35 
The APC ' s  initial proj ect ,  the sponsorship of a ' peace ballot ' , 
generated considerable interest ; in fact, proved so successful that it 
aroused the antipathy of the nation ' s  press , non-Labor parties , and the 
32. See Appendix c for the names of these members and their identifying 
or9aniaations am occupations . 
33 . In addition to the ' three peac e parsons ' , the national executive 
consisted of Miss Heather Wakefield ( Student Christian Movement) , 
Mr .  J. Rogers (CPA and Director of Australia-Soviet House ) , and 
Mr .  J.F . Cairns (then a University lecturer ) . 
34 . The four additional members were Canon W. G .  Thomas (Church of 
England) , Mr .  Alec Robertson (communist journalist) ,  Mr .  Ian Turner 
(CPA and Australian Student Labor Federation) , and Rev . Gwyn Miller
(Presbyterian) • 
35 . His successor , Alec Robertson , was also a Communist ; and so was 
Robertson ' s  successor , Stephen Murray-smith , who in turn was 
followed by Sam Goldbloom , about whom there have been accuaationa 
reqardinq his camnunist Party membership .  (See R. SUmmy ,  'A Repl y
to ,.red Wells ' ,  Forward & Reece , op. cit. , pp .  210-212 .  
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riqht winq of the ALP . The N . s . w. and Victorian Executives of the ALP 
queried the APC ' s genuine concern for peace , and on February and March 
respectively of 1950 declared it a proscribed organisation. This was 
followed by the Federal Executive ' s  Australia-wide ban on the grounds 
36 
that the APC " i s  a subaidiary orqanisation to the Ccmaunist Party" . 
Condemnation of the APC was not confined to the right wing ' grouper ' 
elanent in the ALP , the press and non-I.abor parties . Many of the 
pacifists and non-class dissenting pacificists , with long memories of 
what happened to the IPC in the 19JO ' s  after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
expressed doubts about the sincerity of the new peace group and 
hesitated to j oin in its activities .
37 
The APC suffered a further set-
back in Jwie 1950 , when three of its more praninant members , J . F .  
cairns , Rev .  G .  Miller and Leonard Mann , announced their resignations , 
ostensibly because they obj ected to the way the APC persisted in blaming 
the origins of the Korean war sotety on the Americans and South Koreans . 
Nevertheless, despite these problems and the general anti-camnunist 
climate of the period , the APC managed to survive and even achieve a
modicum of success . Its activities consisted ma inly of organising 
congresses in Australia, sending delegations to the various international 
gatherings ,  and cireulating numerous peace petitions - intera alia ,  the 
36 . Federal ALP Executive , Official Repor-t of F'Pooeedings , Clause 9 ,  
delivered at Federal Conference , March 1951 . 
31 . For details of the debate within the pacifist ranks , see The
Peacema'ktnt issues : June 1950 , p .  3 1  September 1950 , pp . 1 & 2 ;
October 1950 , p .  4 1  September 1951 , p .  2 ;  and June 1953 , p .  4 .
famous Stockholm Peace Petition. Durinq the decade preceding the 
53 . 
mammoth 1959 Congress , three national congresses were held :  the first 
in Melbourne from April 16-19 , 1950 , with the Dean of Canterbury , Dr. 
Hewlett Johnson as principal guest and speak.er 1 the second in Sydney 
fran Septmber 26-30,  1953 , which was entitled the National Convention 
38 
of Peace and War , and was jointly initiated by a qroup of clerqymen 
and sane pacifists as well as the various branches of the APC (still , 
the N . s . w. State Executive of the ALP saw fit to ban the Convention to 
its manbers) 1 and a third congress in Sydney in Septanber 1956 , called 
the Australian Assanbly for Peace which was planned and co-ordinated by 
m.Wers of the Peace Convention and the APC . A feature of the 1956 
conqress was that it received the backing of one hundred and fifty 
39 m-.bers of the Labor Party. The apli t in the ALP ,  which occurred in 
1955 and 1956 , had opened up a new avenue of support for the pacificist 
�in9 of the peace movement . While the ALP '  s Federal Conference at 
Hobart in March 1955 had passed a resolution condemning the use of the
camnunist ' peace tactic ' ,  it had not named any particular Australian 
bodies. Moreover , the ALP Conference had pranulqated foreiqn policies -
s . g. , withdrawal of Australian troop• fran Malaya and recoqnition of the 
Peoples Republic of China - which coincided with those of the peace 
movement . 
38 . For details of this Convention by an ' insider ' , see Rev. J . E .  OWen , 
Phe Road to Pea.cs , Melbourne , 1954 . For the anti-communist point 
of view , see sane of the sources referred to in fn . 4 .  
39. ftt'lbune ,  19 September , 1956 , cited in Forrester , op. oit. , p. 3 5 .
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After each of the peace conqresses the network of pacif icist 
organisations proliferated . The line-up of major groups existinq on the 
eve of the 1959 Melbourne Congress (besides the varioua sponaorin9 
committee• of that Conqress) was as follows & 






N. s . w. Peace Council 
N . s .w. Australian Assembly for Peace 
Qld. Australian Assembly for Peace 
S.A. Peace Convention 
LOcal representatives of APC and 
Australian Assembly for Peace 
Australian Peace Council 
Victorian Peace Council 
Peace Quest For\Dll40 
W.A. Peace Council 
Gradually, during the l9 SO ' s ,  the absolute pacifists had cane to 
support the conventions and petitions conducted by the pacif icista . 
The change in attitude can be attributed partly to the fact that more 
ministers ,  even thouqh they were pacilicists , were participatinq in the 
• other movement ' .  Another factor , no doubt, was the change in editorial
staff and policy of 1.'he Psaoemake�, which after 1954 came under the 
control of two successive editors highly sympathetic to the work of the
pacificists. The first of these editors , w. J. Latona (July 1955 to 
September 1957) , was active in the N . s . w. Branch of the Peace 
40 .  The Peace Quest Forum was begun in April 1951 by a qroup of 
Melbourne ministers interested in fanentinq public discussion on 
issues of war and peace. It is still in existence today , playing 
a small , but active r8le.  
55 . 
Convention , and later in the 1960 ' s became a praninent figure in the 
N. s . w. Peace Committee and the Association for International Control and 
Disarmament (AICD) . Bis successor (also a pacifiat , of course) , Rev. 
E.E.  Collocott (October 1957 to October 1960) , attended the 19 52 Peking
Conference and became Chairman of the H. s . w. Peace Council. However , 
it took an event, the Hungarian Revolution, and the reaction of the 
majority of pacificists to this sensitive issue , to dispel the acepticisn 
of most pacif ista. The Australian Assembly for Peace had expressed 
4l outright disapproval of the Soviet Union' s  intervention; and the 
APC ' s Chairman , Rev. Dickie, after havinq stated his sceptici• about 
the probity of Western reportinq and been critical of the false hopes 
qivm the Hunqaria.na by Radio Free Europe , had gone on record as being 
42 opposed to the use of force in Hungary. Finally, the execution of 
Nagy in 1958 had brou9ht forth an indiqnant public outcry fran some of
43 
the paaificists ' leaders . 
At the t ime of the ' 59 Melbourne Congress , the small pacifist wing 
of the peace movement was canposed of the followinq main qroups : 
41 . See !l.'zti,bune , 7 November , 1956 .
42 . Statement of APC in Age , Melbourne , 9 November , 1956 . For an 
expression of the wide range of opinions within the World Peace 
Council reqardinq HUnqary, see Tl'ibune , 5 December , 1956 .
43. Letters in Age , 10 July, 1958 , and Sydntly Moming Hel'aZd,
4 July, 1958 . 
56 . 
N . s . w. Peace Pledge union (PPU) 
Pellowahip of Reconciliation (FOR) 
W001en 1 s  International League for Peace 
and Freedan (WILPF ) 44









Pacifist Movement of Victoria (PMV) 45 
Western Australia QPC 
FOR 
WILPF 
The de f aJ:Jto co-ordinator for these groups was the Federal Pacif iat 
Council (J'PC) , which provided a canmon forum throuqh its monthly journal
TM Peao11111akn .  The FPC has traditionally rotated its headquarters 
triennially between Sydney, Melbourne and Melaide 1 and every year , 
usually in January , the pacifists have assembled for a National Pac ifist 
Conference . On the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima (Auqust 6th) 
they camnanorate world Peace Day with small services throughout 
Australia. 
44 . Not all members are absolute pacifists . 
45. The PMV was formed out of a merqer between the Christian Pacifist
Movement and the war Resisters League in January , 1952 . 
57 . 
Hovering on the periphery of the peace movanent in 1959 was a small 
band of political intellectuals , who can be credited with causing the 
46 f irat stirrings of an Australian New Left .  Aasuminq the r8le of peace 
movement critics rather than activists , they confined their activities 
to publishing intellectual maqasinea and forminq discussion qroups , but 
when their ideas (or the spirit of their ideaa) took root on the campuses 
in the middle of the sixties , this elment became an important force in 
determininq the peace movement ' s  policies , issues and tactics.  
eowever , at the beginning of the decade the main thrust of the 
movement clearly came fran the clas s dissenters and to a lesser deqree 
the religious dissenters . And the Melbourne COnqress of 1959 , sans 
douu , was their congress .
The 1959 Mel bourne Congress 
In some respects the opponents of the peace movement are correct 
when they claim that the ' 59 Conqress was jus t  another in a long line 
of periodic national conferences held approximately every three years .  
Th e  ' peace tactic ' - as the practice i s  derogatorily termed - had been 
well established as a m eans of camnunicating the movement ' s  general ised 
beliefs and mob ilisinq the support of additional activists , when Rev. 
Dickie , Sam Goldbloom and the APC convened a meeting in Melbourne , late
1958 , of various peace qroup representatives to determine whether 
46 .  see Alan Barcan , � SoaiaZist Left i.n AustroZia,, 1949-1909 ,
Occasional Monograph No .  2 ,  APSA , Sydney , 1960; also Rowan Cahill , 
Notes on thtZ New Left in Au.stztaZia , Australian Marxist Research 
Foundation , Sydney , 1969 . 
58 . 
support existed for the holdinq of a mammoth peace conqress the followinq 
year .  Receiving a favourable response , they proceeded to set up the 
organisational machinery for the fourth national conference since the 
resuscitation of the pacificist winq in 1949 . 
Despite the regularity of these conferences , the ' 59 Congress was 
different from its predecessors , and represented a milestone in the 
developnmt of the post-war peace movement , primarily because it was 
successful in achieving its two main obj ectivea 1 l. e . , firstly , 
propagandising its pacific views (in large measure throuqh an attack on 
the illiberality of the opposition ' s anti-communisu) 1 and , secondly , 
mobilising new supporters and reactivatinq old ones , thus layinq the 
orvanisational foundations for a viable mass movement when the 
precipitating factor of the Vietnam War arose five years later . 
A confluence of factors contributed to the congress ' success :  
(1)  the tremendous controversy and publicity that surrounded the 
Congress ; ( 2) the skill , dedication and industry of the orc;aniainq 
canmittees , particularly that of the COnqress Chairman , Rev .  Alf Dickie , 
and the national organisinq Secretary , Sam Goldbloom ; ( 3 )  the 
participation of a qroup -of dissident ,  critical intellectuals , who 
viqoroasly upheld the "right to hold independent political views and 
insist[ ed] that this riqht shall be accorded to all participants " 1
47 
and (4) the status , calibre and influence of the overseas guests as 
well as that of some of the local individual and organisational sponsors .
41. Outlook ,  Vol . 3 ,  No .  5 ,  Sydney , OCtober 1959 .
59. 
Consider!nq the array of sponsors and 911e sts that the organisers 
were able to assemble , it was not too surprising that the Conqress soon 
became controversial and captured national headlines .  The ' early' list 
48 of sponsors included a large number of outst.anding Australians .  The 
ACTU and its affiliated tabor O>uncils voted to sponsor the Congress , 
as did the Executive of the Victorian ALP .  '.ftle state Executive of the 
N. S .W. ALP decided to send an official deleqate-obeerver , A.G.  Platt , 
49 a Senior Vice-President of the State EXecutive , whan the Conqrees ' 
orqanisers then accorded a position on the Congress ' Planning Committee . 
And under the prodding of the Victorian deleqates and Frank Chamberlain , 
the Federal Executive of the ALP at leaat granted the COngreae an 
48 . .Among them were Sir Marcus Oliphant , Research school of Physical 
Sciences , ANU ; Dr . J . H .  Green , radiation expert fran the Univ. of 
N. s .w. , Rev . Rex Mathias , Director of the Methodist Department of 
Christian Education 1 Prof . A . JC. Stout, Professor of Moral and 
Political Philosophy, Sydney Univ. 1 Judith wriqht , poetess ; Arthur 
Boyd , artist ; Lady Jessie Street , an Australian delegate to the 
United Nations Conference in San Francisco in 1945 , and wife of a 
Chief Justice of the N . s . w. SUprane Court1 Dr .  Barton Babbaqe , 
Anqlican Dean of Melbourne 1 Prof . Walter Murdoch , publicist; Dame 
Mary Gilmore , writer ; Percy Cerutty, Olympic coach 1 Shirley
strickland , athletics star 1 Frank Chamberlain , President of the 
Federal ALP J  J . D .  Kenny ,  Senior Vice-President of the ACTU and an 
MLC 1  and tile followinq MHR ' s :  Clyde Cameron , J . P .  Cairns , T .  uren ,
L.  Haylen , E .J .  Ward , Frank crean , and Gordon Bryant. 
49 . Sydney Morning Hezta.Zd ,  3 November , 1959 . For a full report of Mr .  
Platt ' s findings , which were adopted by the N . s . w. !Xec:utive , see 
'A Report to the Pres1dent and Members of the N . S. PI. State 
Execut1ve of the ALP on the ANZ congress for International Co­
operat1on and Disarmament , held 1n Melbourne - 7th to l4th 
November , 1959' , dated 22 January , 1960 , which appeared in Peace 
Action , Vol . 6 ,  No . 2 ,  Sydney , March 1964 . In his Report , Mr .  
Platt said he attempted to investigate the ' bona-fides ' of the 
congress . The conclus ions he reached were all favourable. 
60 . 
50 
equivocal endorsement . The Methodist ,  Presbyterian, CoDCJX'eqational , 
Church of Christ , society of Friends , salvation Army and Baptist churches 
enhanced the Congress ' prestige by deciding to send deleqates . Amonq the 
list of international quests were the names of British authors ,  J . B .  
Priestley and hi8 wife Jacquetta Hawkes 1 Dr. Mulk Ra j  Anand , an Indian 
writer and editor of Ma:rg 1 Dr .  Linus Paulinq of u. s . A. , a recipient of
the Nobel Prize in Chanistry and a subsequent winner of the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1963 1 Dr .  Joseph Rotblat , an associate Vice-President of the 
British Aaaociation of Atomic Scientists 1 Mrs . Ind.ran! Rathman , a 
reportedly celebrated Indian dancer , and her troupe of associate artiata 1 
and Dean c . w .  Chandler , the Anglican Dean-Emeritu• of Hamilton , N. Z . , 
and leader of the New zealand delegation to the Congress . 
In addition , the National Secretary , Mr .  Goldbloom , announced s 
"We have had messages fran Mrs . Eleanor Roosevelt and the Indian Prime 
51 Minuter , Mr .  Nehru , expresaing their qood wishes for the Congress . "  
An unadvertised but appreciated viaitor was Dr . G . S . Melkote , an Indian
M . P .  and m•ber of the Camnonwealth Parliamentary Delegation ; and an 
50 . The Federal ALP Executive announcement which was handed to the 
press by President Prank Chamberlain read as follows • "The 
Federal Executive has noted the controversy associated with the 
forthac:aing Melbourne peace conference but the Labor Party 
believes that under the terms of ita Federal Conference decision• 
any genuine peace movement must be supported . We are aware that 
members of the ALP and trade unions are attending and will hear 
with intereat their impressions of this conference . "  (Sydney 
J'•Ulgl'aph, 29 October I 1959 . )  
51 . Syduy Moming Bt1ztald, 3 0  October , 1959 . Also pre-Conqresa 
leaflet authorised by s. Goldbloca. 
61 . 
unannounced but not unanimously apprec iated visitor was Mme . Isabella 
Blume , a Communist official from Belgium , who addres sed the Citizens ' 
Conference within the Congress on the subj ect of " an  armed camp in 
52 
Western Europe and tyranny in South Vietnam" . 
The announcement of plans to hold the Australian-New Zealand peace 
congress , together with the periodic press releases about guests and 
sponsors ,  elicited immediate , truculent and not altoqether unexpected 
criticisms fran the Conqreaa ' many opponents . The main line of attack 
centred on the issue of covert canmunist initiation and control . In the 
words of Sir Garfield Barwick , the Attorney-General and Acting Minister 
for External Affairs ,  "this Conqress is Conununist inspired ,  Communist 
organised and devoted to Camnuniat propaganda • • • •  Thia Congress is truly 
a CClllllunist front • • •  [ and ] is not intended to be a vehicle for any 
53 impartial discus sion of international disarmament and peace" . A month 
later , Sir Garfield marshalled his evidence in a lengthy statement before 
54 Parliament. His sentiments were echoed by Prime Minister Menzies , who 
52 . OUt'Zook , Vol . 3 ,  No . 6 ,  Decanber 1959 . The unscheduled appearance 
of !be . Blume on the platform and the accanpanying fervent 
emotionalism that it engendered were seized upon by the critics 
of the Congress as a prime example of communist manoeuvring from 
' behind the scenes ' .  See Harold Crouch et at. , op. oit. , pp .  7 & 8 1  
and James Jupp , ' What Really Happened at the Peace Conference ' ,  
Obsez-vezt , 26 Decanber , 1959 . Mme. Blume ' s unexpected presence 
was also deplored by sane persons qenerally more sympathetic to 
the peace movement - s . g. , see editor ' s  comment , Outlook , Vol . 3 ,  
No. 6 ,  December 1959 ; and w. Macmahon Ball , ' I  Was No Match for 
Ila.dame ' , Nation , 21 November , 1959 . 
53. CPD, HR ,  Vol . 25 , 6 October , 1959 , p .  1750.
54 . CPD� HR , Vol . 25 , 10 November ,  1959 , pp . 2524-28 . 
62 . 
proclaimed that " it is perfectly clear that this conference has been 
55 
made the main 1959 activity of the Ccllmlunist Party of Australia" .
The Anglican Primate of Australia , Dr . H. R. Gough , joined the 
chorus , expressing his unequivocal disapproval of the COnqreas , and 
hoping that "none of our clergy or Church people will have anything to 
56 do with it" . Almost a fortnight earlier Australia ' s  Anglican 
archbishops and bishops at their House of Bishops annual meeting had 
issued a statement , declaring that the ANZ Congress • is being largely 
planned and directed by a partisan qroup whose purpose seems to be the 
dominance of Communism rather than peace based on freedom , truth and 
juatice11 •
57 
Instead of attending the Congress , the bishops "called on 
members of the Church of England in Australia to intensify their prayers 
58 and work for the peace of the world" . 
On the eve of the Congress a group of ten prominent Victorian 
'\ 
church leaders ,  including- the Anglican Archbishop of Melbourne Dr .  WOods , 
issued a press statement , endorsing the stated obj ectives of the 
Congress , but explaining why they were not supporting this particular 
Conqress .
59 And at the opening meeting the following day , five m•bers 
55. CPD� BR ,  Vol .  25 , 27 October , 1959 , p. 2346. 
56 .  Melbourne BsmZd , 6 Novenbar , 1959 . 
57.  1!he Cou.zti.Bzt-Mai i I Brisbane , 26 October , 1959.
58. Sydney 2'e 'UJgzeaph, 26 OCtober , 1959. 
59 . !!.'he Cou.zt'ln-MaiZ , 9 November , 1959 , and Sydney Moming BezeaZd,
6 November , 1959 . 
63 . 
60 of the University of Melbourne staff , who insisted they were not 
' profess ional anti-Communists ' ,  circulated a pamphlet to fellow Conqress 
delegates , warning against the tactics employed by camnunists at 
qatherinqa like this . Throuqhout the week this qroup of academics 
sustained their criticism , ' caucuainq ' with other dissidents and 
receiving a large share of press coverage despite their tiny numbers .  
The so-called ' professional adti-Communists ' who entered the fray 
came from as far away as the Uni�ed States . The Chairman of the
International Assembly of CaptJ,ve European Nations , Mr .  s .  Korbonski , 
. . J 
wrote to the Sydney Moming Hfttald from New York City , charqinq that the 
Congress organisers had spent large sums from " the treasury of 
international Communism to launch one of the least original contemporary 
political circuses" . 6
1 
Mr. Korbonski ' s  organisation shipped to 
Melbourne an exhibition of forty larqe panels depicting Russian 
' imperialism and terror ' ,  which was opened to public viewing by the 
Victorian State Minister for Houainq , Mr .  Petty. Among the Australian 
sponsors of the exhibition were Senator Hannan (Lib. , Vic . ) , Senator 
McManus (OLP, Vic . ) ,  Senator Cole (OLP, Tae . ) ,  Mr .  Wentworth (Lib.  MHR, 
62 
N. s . w . ) ,  and Mr .  Wiqht (Lib. MHR, Qld . ) .
60 . The five staff members were 1  Rev . Colin w .  Williams , Prof . of 
Systematic Theology , Queen ' s Colleqe1 Rev .  George Yule , Prof . of 
Church History , Ormond College ; .L-ir . Peter Fensham , Lecturer in 
Chemistry ; Mr .  Phillip M .  Knight , Tutor in Political science; and 
Mr .  A. Sinclair , Lecturer in Econaaic Hi story . 
61 . Sydnsy Moming Hsmld , 4 November , 1959 . 
62 . Melbourne Herold ,  4 November , 1959 . 
64 . 
'lhe anti-communists made their presence felt throughout the week 
of the congress . Approximately two hundred ' New Au•tralians '  marched 
63 outside the opening session of the Congress , and smaller numbers 
continued to protest during the week , distributing leaflets and 
occasionally interj ecting at public meetings . A rival ' Freedcm Rally' , 
sponsored by such qroups as the Committee of Nationals frcm Countries 
Behind the Iron Curtain , the Australia Free China Association , and the 
Asian People ' s Anti-COlmnunist Leaque , was staged on the opening day of
the Congress . Its featured speakers included the Navy Minister Senator 
Gorton , Senator Cole , Mr .  Wight , and Mr .  KU Cheng Kang , a former 
Nationaliat China cabinet Minister . A ballet depicting the Hungarian 
64 uprising was presented by one of the anti-cOllllllunist migrant societies .  
Finally , the week ' s activities by the Congress ' ' hard core ' opponents 
ended in a caaic fiasco ,  when sane of their number attempted to burn
down a tree around which the delegates were preparing t.o hold a farewell 
picnic: . 
Al l  of these incidents were highly publicised by the popular press , 
as was a circular distributed by the R. S . L. , which declared , " The  
executive i s  satisfied that the Peace Conqress i s  designed primarily to 
advance the Canmuni� t  cause • • •  " . 65 A highlight of the Catholic right
wing ' s  contribution to the opposition campaign cons isted of the release 
63 . Melbourne Sun , 9 November , 19 59 . 
64. SydMy Noming HsraZ.d, 7 November , 1959 .
65 . Ibid. 
65 . 
of a pamphlet entitled Phs Psaos Gains , sponsored by the National Civic 
66 council and written by Mr .  B .A. Santamaria . However , criticism of the 
Conqreaa also ananated from the Catholic left , represented by such 
journals as the Cathotio f/oztks:r and P:ro6!JBOt. For example , writinq in 
the latter , Vincent Buckley argued that the Peace Congress "builds up 
Cold War tensions by the very fact that pressure is brought on only one 
aide in the dispute , and that aide is our own" . The present peace 
movanent , he averred ,  " contains elauents of hysteria , paranoi and 
6 7  exces sive self-righteousness" . Som e  of the non-Santamaria Catholics 
carried the battle directly into the heart of the Congress , dist:ributinq 
at the opening rally copies of P:rospsat which contained two highly 
critical articles . They were joined in the distribution of unauthorised 
literature by another qroup of young intellectual s ,  most of whom 
68 belonged to the moderate-right of the ALP ,  who were issuing their 
leaflet called the Peaoe Gaaette . 69 
66 . B.A.  Santamaria , Ths Peaoe Game , National Civic Council , Fitzroy ,
Vic . , November 1959.  
61 . P:roepsot , Vol . 2 ,  No . 4,  1959 . 
68 . For a definition of the term ' moderate-riqht ' in the ALP ,  see 
Tan Truman, Ideological G:roups in ths Aust:ratian Labw Paltty and 
Phair Attitudes , Univ . of Qld . Press , St . Lucia , 1965 . some of 
the intellectuals referred to are James Jupp , Phill ip Knight , 
and Barry Jones .  
69 . This four-paqe leaflet drew attention to ' Red  China ' s  record of 
military aqqression ' ,  but urged her admission into the United 
Nations - providing saf eguarda of some sort could be arranged. for 
the Formosans . It also stated that freedan and democracy were the 
best guarantees of peace , and in this regard supported the 
Priestley-Bertrand Russell protests over the gaoling of the 
Hungarian writers . 
66 . 
Since Sam Goldbloom announced fran the platfoxm that Peaoe Gaastts 
was not an official publication of the Conqresa , while another 
unauthorised leaf let - this one distributed by the Seamen ' s  Union - was 
not similarly disowned by the organising camnittee , the opponents of the 
Congress seized upon thia incident to aubst:antiate their arguments that 
70 the orqaniaing committee possessed a pro-camnun ist bias . 
Paradoxically , the controversy and clamour surrounding the countless 
pro-cc:mnunist charges , by adding greatly to the publicity of the 
congress , helped to ensure its succe s s . Not only did the publicity 
provoke public sentiments of hostility but it also elicited interest fol' 
the Congress and even served as a means for ' permeatinq ' ,  to a small 
deqree , the society with the qeneralised beliefs of the Congress .  Many 
opponents , like the ten Victorian ministers (supN ) , when they did 
express their disapproval f elt compelled to affirm their agreement with 
the Congress ' general aims , if not its methods . However , the main 
context ,  in which the public debate wa s  conducted , centred on a series 
of withdrawals of some of the early sponsors ,  and the outcane of this 
debate proved to be pr.iJnarily a diversion from the issues of peace to 
matters of the Congress ' credibility and the Government ' s  infrinqement 
of civil libertie s .  
The first sponsor to resign was Dr .  Barton Babbage , Anglican Dean 
of Melbourne , who gave as his reasons that " some of tlx>se who are actinq 
70 . See Crouch et aZ. , op. ait. , p .  10 1 and Richard Krygier , ' 7.'he Soft 
Sell ' , ObsePrJ11z- , 14 November , 1959 . 
67 . 
as organising secretaries in various states are active members of the 
Canmunist Party" . 7l Professor Stout, after a visit fraa Brig. General
72 Spry of A. S . I . O . , also declined to participate1 and Profeaeor Oliphant ,  
apparently believing that the congress could not now "present in its 
73 conclusions an Australian point of view" , withdrew his endorsement. 
Two days before the Conqress was to begin the Victorian Baptist Union ' s
Executive Council "decided to withdraw • • •  following representations about 
74 its origins , basis and motives" . Also withdrawing at the last moment 
was the Presbyterian Fellowship of Australia , because "the original 
intention of the Youth Conference committee that the Conference would be 
attended almost entirely by delegates elected by youth orqaniaations has 
not been followed . A large number of youth organisation•" , insisted the 
Fellowship , "have failed to support the Conference , thus making it 
impos sible for it to be representative of Australian youth" . 75 
71 .  Melbourne Sun ,  4 September , 1959 . In point of fact only one known
Communist was listed among any of the state secretaries ,  chairmen , 
vice-chairmen or treasurers of the organising camnittees .  He was 
Dr . s. Lovibond ,  a Senior Lecturer in Psychol09y at Adelaide 
University , who had assumed the secretaryship of the snall South 
Australian camnittee (only 43 delegates attended the Congress from 
s . A . ) . However , some of the other offic ials were reputed by the 
Congress ' critics to be Cccnmunists , notably Mr .  Goldbloom (see 
R. SUmmy ,  op. oit . , pp . 210-212 ) .  
72 . See CPD, HR ,  Vol . 2 5 ,  27 October , 1959 , pp . 2279-80 & pp .  2347-52 .
73. Melbourne Hsztald ,  27 October , 1959. 
74 .  Melbourne Sun , 6 Novanber , 1959 .
15. Thl4 Cmaieze-Mait , 9 November , 1959 . 
68 . 
Another withdrawal casualty was Councillor K. McD . Farrall of 
Moorabbin Municipal Council ,  who announced on October lOth that he would 
76 not attend as a delegate from his council . A few days later the 
Moorabbin Council itself withdrew official endorsement and declined to 
77 send any delegates . 
Congress officials and their sympathisers immediately launched a 
trenchant counter-attack. Planning Camnittee Chairman Rev . Alf Dickie 
reiterated the Congress ' principle of " exclusion of none , danination by 
none" , to be implsented through the so-called 'Methodist Plan ' , whereby 
each of the sectional conferences within the Conqress •would be permitted 
to determine its own procedures and basia of participation and whose 
findings could not be interfered with by any other grouping within the
78 Congress or by the Conqreas as a whole• . As was constantly explained 
in the various Congress brochures inviting participation , the structure 
of the Conqres s  called for the setting up of eiqht ' autonanous ' sectional
conferences :  Trade Union, Citizens , Youth , Artists and writers , 
Municipal , Education , Christian Churchmen , and Scientists . Each of the 
sectional conferences would form its own aqenda and report its findings , 
if any , to plenary sessions of the Congress , but the latter had no power 
76 . Melbourne HsmZd ,  31 October , 1959 . 
77. Melbourne Heztatd ,  4 November , 1959 . 
78. Rev . Alan Brand , Statsmsnt Issued to Sydnsy Pltess ,  4 March , 1964 ,
reprinted in Peaoe Action , Vol . 6 ,  No . 2 ,  March 1964 . Rev . Brand
was countering charges of 'manipulation ' at the Melbourne Congres s
that were raised in conjunction with the proposa l  to hold a
congress in Sydney in 196 4 .
to alter these decisions . Two elected repreaentatives from each 
69 . 
conference , together with the National Planning committee Chairman (Rev .  
Dickie) and the Secretary (Mr. Gold.bloom) , were to form a draftinq
ccanittee that would present a joint statement to the closinq session of 
the Congress (which became the Charter of Hope) . If any of the sectional 
conferences rej ected the final statement , none would be issued by the 
Co:nqrees . 
According to Mr .  Goldbloan , it was Rev . Hartley who insisted on the 
canplete unanimity of acceptance of the Congress ' final statanent by 
every sectional conference . "Although• , explained Mr .  Goldbloom , • this 
meant any one conference could veto , we accepted this , and we then had 
79 official participation of the churches at the conference level . " 
Reassurances reqarding the Congress ' planned operational procedures 
merely constituted the f irat qamb it in the counter-attack aqain st all the 
critics . The ' leftish' journals took up the theme of the importance to 
create a public awarene ss of the gravity of nuclear warfare and the need 
for a peace movement to rally 11humanists who refuse to be implicated in 
80 t •mutual genocide" . Arqued Oliver Paul in the Na um : "The fact that 
ao many varied qroups - the Trotskyists , the anti-Santamaria Catholic 
left , the Revolutionists (who know full well the communist technique at 
peace congresses ) ,  the Labor Party , the more intelliqent section of the 
Conqress of Cultural Freedan , to say nothing of plain , ordinary , 
79 . In interview with writer , 23 Auqust , 1966 . 
so . Outlook ,  Vol . 3 ,  No . 5 ,  October 1959 . 
70 . 
uncanplicated people - have interested thmselves in the Congress proves 
at least one thing s that there ia a need for a movanent which will 
concern itself with the problem posed by Einstein and Russell - will 
mankind abolish war , or will mankind perish?" B
l 
Many of the sponsors and overseas guests publicly entered the fray 
a9ainat their detractors . When queried about his political affiliations , 
Prof . Murdoch is reported to have snapped : "No , I 'm not Red ,  but I see 
82 red l " Prof . Pauling , upon his arrival in Australia , parried a 
reporter ' s  question about ccanunist influence at the Conqreaa with an 
acerbic criticism. of the Government . "The Australian Government" , he 
pointed out , "has adopted this irrational moral attitude towards the 
Melbourne Conqress because it has not an alternative positive solution 
to help overcome the destruction of the world by nuclear weapons . But" , 
he went on , " I  would say their attitude towards the Congress is 
politically rational . Australia was going throuqh the period of 
83 McC&rthyillll similar to that experienced by u . s . • 
For his pronouncement on Australian McCarthyism ,  Dr . Pauling was
taken to task by the Sydney Moming Herold. In a feature editorial 
headed ' f'hrough the Looking Glass ' , the newspaper criticised hi• lack of 
"careful scientific inquiry" in the political sphere which opened the 
84 way to " those skilful fishers of men , the Communists " . 
Bl . Nation , 7 November , 1959 . 
82. Melbourne Bsztald ,  31 October , 1959.
83 . Sydnsy MOPning H�ztaZd , 3 November , 1959 . 
84. Sydnsy Moming Heztatd ,  4 November ,  1959 .
71 . 
Another visitor who•e ra:narks were praminently featured in the press 
waa Dean Chandler of New zealand. ' The Dean ' frontally attacked the 
attitude of Dr. Gough to the Congress , saying : " I  think the Primate of 
Australia who appealed to the church to boycott this Congress was mpeakinq 
85 
in a very un-chriatian fashion . " On another occasion Dean Chandler 
levelled hi• criticism at the clerqy and laity of the Anglican church in 
Australia , with the observation that "Those who are the slaves of fear 
86 and mistrust are the slaves ,  to my mind ,  of the devil himself" . 
Critician of the Church of Bnqland also came fran Australian 
churchmen. Pha AntiLioan newspaper criticised the bishopa and Dr .  Gough
for their ' negative attitude ' ,  and the editor of f'hs Psaoemak•zt , Dr .
Collocott, stated that he found his ' personal impressions and opinions ' 
at variance with the condemnatory views expressed by the Bishop of 
Rockhampton, gld . The Bishop had contended that , "We (the bishops of 
the Olurch of England) could not back the Peace Congress because of the 
people who had organised it , and because we knew it was so organiaed into 
llUbcamittees that no reaolution could be passed that did not meet with 
87 
the approval of the organisers" . 
J. B .  Priestley ' s curt and definitive reply to this persistent charge 
of oommuniat manipulation was a  " Sane people see Communists under their 
�..- " ''a . 
85. !J.'hs Coul"lsza-Ma:L Z ,  9 November , 1959.
86. Melbourne Age , 10 Novmber , 1959.
87. C'faatoh Gaa•tt• , Diocese of Rockhampton , Qld . , December 1959 , cited
in !l!he P"40"'11a.kszt , Vol .  22 , Nos 1 & 2 ,  January-February 1960 . 
BB. Sydney Dai'L11 Tt'1,11gzeaph ,  6 November , 1959.
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While the se kinds of retorts made excellent ' copy ' and helped to 
feed the publicity and controversy surrounding the COnqreu , the most 
89 effective counter-attack was launched by the ALP in Parliament . Led 
by MP ' s  cairns , crean, Haylen , and Ward , the Opposition concentrated on 
the twin is sues of the activities of the security Service and the civil 
riqhts of Australian citizens .
Although the debate had begun with the Government attackinq the ALP
for its association with the COnqress , the Opposition managed to "cut 
90 the ground from under the Government ' s  feet" , followinq an admission 
by Sir Garfield Barwick (under persistent questioning ) that he had sent 
the chief of A . S . I . O . to interview Prof . stout prior to the Profeaaor ' s
decision to resign as a sponsor of the Congres s .  The sensat ional aspects 
of this revelation were then magnified when it was disclosed that Liberal 
backbencher , Mr .  w. c .  Wentworth , had acted as the liaison between Prof .  
Stout and Sir Garfield . According to Mr .  Haylen , it was Mr .  Wentworth 
who had been leading A. S . I . O. officers , telling them to check certain
.. individuals and give information to others - in effect , "subvertinq the 
security service to his own ends11 • 91 Mr .  Haylen produced the information
92 that a constituent in Mr .  Wentworth ' s  electorate , Mr .  W.J.  Latona , who 
89 . This point is even made by the highly critical writer of 'Canberra 
commentary ' column in Sydnsy Moming Bszea.Zd ,  3 November , 1959.  
90. Ibid. 
91 . CPD, BR , Vol .  25 , 27 October , 195 9 ,  p .  2347 .
92 . Mr .  Iatona was a former editor of !'he Peacemaker , a long time
Methodist pacifist , who was active in the FOR and the N . s . w. PPU , 
and a conscientious obj ector during World War II . 
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was the joint secretary of the N. s . w. organising camnittee , had even
been approached by Mr .  Wentworth and advised that a security officer 
could be sent around to see him. 
Although Mr. Wentworth did not expressly deny all these charges , he 
interpreted them quite differently. He stated that in the case of Prof . 
Stout he had mentioned to the Attorney-General that the Professor had 
reservations about the Congress and was seeking conclusive proof about 
communist danination. 'Ihe Attorney-General , in turn ,  had then asked him 
to make sur e that this was what Prof . Stout wanted , " so  that the person 
who saw Prof . Stout would do so with the Professor ' s  concurrence and 
93 full permission" . Only then was Br ig .  General Spry sent to see Prof . 
Stout , and with the explicit instructions that he was not to attempt to 
alter the Professor ' s  decision. 
Mr .  Wentworth admitted to the conversation with Mr .  Latona and the 
fact that he had said he would get some one to provide him with 
information about the Congress . However , "At that stage" ,  explained the 
member for Mackellar , '' I did not necessarily have in mind a member of 
94 
the security service" . 
Before this heated colloquy between Mr .  Wentworth and Mr .  Haylen , 
sane other ' sensational ' incidents involving security procedures had 
emerged . Answering a question of Mr .  Crean ' s ,  Sir Garfield informed the
House that Prof . Stout was not the only one to have requested and been 
93.  CPD� HR , Vol .  25 , 27 Octob er , 19 59 , p. 2349 . 
94. Ibid. 
provided with infozmation about the Congress. He mentioned the 
74.  
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Archbishop of Sydney and a Methodist clergyman as aeakin9 information. 
Later , in the same day , Mr .  Crean produced a letter written to Sir Mark 
Oliphant in which the Acting Secretary of External Affairs asserted that 
the Communist Party had developed a series of plans around the Conqress . 
Mr .  Crean also disclosed that Sir Mark had received an earlier letter 
fran the External Affairs Department , this one written two months before 
and siqned by the Minister , Mr .  Casey , which actually discouraged his 
96 sponsorship and attendance . SUb sequently , Sir Garfield conceded , albeit 
obliquely , " Letter s were written to some other persons , who , it was 
thought , might find this infonnation useful 11 •
97 
Dr .  Cairns deduced the Opposition ' s conoluaions fran all this
evidence. Mr. Wentworth has admitted , he stated , that " it is possible 
for a private member of Par liament to make arranqements for the chief of 
the Australian security service to interview a professor at a university 
and to make statements about other people which ma.y be haJ:mful , libellous , 
and damaqinq , those people having no chance of knowing what was said or 
98 of answerinq what was said" . Dr . Cairns maintained that undue pressure 
had been exerted on Prof . Oliphant - as in the case of Prof . Stout - to 
induce him to withdraw. Althouqh Prof . Oliphant had received the second
95 . Ibid. , p .  2280 . 
96. Ibid. , p . 2344 .
97. CPD, BR ,  Vol . 25 , 10 November , 1959 , p. 2531 . 
98. CPD.1 BR ,  Vol .  25 , 27 OCtober ,  1959 , P• 2350 .
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letter from the Department of External Affairs in Auqust , a couple of 
months later he was •till prepared to stand by the Conqress. Por , on 
October 26th Prof . Oliphant waa quoted in the press as having said 1 
" • • •  whatever truth there may be in these statements , the natural reaction 
of all decent-minded citizen s should be to flock to the conference and 
ensure that whatever resolutions are passed and whatever conclusions are
99 reached , represent a true majority view of the public as a whole" .
Yet less than forty-eiqht hours later , as Dr .  cairns pointed out , Prof .
Oliphant withdrew ,  qivinq as one of his reasons the fact that the Conqress 
" involves so many people that no effective d iscussion can take place" . l
OO 
The apparent contradiction between these two statements has never 
been CC111lpletely resolved , even to thi• day , thouqh sir Mark does make 
it aplicitly clear that it was because of the organisers ' intention 
to pass reaolutiona , rather than the •ecurity issue , that induced him
1 01 to resign as a sponsor . In the end , he did decide to attend the 
99. Ibid. , p. 2351 .
lOO. Ibid. 
lOl . In a letter to the writer dated 15 March , 1967 , Prof . Oliphant qave 
the following explanation for his withdrawal :  "The proposal for
the Melbourne Conference interested me , and I attended meetinq• 
which formulated how it would operate . I was utterly opposed to 
the passing of resolutions ,  believing that , following discus sion , a 
report giving the consensus of opinion on the question• raised 
11hould be issued . Also ,  the Congress grew to such proportion• that 
I felt that the limited time given to each problem was far too 
short for effective di scussion . Reaolutions were framed beforehan:i,
and discus sion was likely to be limited to these , rather than to 
the ia sues themselvea . It was for these reason s  that I withdrew as 
a sponsor , and not because of any pressure exerted on me by
security officer•. "  See also the statement of Sir Mark in crouch 
st ai. , op. oit . , pp . 6 & 7 ,  where he avers that " I  will have no
part in any future Congress which does not specifically ban the 
pa••inCJ of resolutions" . 
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sectional conference of scientists within the Conqress , as a mere 
dal8C)ate . 
Meanwhile , Dr . Cairns ' speech in Parliament had shifted the debating 
ground . In hia words , this debate " covers not only the nature of the 
Congress , but also the right of people to meet and associate for lawful 
purposes , and the question whether the security service should be used 
102 as an instrument of party-political policy" . For many weeks the 
Opposition continued to harass the Government on the security issue and 
the alleged infringement of civil liberties .  Mr .  E .  Ward , as a sponsor 
of the Conqress ,  asked if he , too , might have access to security 
infoxmation , but the Prime Minister refused to make it available in his 
103 case . When the Government did reply to the alleqations raised aqainst 
it by the Labor Party, it confined its answer to a detailed denunciation 
of the alleged communist influence behind the orqanisation of the 
1 04 congress.  In due course the Government: refused to answer any more 
questions concerninq the Congress , and the topic faded fran parliamentary 
limelight. 
However , the debate - particularly, over the issue of freedom of 
dissent - continued elsewhere .  The Australian Council for Civil 
Liberties , throuqh its spokesman , Mr .  Brian Fitzpatrick , announced that 
it was "disturbed by some features of Government ' s  policy on Peace 
102 .  CPD, HR ,  Vol . 25 , 27 October , 195 9 ,  p .  2351 . 
103. CPD, BR ,  Vol .  25 , 29 October , 1959 , P• 2453 . 
104. CPD, HR , Vol .  25 , 10 November , 1959 , pp . 2524-28 . 
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" l OS 11 .1.v.• • Conqre•• • The "a., .. on ,  which was cautiOW1ly reserving its judgaent
on the Congress , had no hesitation in condemning the r8le of ASIO.
Exclaimed one of ita columnists : "Professor Stout is not: the only person 
to whan the security service has shown confidential data on the political 
activities of his fellow citizens . Where will all t:his st:op?11106 In 
addition, a statement issued by Prof . s . E . Wriqht and Mr .  I.at:ona , the 
joint Secretaries of the N . s . w. organisinq committee , received wide 
press coverage . They declared that the information Briq . General Spry 
qave Prof . Stout should be made public , and concluded on the note that 
"we believe that the very concept of the Gestapo ,  with its attendant 
phone- tapping , innuendo and the inability of the accused to defend 
107 himself , sends a chill through most Australians" . 
While the Government' s  action might not have sent "a chill through 
most Australians" , the a:poss of the rSle of the Security service
certainly ' took the heat off ' the ALP . As noted in the Sydney Moming 
Htnta'Ld ,  "It will now be very difficult, short of sane new explosion, to 
uae the CODCJr••• issue effectively for party political purposes. The 
108 Labor Party has cause to thank Sir Barwick • • •  " .  The article was 
ref erring specifically to the vulnerability of the Party because of the 
rift within its own ranks over the Congress issue. The battle lines 
105. Melbourne Bsztald, 7 November , 1959. 
106 .  Oliver Paul , Nation , 7 November , 1959 . 
107. Sydnsy Mom.lng Heztatd ,  29 October , 1959 . 
108. Sydney Noztnl,ng BBl'aZd ,  3 November , 1959 .  
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were most sharply drawn between the Federal Preaident Mr .  F .  Chamberlain 
and the Federal Secretary Mr .  J .  Schmella , as well as between the 
Victorian branch and the Queensland branch . At a Federal Executive 
meeting on October 27th , the Victorian delegates subnitted a motion for 
strai9ht-ou.t support of the Conqressr Queenaland countered by claiminq it 
was impo••ihle to be aure that the Congress was free from Communist 
dcaination. Th• result of this contrcwerey was a cxnprcn.ise, which left
l09 either faction free to interpret the statement as it chose . In an 
ensuing preaa conference the differences in interpretation readily came 
to U.qht.  According to one newspaper account , "Mr .  Schmella made quite 
clear at the Press Conference today that he wanted known that the ALP 
was not supporting the Conqresa • • • •  [Be] asked the Federal ALP President 
to point out that the ALP Federal Executive had not endorsed the 
COngreaa • • • •  Mr .  Chamberlain did not back hJm up , and Mr .  SClmella walked 
11 0 out of the roan" . 
The sensitivity of the ALP to the COnqreaa issue was illustrated 
again when the Labor Pr•iar of N. s . w. , Mr .  Heffron, declined to answer 
a question on the CollCJreas that had been raised in the Legislative 
Aaambly. 111
l09. For the contents of the brief statement , see fn . so . 
llO .  Sydney !'et�h, 29 October , 1959 .
lll . BJJdn1111 Moming Hlll'a14, 4 November , 1959 . 
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1'hese incidents are typical of the division that has constantly 
plaqued the ALP in its attitude towards the peace movement. Althoa9h
tha 1963 Federal Conference at Perth received a detailed report on the 
continuing comitteas of the Congre•• and other peace bodie s ,  and 
declared that the continuing camittees were ' bona-fide ' peace bodies in 
which Labor Party members could feel free to participate , the attitude 
within the ALP has never , at any time , been aotidly behind the peace
movement. This disunity (which has deep ideoloqical roots) has made it 
difficult for the Party to meet the attacks of its opponents when pressed 
for c larification regarding its relationship to the movement - whether it 
be at the 1959 Congress , the 1964 Sydney Congress , the 1966 Federal 
election , the danonstrationa against Premier Xy in early 1967 , or the
Vietnam moratorium campaigns in 1970 . 
In 1959 , the ALP was sinqularly fortunate that any adverse effects
it might have · suffered fran intra-party atrife were more than offset by 
the Government ' s awn penchant for blundering . Moreover , so much 
publicity attended the fast-moving events of the Congress that specific 
incidents tended to become lost in a kind of episodic blur . At one time , 
during a fortniqht that included the actual week of the congress ,  the 
Australian press featured the Congress , in texms of quantitative coverage , 
as the second major news story. The first concerned a gaol escapee . 
Throughout the main week of Congress activities , the mass media 
concentrated almost solely on the overseas visitors and some explosive 
incidents that occurred within four of the sectional conferences (the 
80 . 
Artists ' and writers ' Conference , the Youth Conference , the Citizens ' 
Conference , and the F.ducation Conference) .  The three plenary sessions , 
11 2  thouqh well attended by the 1064 credentialled deleqates , and the 
varied proqrammes staged by the Festival of Arts (which were held in 
conjunction with the Congreaa) were virtually ignored by the media. 
Mr .  Priestley considered the best feature of the Conqress to be 
sane of the rallies held in the suburban town halls . 11 3 He left behind
hm a trail of ' quotable quotes ' :  for example , " It ' s better to come to 
the conference table naked than to come radioactive . " ,  or " I  would not 
114 
give We s t  Germany a pop gun. " He appeared on ' Meet the Preas ' in 
Melbourne . His maj or contention about disannament was that the nature 
of nuclear weapons precipitated the need for disarmament in this area
first , before proceedinq on to general disarmament. The point was 
contested by the Indian writer , Dr. Anand , and Mr .  JCenny (the Senior 
Vice-President of the AC'l'U) , who claimed that total disarmament - and 
not nuclear disarmament as a first step towards total disarmament -
ll5 should be the aim of the Conqrasa. Mr. Priestley elicited sane less 
friendly critici• fran a visiting Chinese Nationalist official , Mr. tal .  
ll2. See A . G .  Platt , op. oit. On the other hand , the Melbourne Sun 
gave an unofficial fiqure of 1244 , excludinq the guests . This 
figure was broken down by state s as follows s Victoria - 940 ; 
N . s . w. - 176 ;  Qld . - 591  S . A. - 43 1 New Zealand - 15 1 W.A. - 6 1  
'l'aa.  - 5 .  (Sun , 14 November ,  1959 . )
ll 3. See Ol iver Paul , ' Priestley Preferred the SUburb11 ' , Nation , 
21 November , 19 59. 
ll4. Melbourne Ags , 11 November , 195 9 .  
ll5 . Melbourne Age , 1 0  November , 1959 . 
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Upon hearinq Mr .  Prieatley comment that , " I  have found no one who will 
aay anythinq in favour of Chiang JCai-Shek ' s  Government" , Mr .  JCu suggested 
that "he [ Priestley] must be blind" , and " should have stuck to fiction
writing , at which he is an expert , and not dabble in facts in Asia , of 
which he has only very sketchy second-hand knowledqe" .
116 
Dr. Pauling who sparkled in repartee with his detractors at the 
public meetings also claahed head-on with off icialdcm or sami­
ll 7 off icialdan. Accordinq to newspaper accounts he seems to have fared 
much better than Mr .  Priestley whose ' Meet the Press ' interview was not 
favourably reported. In one of Dr .  Pauling ' s first public utterances he 
claimed that 150 , 000 people would die because of fall-out from all the 
nuclear tests up to that t;ime. Whan Senator Hannan (Lib. , Vic. ) noted
that this figure was at variance with the eetimate of the Australian 
Atomic Energy Camnission , Dr .  Pauling repeated his claim , explaining that
11 8 new scientif ic evidence suggested that the figure might even be higher. 
He wa s supported in this a ssertion by the scientists attending the 
ll9 Scientists ' Conference at the Congress , who believed that Dr . Pauling ' s
estimates of the effects of Carbon-14 were even on the conservative
id 1 20 s e. 
ll6 . Ibid. 
11 7. Mr .  :Ku was an official quest o f  the Government , and while in 
Auatralia received interviews with Prime Minister Menzie• and the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreiqn Affairs. (Melbourne 
Hem.ta.,  11 November , 19 59 . ) 
ll B. Me lbourne HIJZ'<lld, 11 November , 1959.  
119 . Included among the approximately fifty invited sc ientists at the 
Conference were Prof. (Max) Rudolf Lemberq , Prof . Oliphant , and
Dr. Walter Boaa. 
1 20 .  Outtook ,  Vol .  3 ,  No. 6 ,  Sydney ,  December 19 59. 
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While the status and personalities of the overseas visitors helped 
to elevate the quality of the Congress and ensure the publicity needed 
t.o create public awareness of the movement ' s  general ised pacific beliefs ,  
the most effective stimulant for the immediate growth of the peace 
movement appears to have occurred within the Conqre•s itself . For it 
was at the three plenary session• and particularly within the separate 
conferences or subdivisions of the Congress that the participants either 
recharged their old determination or generated new zeal for the mobilising
of public opinion and action against norms and policies in the society 
they considered to be war-oriented . 
The record of the COnqress waa primarily written in the eight 
l 2l sectional conferences . The record reveals considerable controversy 
and a fair share of platitudinous statements . Yet the ' net effect' of 
l 2l .  Por a record of the speeches and many resolutions of the Conqress , 
see Doaumenta of the Auatro'tian and NerJ Zealand Congzesss f oz­
Intfll9nationat Co-opsNtlon and Di.saZ'tnament , Challenge Press pty. 
Ltd. , Coburq , Vic . , c. 1960 . Interpretative accounts of the 
proceedings can be found in the following : A . G .  Platt , A RllpOJ't 
to t'he Pltuident and MerribBPs of thtl N. S. 'fl. Stat• llDsoutivs of the
ALP on tM ANZ Congress f oze Intemati.ona.1. Coop•Mtlon and
DitKrl'fnOllltmt. he l.d  in Me 'UJouztns - 'Ith to 1 4th NovembeP .. 1959 ,
22 January , 1960; Frank �opfelmacher , 'Hore Than A Stunt ' , 
ObseztVeze , 28 Novanber , 1959 1 Outlook ,  Vol . 3 ,  No . 6 ,  December 1959 1 
Harold Crouch et al.. , op. oi.t. 1 '!'he Peaoemak.11zt , Vol .  21 , No. 12 ,
Decaaber 1959 , and Vol .  22 , Noa . 1 & 2 ,  January-February 19601 
w. Macmahon Ball , 'I Nas No Match for Madame ' , Nation , 21 November ,
1959 1 Vincent Buckley , James Jupp , Barry Jones , & Phillip Knight , 
' Wha t  Really Happened at the Peace Conference ' , Obse1'1)ezt , 
26 December , 1959 ; 'Pztospect ,  Vol . 3 ,  No .  1 ,  Melbourne , 1960 ; 
Rev .  Alan Brand , ' Statemen t Issued to Sydneg Press , March 4 ,  1 964 ' ,
reprinted in Peaoe Aotion , Vol . 6 ,  No .  2 ,  Sydney , March 1964 1 
Richard JCrygier , ' 'J!he SOft Sell ' , ObserrrJe1.' , 14 November ,  1959 I 
and tha daily press throuqhout Australia , as well as the coomuniat 
papers Pltibun• and Gua!'dian (Vic . & Qld . ) .  
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tha controversy , reported the independent socialist journal <Mt Zook ,  
"ha• been to make impossible any more of the bad old Conqreaeea .  Wider 
122 sections of the electorate are moving• . Moreover , in connection 
with the platitudes , they perhaps manifested an ability on the part of 
the deleqatea to compromise at critical points rather than force 
permanent divisions . Neither were all the conference findings non-
constructive or meaningless , nor the occupational and age groupings 
without aiqnif icance in the developaent of future peace groups outside 
the movement ' s  main stream - e. g. , the Youth Conference in the formation
of the Victorian CND ,  and the Scientists '  Conference in helping to 
instigate the Australian Puqwash group . 
The standard of the scheduled talks was generally agreed by critics 
and supporters alike to be of high quality - thouqh the discussion• which 
followed often drif ted into the proeaic and cliche-ridden (as mi9ht be 
expected at a forum of public participation) .  
Fran the standpoint of the hypercritical Australian pres s , tha 
hiqh-water mark of the week of Conqress activities occurred during the 
middle of the week when a small minority of delegates , toqether with 
some persons not attending the Conqreaa , called a special meeting to 
review the proceedings of the congress . The meeting was chaired by the 
Anglican Dean of Melbourne , Dr. Barton Babbage , who (as noted supm) had 
previously withdrawn as a sponsor . After hearing reports fran Mr .  
122. OUt'Look , Vol . 3 ,  No . 6 ,  December 1959.
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Vincent Buckley (on Artiata ' and writers '  Conference) ,  Mr .  James Jupp 
(Citizens ' ) ,  Mr. Barry Jones (Mucation) , and Mr .  Phillip Knight (Youth) , 
the meeting reaolved that " the aim of the Congress was to set up a new 
pexmanent Australian peace organisation under the control of the Communist
1 23 Party and the Co1mnuniat front World Peace Council " .  Sane of the 
Congress delegates attending the protest meeting indicated they were 
going to dissociate themselves fran any decision• handed down by the 
drafting canmittee s  of the sectional oonferences .  They claimed the 
resolutions were "deliberately vaque" and passed under conditions which 
1 24 gagged free discussion. 
However , this partimlar point of view , which was directed mainly 
at the four above mentioned sectional conferences , was certainly not 
shared by the overwhelming majority of Congress delegates . Their 
enthuaia• and sense of achievement - after a week of discussion ,  debate , 
reaolution drafting , controversy (acmetimea personally abusive) , 
frustration and triumph - was vividly captured by one of their m•ber ,
125 Mrs . Joy Guyatt of Queensland , in the following description of the 
final plenary gatherin9 : 
123 .  Melbourne Sun , 13 November , 1959 . 
1 24. rhll CouPl.el'-Malt ,  13 NovElllber , 1959.
1 25. An active member of the ALP, Mrs . Guyatt contested the Federal
aeat of Ryan in the 1961 election. Later she became a manber
of the Qld. central Executive of the Labor Party , a position 
aha hold• today. 
"!'be Chairman oL the Congrea• , Rev. Alr D1c:Jd.e , .PUt tbs 
Declaration of Hopel. 26 to the meeting for accept:ance 
or rejection. A loud shout oL 'Age '  arose from over 
lOOO throats. Rev. Diald.e •pole• again - ' 'rhose
again11t? ' • The contrasting silence , unbroken bg a 
•1ngle d1ssent1ent , was most dramat1c.
" Jihen 1t was clear that we had aclUeved our goal , the
1••ue or a unan.tmous �tement , the delegates expressed 
their jog 1n the manner of all enthu•1astic gather!nls
- by cheers , band-clapping, stamp.1ng and wh1•tl:l.ng. " 27 
a s .  
The DtlOZaztation of Hope refers to the Congress statement drafted by
the representatives from the eiqht ' autonanous ' conferences together with . 
the Chairman and Secretary of the Congress . Althouqh it was couched in 
generalities and promulgated broad principles rather than policies , it 
aerved ita intended purpose of bec:cming a creed for the peace movement 
during the ' Sixties ' - especially for the pacificists . 
In the sense that the C-onqrass helped to lay the groundwork for 'the 
future expansion of the pacificist wing , it must be adjudged a success . 
Yet , at the time , the criterion for success or failure was almost solely 
related to the canmunist issue. 'this was the issue that had initiated 
the great public debate , and it represented the standard by which the 
1 28 Congress in the and must also be evaluated . Unfortunately , the 
1 26 . See Appendix A for a copy of the DsoZaztation of Hope. 
1 27. NBtl1 Age , Brisbane , 3 December , 19 59 .
1 28. The debate had been touched off with a press statanent in June by 
the External Affairs Minister , Mr .  R. G .  Casey . Although he was 
tourinq abroad when the Congress concluded , he reiterated his 
claim that it was a " straiqht Communist-front meeting" . (BBC TV 
interview reported in the Melbourne Age , 11 November , 1959 . ) 
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verdicts were as inclusive and varied a s  the predisposed attitudes of 
the commentators . Thus fran one critical deleqate , who had condemned 
the Conqres e from the beginning , came the verdict : " • • •  now that it [ the 
Congreas] is dead , one can see why • • • •  ['lbere was] Communist control of
the prelillinary organisation , Communists monopolisinq the ' office ' , 
1 29 
Communist Secretaries runninq several of the sectional conferences . " 
Another delegate , also an intellectual but with an entirely 
different predisposition towards the Congreas , tartly observed : " If 
the Party led the Conqreas , they did it like the Duke of Plaza Toro , 
fran behind1 so far behind as to be almost inviaible1  and al ao  to 
sinqularly l ittle purpose as the conference finding s and the final 
l30 Congress Charter of Hope show. " 
Few persons (the CPA included) would deny the Party was e119'aqed in
a "united front from below" strateqy , "attracting aggressive support in 
131 pre-revolutionary politics• whenever and wherever possible. But an 
evaluation of the Party ' s success in :lmplementinq this strateqy defied
any qeneral aqreenent , mainly because different criteria were selected 
and different measuring technique• adopted - an almost inevitable
outcane .in the ideoloqical context of the Cold war . 
l 29 .  'PJtospsct , No .  1 ,  1960 , presumed to have been written by the 
editor , Vincent Buckley. 
130.  Myra Roper , ' Letter to the EdJ tor ' , Nation , 5 December , 1959 .
lJl .  J . D. Playford , op. oit. , p. 402 . For accounts of the united 
front policy of the Canmunists , see his Chap s .  5 & 8 .  
CHAPTER I I I
WEST AUSTRAL I AN MOVEMENT 
Following the Melbourne Conqress the pacif icist wing gradually beqan 
to show signs of beccminq a viably structured , enduring and expanding 
movement . over the years it evolved the movement requisites enumerated 
by Blumer of "orqanisation and fom , a body of custans and traditions , 
establ ished leadership , an enduring division of labor , social rules and 
social values - in short , a culture , a aocial organisation , and a new 
scheme of life" .
1 
In contradistinction , the pacifiat section failed to expand beyond 
its coterie of small , self-contained groups , and its influence as an 
independent political force raaainad negligible , despite the 
contributions some of its members made to the developnent of the overall 
movement . 
In this and the next chapter the specific OJ:9anisationa , activities 
and personnel asaociated with both sections of the peace mov•ent will 
be examined closely in the states of Western Australia and Queensland. 
These two states have been selected as prototypes of the movement 
operating in the two most active states , New South Wales and Victoria. 
l . H .  Blumer , 'Collect1ve Behllv1our' , in A.M . Lee (ed . ) , NBl4 tMtt.tns 
of thtl PztinoipZss of Sooiotogy ,  Barnes & Noble , N . Y . , 1951 , p .  199 .
87 . 
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w.A. ' •  diversified structure tended to resemble that of Victoria , whereas
Qld ' s hi9hly centrali•ed structure mirrored the organisational framework 
of N . s . w. 
However , before undertaking this detailed description oum analy•i• 
for Western Australia and Queensland , it is proposed to look broadly at
the organisation and modus op•�and.i of the movement on an Australia-wide 
basis . 
Organisati onal  Structure of Austral ian Peace Movenent 
Almost without exception, the larger and more enduring peace groups 
are organised formally on a state-wide basis . The names of the 
orqaniaationa contain the names of the states or capital oitiea , and the 
mpportars undoubtedly perceive their orqanisations in federal terms . 
While some of the state groups may belonq to national bodies , the 
latter do not exercise coercive powers over policy or provide the 
impetus for activities .  The national bodies merely serve as 
0C11111unicative and co-ordinative links - the 1 talking shops ' which help 
to c•ent what the pacifici•t• fondly refer to as their ' fraternal tie s ' .
Occasionally , large national conferences are held to propa9andise 
publicly the views of the peace movanent - s . g. , the 1959 Melbourne 
concp:esa and the 1964 Sydney Conqrees - and , in the wake of critical
world and national events , meetings on a movement-wide basis are convened 
for the most active participants to asaeaa these events and to discuss 
future qoals and methods - e.g. ,  the Sydney inter-organisational meeting 
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of January 1967 in the aftermath of the resounding election def aat. 
More frequently ,  however , u11U&lly on an annual or semi-annual ba•i• , the
individual poupinqa within the movement such as SOS , the continuing 
COlllDittees of the Melbourne Congress , WILPF , eta. meet nationally to 
discuss their particular problans and co-ordinate their atrateqies and 
tactic• . An aura of ' renewing the faith ' for the camnitted tends to 
prwail at these meetinqs 1 certainly the independence of the state body 
ia not jeopardised. 
'thus , while one can allude to an Australian peace movement , a 
nationally oztganised mov•ent is largely illusory . The orqanisational 
aspect is confined to the exchanqing of correspondence , the planninq of 
national tours by foraiqn visitors , the clarification of broadly 
conceived policies and strategies , and the co-ordination of activitiea 
whenever feasible . 'Dle mainstay of the movement is clearly bu.ilt around 
the state groups , with a few groups recently oriented around the 
universities .  
Some of the state groups have established branches in the suburbs 
and in the towns. These sub-units usually operate autonomously ,  
maintaining their foxmal links with the state qroups throuqh an oYerlap 
of leadership , similarity of name , and consensus of broadly defined 
goals.  The structural atomisation of the peace groups , with their 
emphasis on individual participation , can be traced , in part , to the 
mov•ent ' s  9eneral attitude towards their government ' s  foreign policy 
formation process . •Traditional - diplanacy with its confidentiality , its 
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detailed neqotiations over small iesues , itll reputation for old world 
deviousness , its monopoly by the upper clasaes , its lack of personal 
2 
force and color" ia denounced in the context of anti-danocracy. The 
aim of the peace supporters is to construct their organisations in 
accordance with the peace norms they are advocating . However , as the 
individual qroups have developed , they have tended to become dominated 
by their executive committees or one or two personalitie s .  The ideal of 
rank and file participation and control is soon sacrif icad to the 
pragmatisn of institutional survival and efficacy , and perhaps personal 
power accretion. 
To summarise : - Centralised control tends to exist within the qroups , 
while pluralism prevails between the groups . Graphically , t'he movement 
resembles not a pyramidal hierarchy , but a system of layers , with the 
top , national layer , moreover , formle ss and powerless .  The second layer 
at the state level is the dynamic el•ent of the movenent1 the third , 
fourth and descending layers , thouqh organisationally independent , derive 
their strength from the state bodies . In addition, amonq the state 
bodies (particularly in N. s . w. and Qld. ) ,  one state qroup tends to stand 
out as the ' core body ' or ' amalqamatinq force' around which the other 
groups develop various deqrees of affinity , based upon such factors as 
overlappinq membership , common historical roots , use of the dominant 
group ' s equipaent and facilities , joint undertaking of activities , and 
the similarity of aims and objectives . Since the ' core body ' is apt to 
2. F.dward Shila , !I'hs Tonnent of Seer-soy , The Free Press , Glencoe , Ill . ,
19 56 , P• 128 . 
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be qreater in size , as well as in many other resources ,  its gravitational 
pull can prove irreaistible and in some cases destructive . This ia not 
to say that the smaller bodies lack autonomy or take orders from the 
' core body ' . The relationship is more one of subtle influence than of 
overt domination . Por example , rarely , can one of the non- ' core bodies ' 
( irrespective of its structural layer) undertake successfully a major
project without the assistance or at least the tacit approval of the 
' core body ' • 
In effect , the peace movement mobilised for action qua a movement 
through the ' core bodies ' . They amalqamated what would otherwise have 
been a hopelessly disparate and fractionalised collection of peace 
groups . When the multifarious smaller qroups formulated polar attitudes 
- gradualism VB radicalism , moderation VB militancy , constitutionalism VB
anarchism, and power manipulation VB power renunciation - the ' core bodies ' 
attempted to mollify the differences .  Since they achieved a modicum of 
success in this role , they came to speak for the broadest section of the
movement . Certainly, to the press and hence to a larqe section of the 
public , they conveyed the impression of being th.e movement .
The ' core bodies ' ,  at least until after the 1966 Federal elections , 
were the continuing Committees of the Melbourne Congress or their direct 
successors . This can be attributed to a number of reasons : ( 1) they 
deliberately propounded the movement ' s lowest common denominator 
re9ardin9 issues and policies ( in the prooeas exposinq themselves to
charges of promulgating peace banalities) 1 ( 2 )  they made special efforts
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to initiate coaaunity-w14• projects that would involve the other qroups 1 
( 3 )  within their own organisation• they attanpted to encanpass support 
fran all the types of diaaenters or potential dissenters (in this they 
were not always too successful ) 1  (4 ) their aims and objectives were 
usually leas sectarian , being amendable to comprani•e1 and ( 5) most 
importantly, they possessed the advantage of a fairly reliable and 
constant financial and numerical base of suppor t ,  so that they were not 
subject to the sudden and sharp reversals that affected those qroups 
appealinq to transient and impecunious supporters and dependent on the 
chari•a of one or two leaders .  Fran their left wing trade union base 
of support the Continuing Camnitteea or their equivalents were able to 
set up pemanent headquarters manaqed by experienced and of�n salaried 
3 
official• and staff , whose professionalism could bring direction to
a movanent , which , by its nature , tends to attract political dilettantes .  
The three major centres o f  peace activity existed aloncJ the 
Eastern •eaboard , in Sydney, Brisbane , and Melbourne. Of the three 
cities , the movanent was least integrated in Melbourne. The ANZ congress 
canpeted against a multiplicity of groups and encountered a host of
rankling problems endanic to the Melbourne scene a in.tel' a'Lia ,  the deep 
divisions that exist in the Victorian trade union movement and within 
the State branch of the ALP ,  the schi• between the intellectual 
3 .  'lhe best staffed peace group existed in Sydney. Th e  AICD , in 
fiacal 1966-67 , anployad on a full-time or part-time basis seven 
officers and staff members , earninq a pay-roll of $13 , 146. 51.
(G . R. Anderson , St101'stazty 's Repwt to Annua'L Gen.smZ Meeting of 
A. I. C. D. , 19 June , 1967 . ) 
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dissenters and the claaa diaaentara that f irat erupted at the Melbourne 
Conqraa a ,  and the inability of the ' old guard ' peace leadership to adapt 
to the deand• and style• of the new and potential recruits. The failure 
of the ANZ Conqreaa to maintain its poaition of ' core body' affected 
not only its local influence but its national prcminence as well . 
Neither , for different reasons , did any one qroup daninate the 
mnall movements in Western Auatralia , south Australia , or Ta .. nia . In 
Western Australia , the W.A. Peace Council or WPC (roughly the equivalent 
of the Continuinq Cc:Jmmitteea in the other states ) shared control with . a 
small coterie of pacifists and their organisations . 
Western Austra l i a  
The W.A.  peace movement was liJaited in both effort and effect. Ita 
' hard core ' participants never nmnbered in the years between 1960 and 
1966 more than twenty-five , and its impression upon the general public 
in a State more interested in the politics of places and projects than 
issues and ideas was neqligible . Its penetration and success in the 
trade unions was limited , primarily because " traditionally the industrial 
movement in Western Australia has been weaker , less militant , and more 
4 State-centred than that in the eastern States" . Moreover , the potential 
support of the more militant unions was dissipated in the long struggle 
between these union• and the AWU over the issue of the establishment of 
a separate Trades and Labor Council . The peace movement did achieve some 
4. Louise overacke.r , Austzta1:lan Pazeties in a Changing SooUty 1 946-61 ,
l' . W. Cheshire, Melbourne , 1968 , p .  81 . 
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success in the co-operative links it managed to forge with the extra-
parliamentary winq of the State Labor Party. But these links , for the 
most part , constituted the personal ties of men like the Rev . Keith 
5 6 Dowdinq and Mr .  Lawrence D. (Laurie) Wilkinson , and were not the 
result of the movement ' s  organisational talents in acting as a ' ginqer 
group ' within the ALP or in mobilising outside pressure on the Party . 
Even the tacit endorsement of most peace movement policie• by Mr .  Frank 
E .  Chamberlain , the powerful ALP State Secretary (since 1949 ) and ALP 
Federal President and then Federal Secretary (between 1956 and 1 963 ) did 
not bolster the W.A. movement qua a movement , since his time was 
engrossed mainly in intra-Party factional struggles at both the Federal 
and State levels . 
w.A. ' s  embryonic movement consisted of t1«> main qroupinqe a  first ,
the W.A. Section of the Australian Peace COUncil (WPC) which derived its
chief support fran the left wing and canmunist daninated trade unions 
(the class dieaenters) and was associated with the national body in 
Melbourne; and second , the qroupinq of pacifist orqaniaationa that 
included the Quaker Peace CClnmittee (QPC) , the Fellowship of Reconciliation 
(FOR) , and the Conscientious Cbjectora Advisory COmmittee (COAC) . 
Closely related to the f irat grouping were the Hiroshima Commemoration 
5 . Rev. Dowdinq was ALP State Vice-President , but resigned in the 
early l960 ' s fran the ALP when he was given the choice of either 
renouncing hi& membership in the Dmniqration Reform Group or 
leaving the ALP . The fonier body had been proscribed by the ALP 
because it advocated the abolition of the so-called ' White 
Australia Policy ' • 
6 .  See pp . 101- 102 for description of his activities . 
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Camnittee and the State Sponsoring Committee of the 1964 Sydney Congres s ,
whilst the Women ' s  International League for Peace and Freedan ' s (WILPP) 
7 membership overlapped with that of 1:he pacif ist groups . 
As well as co-operating with each other on many projects - e . g. , 
marches , meetings ,  circularising petitions , sto. - the two major groupings 
formed the nucleus of the State ' s  two largest issue-oriented peace 
bodies , the Western Australia CND (unilateral renunciation of the
procuranent of nuclear weapons) and the Church and Community Committee 
on Vietnam (anti-Vietnam policy) . What little public support was 
mobilised for peace dissent was mainly achieved thrOUCJh these two 
8 9 orvanisations. Att•pta to organise groups like SOS , VAC ,  and YCAC 
never gained the support enjoyed by their counterparts in the Eastern 
States .  
By 1966 , the Peace Council , in the words of its secretary, wa s  
•nearly non-existent , the reason being that we felt that the Peace
Movement has now becane so large that our best work would be to encourage 
lO peace moves fran an y  direction• . The qroup ' s decline can also be 
7 .  AlthOUCJh the w.A. Branch of WILPF managed to publish fairly 
regularly a local journal called Psacs and Freed.an , it was involved 
in few other peace activities during the l960 ' s . 
8.  Occasionally , ad hoe peace groups were formed such as the one which 
confronted Prime Miniater Bolt during the 1966 election campaign 
and forced him to flee in a hastily camnandeered taxi . (See 
Yha Austmlian , 16 November , 1966 . )
I. A few months before the 1966 Pederal elections the tiny SOS Branch
manentarily captured national attention when one of its members 
threw a shoe at Prime Minister Holt. 
l O. H . G .  Clemen ts , letter to the writer , 18 February , 1966 .
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attributed to some factors outside its control . From the tiae of it• 
inception ahortly after the foundinq of the parent body in Melbourne on
JUly 1 ,  1949 , the Perth branch had constantly been subjected to public 
criticism. for its alleqedly partisan Moscow view• and double standards 
of peace . 11 Althouqh Secretary H . G .  Clamente12 considered these charges
to be unjust smears , in correspondence with the author , he baa merely 
confined his defence to the simple observation s "We have never been a 
pacif iat organisation and will support any atru99le for freedom and 
13justice with force if necessary . " 
In the early years of the organisation , it only manaqed to stay 
alive, according to Mr .  Clements , due " to  the devotion of Katharine 
susannah Prichard , doyen of the Australian literary world • • •  11 • 1 4 An
15 octogenarian in 1963 , the late Miss Prichard understandably became leas 
and less active in Peace Council affairs , though her continued intereet 
in the peace movement was reflected in the theme of her last book ,
Subtte PZarne (1967 ) . 
ll . See Chapter II , p .  52 , for an account of some of the opposition 
that the Australian Peace Council encountered . 
12 . Mr .  H . G .  Clements became Secretary in 1954 , a post he held throughout 
the years of this study . Professionally, he is known as John 
Clenents ,  the reader of Australian verse and short stories ( " the 
beat • • •  we have" , accordinq to the Sydney Sun Herald, quoted on a 
blurb of Grand Specialities , the name of Clement ' s  record.inq 
businesa) . 
lJ. H . G .  Clements , letter to the writer, 8 March , 1966 .
14 . Ibid. 
15 . Mi•• Prichard died l OCtober , 1969 .
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The declining fortunes of the Peace Council can probably best be
explained by the nature of its power base . The Council had always 
depended chiefly on the narrow and weak base of support it received from 
the ' old guard '  class dissenters in the trade unions . When new types
of dissenters beqan caninq into the national movanent , first appearinq
in the am groups and then inundatinq the movement over the Vietnam
iasue , the Council failed to adopt new pol icies and attitudes to attract
than. The same sort of problem of being ' locked-in ' to its power base 
curbed the growth of the ANZ Congress in Victoria. Yet the Victorian 
qroup at least enjoyed the minimum backing of some very powerful unions , 
whereas the Council ' s  support cmne from small union s , and , in its 
general relations with the trade union movement , it constantly met
serious rebuffs .  For example , its applications to participate in the
annual Perth Labor Day Parades with a float and contingent of its own 
16 were never favourably received .
Despite all these difficulties ,  the Peace Council came as close as 
any peace qroup in Western Australia to assuming the role of ' core body ' .
It led the protests over the Government ' s  decision to mild a radio base 
1 6 .  Application were rejected in 1961 , 1962 , 1963 and 1964 , and not 
suanitted thereafter . usually peniission was denied without 
explanation , but the 1964 request was turned down on the grounds
that , "As the Trade Unions and the ALP are known to be in full
support of the abolition of war ,  for the settlement of international 
disputes ,  quite obviously , your Peace one [ f loat] would be a
duplication of sanething that we ourselves are telling the public . "
(G . Piesley ,  Hon . Organiser , Labor Day Committee , letter to the 
Secretary , Peace Council , 26 February , 1964 . ) 
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for the Polaris submarines at Exmouth Gulf on the Northwest Coast -
co-ordinating a national petition in w. A. on this i ssue in 1961 , 
publishing a pamphlet entitled ' Earl g Warnlng '  which was widely 
distributed in the trade union movement , and leading a deputation to 
1 1  
the u. s .  Vice Consul in Perth. Initia1ly ,  the Council erroneously 
l B  
maintained (despite press reports to the contrary) that the intention 
was to build " a  u. s .  Polar is sul:marine base on our N . W. Coast similar
to those e stablished in Scotland"l 9 rather than the construction of a
very powerful low frequency radio base for the United States . The
Council warned that "onc e  the U. S .  gets a base , it asserts the riqht to 
hold on to it even to the extent of armed attack on any government which
trie s  to remove the base " , and cited "U. S .  threats to CUba over the 
Guantanamo base , which is on CUban soil , • • •  [as]  warninqa to Au•tralia . 
Rmanber" , continued the Council , "no Australian will be allowed in the 
area without u. s. permission" . 20 The comparison with CUba was probably 
moat unfortunate , and it is not too surprising that Protests over the
base never made appreciable headway . According to public opinion polls , 
1 7 .  see Psaoe Aoti.on , Vol . 2 , No . 3 ,  Apr il 1961 , p .  11 1 and Peaoe 
Action , Vol .  2 ,  No .  S ,  June 1961 , p .  11 . Members of the 
deputation , besides Mr .  Clements , included A .  Mitchell of the 
seamen ' s  Union , K. Day of the Amalgamated Engineering Union , 
B. Erles of the Fremantle Younq Labor League and eight women 
representing the Union of Australian women and women ' s committees 
of industrial unions . 
l B. See Melbourne Hezaa. Zd ,  27 January , 1961 1 Bydnsy Momi.ng Htn'tl.ld ,  
2 8  February , 1961 1 and Sydney DaiZy Petegmph , 2 7  March , 1961 .
19 . Pamphlet Eazely Wazeni.ng , issued by secretary , Australian Peace
Council , w.A .  Division , n. d. 
20. Ibid.
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an overwhelain9 majority of Australian• favoured a u. s .  presence on 
2l Australian soil as a kind of insurance policy. 
During the first part of the ' Sixties ' the Council was also actively 
engaged in propagandising the rise of neo-Nazi• and irredentian in West
Germany. 'lbe so-called ' German Problan ' ,  in fact , constituted a major 
preoccupation throughout: Australia of the Continuinq Committees of the 
22 
Melbourne Conqresa in the years precedinq the Vietnam issue . outside 
screenin9a of the film Nei.n Xampf, Peace Council supporters distributed
a pamphlet entitled Neva- Again , which pointed out that " sane of the 
2l . In reply to the Roy Morgan (Gallup) Poll question , "Do you favour 
or oppose letting America build that radio station in Australia?" , 
eiqhty percent of the respondents said they supported the station. 
Only eleven percent were opposed . Comments fran th>se polled 
reportedly took the following sort of l ine :  "Australia is not
strong enough alone" ; "America is our main hope for defence" 1 
" they saved us before" . That poll was conducted in April 1963 . 
As early as 1960 , another Morgan Poll had reported that sixty-two 
percent of the Australian people said that the U . S .  should be 
permitted to set up bases in Northern Australia similar to those 
in England , if she wanted to .  Only twenty-three percent had said 
' no ' . 
22 . Mr .  Sam Goldbloan , a Jew and Secretary of the ANZ Congress , was 
particularly vocal o n  the topic o f  growing militarian in the 
Federal Republic of West Germany ,  and authored a widely circulated 
article called Ge.man Re-azrmament - The G:reat Betm.yat , as well as
a pamphlet entitled Peace and the Gennan 'Pzaob lem . A film called 
the �rman Story Today was distributed amonq the various peace
groups , and the national peace literature abounded with articles 
such as ' The Ei. chmann 'l'r!al and Hls Accomplices 7.'0dag' (Peaos 
Aotion , Vol . 2, No . 1 ,  February 1961 ) . In the period immediately 
following the Melbourne Conqress , the Australian Peace Council , 
including its W. A .  section , responded to an appeal fran the WPC 
that support be organised in defence of seven German peace workers 
accused by the West German Federal Republic of undermining " the 
constitutional basis of the Federal Republic" . 'l!le support fran 
the Australian sections took the form of cables and letters to the 
Special criminal Court in Dasaeldorf and messaqes sent to the 
aolicitora of the accused . 
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people you saw in Mein Kanpf ar e  [ again ] in top positions • • •  [ and ] 
operating policie s  which prevent a peaceful solution to the German 
23 
problen which is the greatest threat to the whole world" . 
Other activities of the Council included the sponsoring of peace 
24 25 poster exhibitions , the circularising of national peace petitions , 
and the aellinq of various publications including an article on the 
Crimes Act and the APC ' a  j ournal P�. In addition , the C0tmcil collected
aignatures for a protest letter to the South African Hiqh Commis sioner in 
Canberra , denouncing the Sharpesville massacre and the policy of 
26 27 apartheid. The Council sold Lumumba post cards , as well as the leea 
controversial UNESCO Christmas cards . Occasionally ,  it organised a 
march or demonstration , and waa instrumental in fondnq the Hiroshima 
Commeuoration Committee which held a meeting cum march once a year on 
the anniver sary of the dropping of the A-banb on Japan . And finally , the 
Council was the chief body pr<me>ting the W. A. Sponsoring Canmittee of the 
1964 Sydney Conqress . 
The other main grouping in the W. A. movanent - the pacifist bodies -
was caaposed pr imar ily of members of the society of Friends , who had 
23 . Peace Aotion , Vol .  2 , No . 6 ,  July 1961 , p .  11 . 
24. P•a09 Aotion , Vol . 6 ,  No .  7 ,  Auqust-September 1964 , p .  10.
25. For a description of these national petitions , see Chap . 5 ,
PP • 164-165 . 
26 . Letter fran W.A.  Peace Council to South African High Commiasioner 
dated 24 March , 1960. 
27. Cited in letter fran Victorian Peace council to all States and 
New Zealand dated 23 March , 1961 . 
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been dedicated to the cause of paoif i• for many years . Operating 
through the Qgaker Peace Ccmm1ttee (QPC) , the Fallowahip of Reconciliation 
(FOR) and the C.Onacientious Objectors Advisory Committee (COAC) , they 
confined most of their activities to meetings and discussions , yet sane 
of their members played prominent rSlaa in the iasue-oriented and ad hoo 
pacificist groups - via. , the W. A. CND and the Church and C<mmunity 
Committee for Vietnam. 
One of the moat ubiquitous activists among the Perth pacifists was 
Lawrence D .  (Laurie) Wilkinson ,  the Quaker elected on the ALP ticket in 
1966 to fill a casual vacancy in the Australian Senate . Senator 
Wilkinson was subsequently re-elected for a full term in the 1967 Senate 
elections . As a senator , he has not been particularly outspoken in hi• 
criticism of Australia ' s  involvement in Vietnam (perhaps because pacifism 
ia not a part of Labor Party policy) , but acting as a Quaker , he baa 
continued to voice strongly his opposition to the war. Attending the 
Fourth World Conference of the Religious Society of Friends at Greensboro , 
North Carolina in August 1967 , he was appointed a member of the
Conference ' s  six-man delegation that delivered a statement to the U . S .  
Departments o f  state and Defense , demanding the withdrawal of "all 
28 support , active and tacit , fran this war" . For a long time , a special 
interest of Senator Wilkinson has been the application of a ' scientific 
method ' to the study of peace throuqh the establishment of peace research 
institutes . Be supported such an idea at the time of the 1964 Sydney 
28. Paotfio , Vol . 2 ,  No. 3 ,  Sydney , September-October 1967 , p.  20.
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29 
Congress ,  and in his maiden Senate speech proposed that a peace 
research institute be financed by the Government at the Australian 
ll&tional Univeraity along lines aimilar to those of the International 
30 Peace and Conf liot Research Inatitute operating in SWeden. 
Before his election to the Senate, Senator Wilkinson helped the W.A. 
pacifiata aet up a local branch of the COAC. The purpoae of thi• body , 
which also had branch•• in the other states and the A. C.T. , was to offer 
counsel to young men about to be conscripted who expreaaed reservations 
about being forced to take or asaiat in the taking of human life - either 
in all wars or in a particular war . COAC ' a  official position was to
offer whatever philosophical assistance it aoul4 , and channel legal 
matters , when necesaary , to members of the law profession. 
Although it only numbered about twenty members and met irregularly , 
FOR was the most active of the W.A. pacifists groups between 1960 and 
1966. This group - which never officially affiliated with the national 
pacifist body , the Federal Pacifist Council - assisted prominently in 
creating and activating groups like the Church and Coanunity Committee 
and the COAC . It also joined the Peace council in numerous undertakings 
- • . g. , the Hiroshima Commemoration Day Services - and staunchly supported 
many of the CND projects . On Auqust 7th , 1966 , it helped to organise a 
march and rally of about 500 anti-conscriptionists , during which two 
29 . For an exposition of his views on peace research, see 1!he PeacemakR ,
Vol. 27 , Nos . 6 & 7 ,  JUly-August 1965 . 
30 . CPD, S. ,  Vol . 33 , 1 March , 1967 , pp .  221-222 . 
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youths burned their draft cards . However , its own activities - due to 
it• size - were limited to more modest undertakinqs like the leafletinq 
of handbills , orqaniaing of public study qroups , and the schedulinq of 
meetinqs to be addressed by outside spaakera . 31 
The pacifists , as well as the Peace Council , were much more effective 
in gaining public recoqnition throuqh the issue-oriented organisations. 
In early 1962 a CND group, inspired by the success of the British model , 
was created in W.A. Almost fran its inception until it• quiescent demise 
in mid-1965 , the CND ' ers dominated Perth peace activity. Their 
objectives and language were •illlilar to those of the British CND , in that 
they wanted to alert the public to the dangers of nuclear weapons and 
prevent a ' nuclear armaqeddon ' , but unlike their British counterparts 
who were propo•in9 unilateral nuclear disamament for Britain , the W.A. 
CND ' ers and their colleagues in Melbourne , Sydney, and Brisbane sought 
to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into Australia. 
Specifically , they supported the Leader of the Opposition ' s call for a 
nuclear-free Southern Hani•phere ,  which they believed demanded two 
initiatives fran the Australian Government s  " a )  Non-acceptance of 
nuclear weapons ; b) Refusal of military bases , such as the North-West 
32 cape Radio Station . "  The Governnent ' a decision to grant a site to the 
u . s .  for the aODmunioationa baae at Learmonth was bitterly denounced by 
CND ,  and at its cons tant round of public meetings and danonstrations 
Jl . For an account of sane of the major activities of FOR ,  see !Iha 
PtlQIJBltlaklJZ' , Vol .  27 , No . 2 ,  March 1965 . 
32. "II. A. CND Montht11 NIRMBUtt.r , February 1963 .
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fozmed the principal issue of protest. These protests were frequently 
attended by officials of the W.A. Branch of the ALP ,  and by 
parliamentarians like Senator-elect John Wheeldon . 
W.A. CND went to elaborate lengths to try to make the peace issue 
relevant and immediate to their fellow West Australians . To demonstrate 
graphically the realities of nuclear warfare, the Committee prepared a 
pamphlet , with map, depictinq an assimilated attack on the city of Perth .
Entitled An Aeeumsd 2'hezrmonwal.9al' Attack , the pamphlet applied to Perth 
33 the f indinqa of a atudy of an assimilated attack on Boston, Massachusetts. 
In the Perth situation - contended w.A. CND - if only blast and fireatom 
(not radiation) effects were considered , a mere 6\ of the population 
would escape uninjured fran a 6 megaton bomb . 425 , 000 persona would be 
killed , and there would be 45 , 000 injured to be attended to by 20 
34 
surviving doctors . Another pamphlet , widely distributed by W.A. CND , 
was an article that had appeared in Nation stressing the fact that the 
u . s. radio base , " in  the event of an outbreak of nuclear hostilities 
between world powers , • • •  would be a logical target for immediate 
destruction by intercontinental ballistic missiles1 the very difficulty 
of knocking out submarines would , of course , make it the more imperative 
to cut off their ccmmunication" .
35 
33 . Reported in NiJIJJ BngZand Jou:ientlZ of Mediaine , Vol.  266 , Boston ,
31 May , 1962 , pp . 1126-55 . 
34. Psaoe Aotion , Vol.  4 ,  No. 2 ,  March 1963 .
35. Nation, 23 March , 1963 .
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Still - despite the zeal of am members , whose activities also 
included leading the local version of the 'WOrld-wide Easter Aldexmaston 
marche•36 and participating actively in the annual Hiroshima Day
37 commanorations - the political goals of most West Auatraliana continued
to be geared to the ' bread and butter ' issues . 
With the Australian Government ' s  policies confirmed at the general
elections of 1963 and the Senate elections the following year , and 
construction of the radio base well underway , the enthusiasm of the am 
supporters gradually bag an to wane . Moreover , some of CND • s d.amands 
were met in the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of July 1963 . An attEDpt to
organise a federal CND had never succeeded beyond the holding of a single 
36 .  The largest of these annual treks in W.A. occurred on Easter
SUnday , 1963 , when over 450 people were reported to have participated 
in a twelve mile march fran Fremantle to Perth.  Although the lead
banner was carried by CND ,  representation came fran all the main 
peace groups . 'lhe rally at Perth Esplanade was chaired by CND ' s  
Chairman ,  Kenneth McNaughton , and addressed by Mr .  Peter Collingwood 
and Rev. ICeith Dowding ( the Presbyterian minister who had been 
forced to resign his Vice-Presidency of the W. A. Branch of the 
Labor Party) • Also in the march, which was composed mainly of 
class dissenters but included sane religious dissenters , were Mr .  
Bert Vickers (author) , Rev . Ralph Button (Methodist and a President 
of the W.A. l'OR) , Rev . Peter Hodge (Anglican and a President of the 
W.A .  Section of APC) , and Miss I<atharine Susannah Prichard (who 
walked the last half mile) - Peaoe Aoti.on , Vol . 4 ,  No .  4 ,  May 1963 . 
The final Aldermaston rally was conducted in 196 5 ,  on Good Friday. 
The meeting was addressed by Rev. SUtton , Senator-elect John 
Wheeldon, and the Most Rev. Georqe Appleton (the Anqliean Archbishop 
of Perth) - The Peaasmaks'Z' , Vol . 27 , No .  4 ,  May 1965 . 
J7. Typical of these camnmorations was a cherry tree planting ceremony 
arranged by CND at st. Andrews Presbyterian Church , after a . march 
had been held fran the Perth railway station. (Peaoe Aoti.on , 
Vol .  6 ,  No . 7 ,  Auquat-SeptEIDber , 1964 . ) 
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national meeting in Sydney in December 1963 ,
38 
so that when Vietnam 
replaced nuclear disarmament as ths critical peace issue by 1965 , the 
CND groups throughout Australia dissolved into the anti-Vietnam 
39 
movement . In W. A.  , many of the CND ' era moved into an anti-Vietnam 
coalition called the Church and CoJllllUllity Committee on Vietnam. 
This group had been set up by the traditional pacifists and the 
' old guard ' supporters of the Peace Council in an attempt to unite all 
Vietnam opposition under one umbrella . Its position was deliberately 
vague and moderate in order to embrace all shades of dissent . It offered 
no specific solutions , confining itself to the raising of issues and the 
generating of moral concern in the c0111Dunity .  In some respects , it 
achieved a modiClB of succes s ,  since it managed to coalesce the dissent 
40 of occupational leaders from such diverse groupings as clergymen , trade 
38. The proj ected meeting for a second national conference the following 
year in Melbourne never eventuated for the reasons cited in the 
text ,  but , in addition , many of the CND ' ers r ej ected the idea of a
second conference •ince they pref erred to concentrate on the peac e
movanent ' s  major proj ect in 1964 , the organising of the national
congress in Sydney .
39 . In Melbourne the VCND virtually became the Vietnam Day Committee 
(VDC) - see R. Summy ,  op. oit. , pp. 204-209 . And in Sydney the
SCND under the direction of Mr. Robert Gould , in effect , turned 
into the beginnings of the Vietnam P ... ction Committee (VAC ) , also 
under the convenorship of Mr .  Gould . 
40 .  Th e  most outspoken of these clergymen were Rev . Sutton , Bishop 
Appleton , Rev . Do'l.ding , and Rev . Hodge . 
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41 42 43 wiioni8ta , academics , and ALP politicians , helping to pave the way 
for the national dissent that began to emerge after the ' Tet offensive ' 
of early 1968. But in terms of immediate effects , the quality of anti-
Vietnam protest - aa well as that of almos t all form.a of peace activity 
44 
in W. A .  - manifested the characteristics of ' expressive pol itics ' . In 
the entire course of W.A. peace politics between 1960 and 1966 , this 
researcher could discover only one case of the protesters achieving a
tangible victory 1 and that, on a very minor scale , was achieved by the 
Union of Australia Wanen , a group which formally does not even come within 
the def inition of the peace movement. Its success consisted of getting
a Perth shop to withdraw a window display of ' jungle war '  toys , an
incident which led one newspaper to declare "organised and arqued protest
can s till achieve wondera" .
45 
After reviewinq the record of W. A. peace activity , one peace
movement leader at least did not share thi• optimistic viewpoint . His 
verdict : "Reasoned argument is very difficult in a nation of many kinds
46 of sheep . "  
4l .  Trade union aupport was confined to those unions such as the Seamen ' s
Union , the Amalgamated Engineering Union , and Painters and Decorators
Union , which cons istently had lent their backing to the Peace Council .
42. Included among the acadanic supporters were three profeasors a Prof. 
E . IC. Braybrooke , Prof . F .  Callaway , and Emeritus Prof . H .  Roberts .  
43. Amon; th e  more prominent ALP pol iticians who endor sed statements of 
the Camnittee were Senator J .M. Wheeldon, Mr . l' . E . Chamberlain ,  and 
State Opposition Leader , Mr. A . R. G .  Hawke . 
44. For the meaning of this tena , see Chap . I ,  p .  18 .
45 . Editorial , ' Protest Upheld' ,  canbel'Z'a Times , 29 June , 1965 .
46 .  H . G .  Clement• , letter to the writer , 18 February , 1966.
108 . 
Concl us i on 
There were two features of the W.A. movement which were paralleled 
in some of the other states . The first of these features , the ab sence
of a ' core body ' , has already been mentioned . The dispersal of power in 
the W. A .  movanent was similar to the fragmented organisation that ex isted 
in Victoria (though , of course , the volatility of Melbourne ' s  peace
pol itics was unmatched in the Perth-Fremantle area , even on a per capita 
basis ) . The structural framework of the W.A . movement was also paralleled 
in South Australia , where the Continuing Committee of the Melbourne
Congress , i . e . , the s . A .  Peace Committee , was unable to assume the
daninant position . The movement there ,  as in W.A. , was divided into the 
same two major sections of pacifists and pacificists , except that the 
husband and wife team of G . E .  and Fiina Hutches son , who virtually ' ran '  
the pacificist , trade union based Peace Committee , were also members of 
the Society of Friends . Although Mr .  Hutches son admitted relations 
between the Peace Committee ' s followers and the pac if ists were slightly 
47 strained in the first years of the decade , the two sections - :for a 
variety of reasons - were much closer in subsequent years .  48 
47 . Letter frcm G . E. Hutchesson , Chairman , S . A .  Committee for I . C . D .  
(foxmerly S . A .  Peace Cormnittee ) to th e  writer , 16 November , 1967 . 
48 . A close alliance between pacifists and pacificists formed around the 
conscription and Vietnam i s sue s .  The fir st anti-Vietnam group , the 
Vietnam Protest Committee , received the strong backing of both 
sections of the peace movement , and so did the more viable group , the 
campaign for Peace in Vietnam , which was set up after the 1966 
Federal elections . Canposed primarily of middle class and middle 
aged moderates (i . e . , in the context of peace pol itics) , this latter 
group ' s  Chairman was the Professor of Philosophy at Fl inder s  
University , Brian Medlin , and its membership included th e  Premier of 
south Australia , Mr .  Don Dunstan . After 1969 , though , a new kind of 
factionalism between ' radical ' and ' reformist ' pacificists splintered 
the S . A. movement. 
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Finally , in the case of Ta•ania , it is difficult t.o draw 
organisational analoqiee with the w. A. situation because of the extremely 
low level of peace activity in the island state . 
The aecond feature the W. A. movement shared with sane of the other 
atatea - notably , S.A. and Taamania - was a failure to transfona miall 
group and. individual protestations into anyt:hing approachinq the 
insistent and unified denands of a mass movanent. There are numerous 
aplanationa to account for this . In s.A. , Tas .  and to a ali9htly lesser 
extent in Qld. , the movements were circumscribed by social factors 
•imilar to those exiatinq in W. A. The politics of . their residents did
49 not r8DOtely revolve around the iawes of foreiqn affairs and defence. 
Not even were there between 1960 and 1966 the semblance of any local cum 
peace movement issues such as arose in w.A. over the radio base , or in
s.A. , itself , in 1947-48 over the 'lbomera PDaket Range and in the 19SO ' s
over its uranium depoeita. 
Mobiliainq diff icultiea were also encountered in the three aallest 
states , becaus e the peace dissenters were unable to secure substantial 
aocio-econanic bases of support fran which large numbers of potential 
fellow dissenters could be recruited , and fran which recoqnised leadership 
for the movement could be obtained . The leadership that did exist was
49 . See Ou.P.r.,,t AffaiPs But.t.stin , Vol .  40 , No .  8 ,  11 Septenber , 1967 , 
entitled ' Pol1t1o• a t  State Level - South Austra.1111 1 ;  CAB ,  Vol . 41 ,
No .  6 ,  12 February , 1968 , entitled 'Pol1t.1.cs at Sta te Level -
QueezJ11land' 1 and CAB , Vol . 43 , No . 11 , 21 April , 1969 , entitled 
1Pol..tt1c• at State Level - Western Austral1a ' .  
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composed , in the main , of unattached artists , intellectuals , and cleric•50 
5l 
- a feature not uncommon among middle class radicals - but it ia exactly
this type of individual who exerts little influence in parochially
orimted canmunities , and who carries with his personal caamitmant no 
wider interest group backing . 
On the other hand , the situation was sanewhat different on the
F.astern seaboard . The unattached and often unknown artists and 
intellectuals found a more receptive audience in the coanopol itan cities
of Sydney and Melbourne. And after the 1966 elections , even Brisbane ,
throuqh the influence of the Society for Danocratic Action (SDA) and then
the Radical Socialist Alliance (RSA) , began to develop an experimental
and radical sub-culture . However ,  the main advantage enjoyed by the 
peace movement in the East was the fact that it was built upon a solid
base of left winq trade union support , and was able to expand during the 
' Sixties ' into other socio-econanic groupings .  Cognizance o f  the
importance of building bases of power , no doubt , ia what led the planners
of the 1959 Melbourne Congress and the 1964 Sydney Conqresa to orqanise 
thoae conferences along occupational and sociological lines rather than
on the basis of topics or lectures to large gatherings of atanised
individuals . The effect of cultivating socio-economic bases of support
50. N . B . , the principals H. G .  Clements , Katharine SUsannah Prichard ,
Bert Vickers (writer ) , and Rev. P.  Hodge in Western Australia1 and
the HUtohessons (publiahinq ) and Dr .  s .  Lovibond (Univ . of Adelaide
lecturer) in south Australia. None of these peace activists
possesaed an independent power base outside the peace movement.
51 . see Chap . I ,  p .  14 ; and Frank Parkin , op. cit. , pp . 97/f. 
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has introduced into the peace movement , in some instances , a new type of 
leadership. It has meant that some peace leaders owe their influence ,  
not to powers deve loped in the peace movement pezt se , but to position and 
prestige earned in areas outside the movement - i . B. , in the bases of 
power .  
If the movements in w.A. , S . A. and Tasmania had been successful in 
attracting as their leaders the type of people who exerted influence over 
important soaio-econOJUio 9roupin9s , then perhaps these movements could 
have duplicated - at least in proportion to their state populations - the 
achievemmts of the movements alonq the East Coast . 
CHAPTER I V  
QUEENSLAND MOV EM ENT 
By almoat any standard other than formal structure , the Queensland 
peace movement between 1960 and 1966 can be equated with the Queensland 
Peace Camlittee for International Cooperation and Disarmament , hereinafter 
shortened to Peace Committee or QPCICD . Its position as the commanding 
or ' core body ' was never successfully challenqed until the University 
based Students for Democratic Action (SDA) ,1 formed in mid 1966 , managed 
to establish an independent base of support during 1967 . This is not to 
say that the two groups were directly and consciously competing against
each other for the allegiance of supporters ,  for at first there actually 
existed a close liaison between the two organisations . But after 1966 
the QPCICD no longer dominated or set the tone for that section of the 
movement which aimed at propagandising a message , and eventually the two 
groups even became rivals . In other words , the movement of the post 1966 
Federal elections , as a consequence of SDA ' s rise , was a qualitatively
different movement in Queensland than the one operating in the first part 
of the decade. 
This theme , applied to the national mov•ent, is pursued in Chapter 
VII . However , in this chapter , the purpose is to examine the activities 
l .  In order to accamnodate non-univeraity support , this qroup by mid 
1967 changed its name to the Sooisty for Democratic Action1 then in
1969 it disbanded and its leaders formed the Revolutionary Socialist 
Alliance (RSA) , with a student branch (RSSA) on the University of
Queensland campus . 
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and supporters of the various Queensland qroups that existed between 
1960 and 1966 , and to indicate broadly their relationship to the heqemony 
of the Peace Canmittee . This situation - where a ' core body ' dominated 
the movement - was paralleled in N. s . w.  where the rSle also was assumed
by a Continuing Committee of the Melbourne Conqreaa ,  the N. s .w.  Peace 
COmmittee , and then its direct successor , the Association for International 
Cooperation and Diea:mament (AICD) . 
When the Qld. Peace Canmittee was formed out of the State ' s 
preparatory canmittee for the 1959 Melbourne Conqress , it abaorbed most 
of the personnel and equipnent of the old Qld . Assebly for Peace group , 
and assumed all of its functions .  The reason for creating the new qroup, 
which constituted little more than a chanqe in name , was to forge publicly 
identifiable links with the Victorian and N. s . w. qroups that had been set 
up after the Conqraaa. The ultimate objective , of course , was to 
encanpass some of the new forces that had been attracted to peace politics 
by the Congress .  
Although this aoion of the Melbourne Congress received more broadly 
based support than its predecessor , its success continued to depend 
heavily upon the backing of a few trade union officials at the Trades 
2 
and Labor Council of Queensland and the loyalty of a minority of the 
2. Among the more prominent and consistent trade union supporters were 
the late A. Macdonald , the Secretary of the Qld . Trades and Labor 
Counail 1 Mr .  F .  Whitby, Secretary of Federated Miscellaneous Workers 
Union , and successor to Mr .  Macdonald ' s  position upon his death in 
19691 Mr .  L. Townsend , Secretary of Vehicle Builders Union of Qld . 1 
Mr. J .  Sherrinqton , State Mana9anent Committee of B.w. 1 .u . , Mr .  P .  
O ' Brien , Snr . Vice-President Waterside workers Federation of Qld . 1 
Mr .  T .  Chard , B .W. I . U .  Qrqaniaer 1 and Mr .  N. Kane , Secretary of 
Electrical Trades Union. 
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J rank and file fran the more ' politically left ' unions .  Without the 
endorsement of these class dissenters - whose support was competently 
4 mobilised by the QPCICD ' s perennial Secretary , Mrs . No:r:ma Chalmers - the 
Committee would soon have ceased to function in any viable sense . 
Despite this trade union base , the Peace Committee ' s  Executive was
not numerically daninated by trade unionists . The majority of its 
manbers were clerqymen , academics , housewives , businessmen , students , eto. 
Yet for most of them their interpretation of society and. events was 
prtmiaed upon the dichotomic conflict between econania classes . They 
accepted the working class as the chief force around which to mobilise 
peace dissent . Their presence on the Executive Committee did not mean an 
upsurge in non trade union influence upon the QPCICD , thouqh, conversely ,  
their association extended the Camnittee ' s ties - if not influence - into 
their particular occupational and socio-econanic areas . 
This tendency of the influence to be one-directional is partly 
explained by the fact that the non-union Executive members did not come 
to the Peace camnittee with established , independent bases of power . 
J. These unions included the Waterside Workers Federation , the Seamen ' s 
Union , the Amalgamated Engineering Union , the Building Workers
Industrial Union - and to a lesser deqree - the Australian Meat 
Industry :Employees Union , the Operative Painters and Decorators 
Union , the Amalgamated Foodstuff• Union , the Federated Miacellaneous 
workers Union , and the Boilermakers and Blackaniths Society . 
4 .  Mrs . Chalmers wa s  an active member o f  the ALP . H er  husband , Hee
Chalmers , a businessman who shared his wife ' s  interest in Peace 
Committee work , was a manber of the State Executive of the Qld .
Branch of the ALP - i. e . , the QCE .  
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Other than a few extra-parliamentary officials of the ALP ,  who owed their 
s 
poaitions in the ALP to the trade union faction within the Labor Party, 
the members of non-union organisations were not influential f iqurea 
capable of involving large groups or inatitutiona in the politics of peace 
dissent. sane of the members , it ia true , provided useful contacts with 
cliques and individuals within larqe qroups , but these forces , in return , 
were not powerful enOUCJh to noticeably affect Peace Committee decisions . 
Although the Peace Committee claimed it welcaned aug9eations from friendly 
sources (and it certainly adjusted its strategy and tactics to ' feedback ' 
fran the society) , its a ims , policies and as sumptions remained uninfluenced
by sources other than a section of the trade unions . The primary flow of 
power travelled one way : frcxn a section of the trade union• (which 
obviously held some tie s  with the Communis t Party) through the Peace 
Canmittee to any part of the soc iety that could be reached. The only 
interaction affecting basic decisions occurred between the trade union 
political left and the Peace Committee , but the latter was little more 
than an appendaqe of the unions , so that its influence was merely based 
on the expertise it had gained in running peace campaigns . Graphically , 
the ayat• operated scmething like the following s 
5 .  Four officers and Executive Camnittee members o f  the Peace Committee
sat on the ALP State Executive. They were trade union officials 
F .  Whitby , T. Chard and L. Townsend (see fn. 2 ) , and businessman 
H. Chalmers (see fn. 4 ) . The three trade unionists were alao members
of the important seven man Inner Executive of the ALP. In addition , 
Mr .  Whitby was one of Qld ' • aix deleqates to the ALP ' s Federal 
Conference , and one of its two delegates on the ALP Federal 
!Xecutive. 
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At the beginning of thia chapter it was averred that the Peace 
CClmnittee , in effect , equalled the Qlc! . peace movement . Thus the centre 
box in Diaqrmn I can be exchanged for the entire peace movement , without 
basically altering any of the other el•ents of the operational system . 
The evidence for equating the Peace Canmittee with the peace 
movement rests on the relationship between the Peace Committee and the 
other Qld. peace qroupa . Whenever any maaller or emerqent qroup attanpted 
to influence the course of the mass mov•ent , it inevitably found itself 
requirin9 Peace CC:mnittee assistance , thus eventually becamin9 dependent 
on it . Since any maa s  protest depended on trade union support ,  and the 
Peace Camnittee enjoyed special trade union tie s ,  the Peace CClmllittee 
autanatically was thrust into an ascendant and controll ing position. It 
had to be consulted and l istened to ;  otherwise , there were no supporter• 
en massll - only the moral witnes ses of a few individuals .  Moreover , 
Peace CCJlllllittae daninance arose not only fran its acceaaibility to the 
trade unions , but because it possessed certain advantaqea in the way of 
experience and material resources that were needed to undertake larqe 
scale proj ects . 
Given the core position of the Peace Committee , there were three 
possible courses of action the smaller , independently initiated qroup with 
limited resources and connections could adopt : 
(1 ) It could refrain fran. engaqinq in activities that involved 
wide scale propagandising and the mobilisinq of mass forces . 
It could retreat within itself . 
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(2) It could decide to break out of such a restrictive circle . 
If it did this , two options were open i it could recognise 
the superior resources of the Peace Committee , and reconc ile 
itself to the QPCICD '  s daninant position , accepting the 
status of being little more than a mere adjunct1 or it could 
persist in its independent r0le and end up destroying itself .
(3 ) It could isolate itself fran the Peace Committee with the 
intention of developing its own power base , and - if successful 
- then choose to co-operate with the QPCICD on an equal footing . 
In effect , there was still a fourth category defining the relationship 
that the small peace qroup may have held with the Peace Committee. It may 
have started under the aegis of the Peace Committee : i.. e. , it may have 
been one of the ad 'hoo ' front ' organisations instigated by the Committee ,
or one of its branches operating in a town or suburb . These types of 
groups - e . g. , the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC ) , the Rockhampton Peace 
Committee , the Norman Park Peace Committee , etc. - are discussed , 
together with the Peace committee , at the end of the chapter , but first
it is proposed to look at the groups that can be classified under the 
first three headings :  the self-contained small groups ; the small groups 
aiming at mass support; and the singl e case of a group buildinq an 
independent base . 
Sel f-Contai ned Smal l  Groups 
gueensland ' s three pacifist groups - the Fel lowship of Reconciliation,
the Quaker Peace Committee , and the Conscientious Objectors Advisory 
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Caaaittee - all come under the category of beinq anall and sell-oontained . 
None of these qroups was as large or aa active aa its counterpart in south 
Australia , Western Australia , N. s .w. , or Victoria. FOR was Queensland ' •  
affiliate with the Federal Pacifiat Council (FPC) , but its membership 
only averaqed about eiqht and it qenerally only held about one meeting 
every two months . Its association with the national FPC was tenuous / 
which partly explains why the biennial rotation of the FPC Executive was 
confined to the three aouthern states of Victoria , N . s . w. , and South 
Australia. 
Since mo st of FOR ' s members were Quakert: and met as well in the 
8 QUaker Peace Camnittee , the pacifiat section of the Qld .  peace movement 
tended to be a well-defined , narrow clique . Both qroups usually held 
their meetinqa at the Friends Meeting House , approached topics in the 
same manner , and rarely ventured into activitie s of a public nature. On 
this last score , however , a couple of individual members participated 
reqularly in the activities of the pacificist qroups , and it was chiefly 
FOR and QPC that set up the Conscientious Obj ectors Advisory Committee . 
6. Another group cl08ely as sociated with the pacifists , the Bertrand
Russell Peace Foundation , was formed in 1966 , but thia local
chapter of an overseas body made relatively little mark in Qld .
1. A fact freely admitted in FPC ' a  journal .  See 7'hs PsaoBtnakszt , Vol . 27 ,
No. 2 ,  March 1965 .
B .  F or  an account of the pacifism of the Qld . Quakera , see Brian
Laver , B .A. thesia , Histoz-y of ths Qu•BMt.and Quakszt• , Univ . of
Qld . , 1967 .
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However , much of the aubaequent work in assistinq prospective CO ' s
was performed by Queensland ' s Save OUr Sons (SOS) qroup , which , besides 
offering advice of a theoretical and practical nature , became enqaged in 
the task of creating a leqal aid fund . 
SOS did not conform ideally to the prototype of the inward looking , 
self-contained group . Nevertheless , it came closest to thi• 
classification. For deepite its involvement in sane proj ect• of high 
public visibility and its occasional liaiaon with the Peace Committee , 
its relation• with the other peace bodies were generally restrained , its 
proj ects modest and limited in scope , an<! its public encounters tended 
to be of a personal , testimonial nature . 
Formed at a public meeting held at the Friends Meetinq House on 
9 September lat, 1965 , SOS derived its inspiration fran the sister SOS 
qroupa created in N. s . w. and Victoria in May 1965 and August 1965
reapectively. The sole aim of SOS was to "oppose conscription of youth
10 into the armed services to serve in overseas wars" . '!'his meant the 
group ' s  major attack was levelled at the National Service Act as amended 
in May 1965 , which authorised the Government to send National Servicemen
to the Vietnam war . As far as SOS was concerned , a member could base her 
obj ection to conscription for service in overseas wars on any ideological 
f .  This meeting was addressed by Father Illtyd (Anqlican) , Rev . R. 
Smith (Methodist) , Mrs. Audrey Buchanan (Convenor) ,  Mr. Fred Harris 
and Mr. Laurie Brown ( the last two beinq active members of FOR and 
the Society of Friends) . See !/!he Psaot1tnake1' , Vol .  27 , No . 10 ,
Novanber-December 1965 . 
JO . sos pamphlet , Statllmsnt of AiJn• of SOS , Brisbane , o. September 1965 . 
121 . 
qrounda whatsoever . However , in point of fact , the women who started the 
Qld. branch were deeply influenced by pacifist views . 
This underlyinq approach never changed in the course of the next 
two years , but the group ' s  political atyle became slightly more militant. 
Under the secretaryship of Mr s . Vilma Ward , an active member of her local 
ALP branch , as well as the Qld . Council for Civil Liberties and the Norman 
Park Peace Committee , SOS began to engage in some militant , even party 
political , activitie s .  One of its mo st publicised encounters occurred 
at a sto:rmy reception given to Prime Minister Holt when he appeared in 
Briabane for his first open election meeting of the 1966 campaiqn . The 
meeting was described by the local press as "one of the rowdiest ever 
held in Briabane " .ll Ths COUPUJze-Mait singled out the flamboyant actions
of sane SOS members for special mention. 
"He [Mr . Holt] was forced to stop several t1mes when 
demonstrators shouted ant1-V1etnam slogans, waved a b1g 
' Save OUr sons ' banner, and held aloft about 20 ant1-
conscr1pt1on placards • • • •  As the w1ld scenes developed, 
the solid core or up to lOO 'Save our Sons' hecklers,
seated at the rear of the hall , were ass1sted by 1solated
pockets of J.nterjectors acattered through tbs aud.1ence • • • •
One large r«>man pers1stently jumped to her feet and led 
a ' choir ' of interjectors in chanted slogans . Hr. Bol t 
was forced to stop speald.ng during these sess1ons of 
' Holt Holt - no conscr1pt1on ' .  'One ,  two, three, four, 
We don ' t  want war' , and ' save our Sons ' • The woman and 
Hveral of her follower• were warned by police to remain
1n their seats • • • •  n1 2  
ll. !'ha Couztisze-Mai'L ,  1 0  November , 1966 .
l2. Ibid. 
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Presumably , the reference - •one large wanan" - pertained to Mrs . Ward . 
outside the meeting hall she again led a protest. This time the police 
linked ums to disperae " the save our sona members gathered in small 
l 3  
groups• , and the Prime Minister aped away in his car .  
The above incident was atypical . Most of the time SOS engaged in 
more restrained protest ,  or worked behind the scenes with potential 
conscientious objectors . Every Friday afternoon for almost b«> years a . 
small band of wanen wearing SOS sashes stood in Anzac Square in silent 
protest against the sending of conscripts to Vietnam . Their vigil s  
received. little publicity and provoked only desultory comments fran 
passers-by . The purpose of the vigils seems to have been aimed at 
rendering a ' witnes s for peace ' in the manner of the Quaker appeal to 
' the light within ' every individual . 
Towards the middle of 1967 the vigils ceased , and the orqaniaation 
itself lapsed into inactivity. Some members continued to be active in 
the peace movement , their main efforts being directed towards helping 
young men with conscientious belief a avoid national service . They were 
especially pleased with the total exemption they helped to obtain for 
Roland Hovey , since his case was won on political grounds and obj ection 
to a particular war . 
13. Ibid. The Brisbane Sunday Tltuth qave a similar account of the
episode , different only in that it spoke more chivalrously of the 
SOS women , referring to them as " the stalwart ladies of the • save 
OUr Sons ' movanent. "  (13 November , 1966) . 
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During its brief existence SOS was not in can.petition with Qld ' s
only other women ' s  peace organisation , the Women ' s  International Leaque 
for Peace and Freedom (WILPP) ,  for the two qroups were different in many 
ways. In the first place , WILPF was much more inhibited in its
activities . Only a couple of ita members belonqed to Brisbane ' s  tiny
core of habitual demonstrators . And as an orqaniaation , WILPP aeldan ,
if ever , partook in any provocative public project - not even a silent 
vigil .  Moat of its members came from middle to upper-middle class homes 
(SOS had more of a workinq class tone) , and they preferred t!o confine
their dissent to the perauadinq of uncamdtted friends rather than submit
to the indiqnities associated with public pol itics . Their projects
atresaed self ec!ucation and quiet spreading of ' the messaqe ' .  Saninars
14 were arranqed around such topics as esperanto , oomnuni• , con80ription ,
world federal!• , and sources of social confl ict. some of the women were 
very active in producinq ' Puppet Plag11 for World Fr1endsh1p' .  Other 
proj ects included the sale of the qroup ' s  special peace stationery , 1:he 
14. This was a very sensitive issue for the WILPF wanen . constantly ,
they were discussing what the relationship of their qroup should be
towards the Communists . Perhaps the closeat they ever came to
formulating a definitive pol icy was contained in a statement by the
editor of the qroup ' s newsletter , who pointed out : "W. I . L . P . P .
membership i a  open to women o f  all political beliefs providinq they
aincerely seek to pranote world peace. At present our branch has
no Communist member s .  Like Bishop Moyes , we repudiate Conmuni• ,
but do not fear it . Nevertheless , we find the ' Communist smear ' a
very real obstacle to proqres s. Many women who would like to join
in our work for peace are deterred by fears that our orqanieation
may be of service to ccmmunist interests in sane way. We want to
bring this question riqht into the open • • • •  n (WILPP NBbUfLettel' ,
Qld . , October 1966) .
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15 sendinq of teleqrams to world leaders , and the constant writinq of
letters to the local newspaper - many of which were directed against the 
16 
popularisation of violence and war toya on television and in the stores .
Probably , the problan that most interested the members was inveatiqatinq 
ways in which non-violent attitudes could be inculcated in children . 17
From the foregoing , it becomes obv'ious that the obj ectives of WILPP
extended over a much wider ranqe than those of SOS . Its multifarious 
aims were premised on a call to strenqt:hen the United Nations . 18 It 
supported "all steps leadinq to general and complete disarmament under
15 . 'l'heae messages were usually hi9hly moral in tone , yet conciliatory
in attitude . For example , the followinq teleqram was sent to 
President Johnaon on the occasion of his visit to Briabane a 
"Peaceloving Australian women wholeheartedly wish you every succes s  
in achievinq worthwhile peace plans a t  Manila /stop/ however we 
deplore United States and Australian participation in the Vietnam 
Civil War and urge you in the name of humanity to cease all bombing
inanediately /stop/ napalm and white phosphorous especially horrify us 
/stx:Jp/ we trust Mr. Malik ' s  hints of peace overtures frca Hanoi will
be thoroughly explored /st:Dp/ reports of American rejection of similar 
overtures in 1965 deeply disturbed us all /stop/ may America ' s great 
traditions be once more upheld . (Signed Qld . Members of W . I . L . P . P . ) "
Printed in WILPF NBl4sZstttJzt, Qld . , November 1966 . 
16 . Two WILPF members opened up a commercially successful children ' s
store of ' creative toys ' in the Brisbane suburb of Tarinqa . 
17. Some of the subj ects listed for discussion included : 'Constructive 
Toy• ' ,  'Ch.1ld Psrichology ' ,  'Popular1ut.1on of Non-V1olence ' ,  ' Ways 
of Combatt1ng Irrational. Pears ' eto. Lecturers from the University
were sometimes secured for addre sses on these subjects , but usually
the women listened to talks from their own members . One member , 
Mr• . Marqaret Henry, co-authored a book &ntitled Pa.Nnts and 
ahi.Zd!'tm, and the group also had as members (though rather inactive
one•) the two well-known Qld . poetesses Judith Wriqht and Kath Walker .
18.  WILPF ' s  international body enjoys consultative status B wi th  the 
tJN ,  UNESCO, PAO, ECOSOC and ILO. 
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law with United Nation• in•pection and control , ( includinq) the permanent 
abolition of nuclear teating as an immediate and basic step" • 1 9 It
advocated "greatly apanded UN programmes for econanic aid and technical 
assistance to underdeveloped countries • • •  establishment of Peace Corps 
20 under the United Nations• , the .. ttin9 up of programmes for population 
control , " effective action to eliminate discrimination based on race , 
21 
sex , reliqion, politics , economic atatua , or national origins" , and 
programmes that would "develop in children and adults attitudes and 
22 
behaviour which will enable them to build a peaceful world" . In order 
to achieve these aims , which were endorsed by all the state branches in 
Australia , WILPF declared its belief in the basic riqhts of freedom of 
thouqht , speech and asselbly. 
WILPF ' s  Qld . branch had been moribund for many years until revived 
in 1963 , mainly throuqh the efforts of an American woman , Mrs . Betty Ruth 
Kay. The wife of a history lecturer at the University , who also became 
very active in the Qld. peace movement, Mrs. Kay built up the Qld . chapter 
around a nucleus of 'Wallen associated in one form or another with the 
Univeraity. ltlen she and her husband returned to the u . s .  in 1966 , 
WILPF ' s  maaberahip numbered about thirty. Her departure did not immediately 
•ignal the decline of the orqanisation, as ahe was replaced by an equally
l9 . Circular , SOth AnniVRe<D'?J, W'anen 'e Inttatnationa't League f 01' Peaas
and l'zt•al.an, AuetJtal.ian S.otion , Sydney , o. 1965 . 
20 . Ibid. 
ai . Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
126. 
anerqetic woman ,  Mra . Eena Job , the mother-in-law of Queensland ' s  leadinq 
student radical , Brian Laver . :ror al.moat two years the membership was 
suatained at the eame level - most of the malbers continuing to come frca 
Brisbane ' s  more ' fashionable '  Western suburbs - and the same round. of 
activities were en9aqed in .  Then , when Mrs . Job left o n  a trip to Enqland , 
the group reverted to its pre-1963 state. 
Smal l Groups A1 m1ng at Mass  Support 
Among those groups att•ptinCJ to venture into mass politics but which 
lacked any strong and coheaive 80cio-econaDic base were the Qld .  branches 
of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Youth Campaign 
Against Conscription (YCAC ) , the Brisbane Professionals for Peace , and 
in its initial etaqes the Students for Democratic Action (SDA) . When 
these 9roups fail.:! to mobilise any degree of mass support , they were 
presented, in effect , with four choice• · They could subnerge their 
identity with the ' core body ' , i . • ·  , the Peace Canmittee. They could 
disband completely. They could change the nature of their activitie s , 
reducin9 them to the scale of the small , self-contained group . Or they 
could retreat within themselves , undertaking the task of sol idifying their 
own independent base of support before seeking to mobilise conm.unity 
wide aupport. 
At various ataqea of its existence Qld . CND adopted all the above 
courses of action •oept the last one . Formed in 1962 with obj ective• 
aimilar to the CND groups in Melbourne , Sydney , and Perth , it naainally
wrvived for m>out three years before its members finally acknowledged 
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their inability to develop a sizeable and cohesive body of supporters and 
let the group becane defunct. Almo•t all att•pts to enqaqe in wide scale 
direct action proj ecta aeeminqly were circumscribed by the Peace 
Conaittee . In vain , CND sought to retain control of its major march and 
demonstration , the traditional Eaater Aldermaston march .  Yet when left 
to its own dwices the re sponae to the march was neqliqible . For 
inatance, tha first Aldermaston march in Brisbane on April 14th, 1963 -
a combination two mile march and subsequent rally - which was orqanised 
and conducted solely by om , attracted a mere one hundred participants , 
23 most of them young people. The f ollowinq year around Aldermaston season 
a ' Consultative Canmittee • ,  composed of twenty committees , was set up upon 
the initiative of the Peace Committee to plan a two-day relay walk fran 
Ipswich to Brisbane . And this time , with the support of the trade 
unionists , approximately one thousand persons were involved in the march 
24 
and rally. 
Although CND constituted one of the twenty camnittees serving on the 
' Consultative Committee ' and it could not reasonably be claimed that the 
spirit of the march diverqed from CND ' s  aims , many CND ' ers objected 
truculently to the manner in which both the march and conclud.inq rally 
23 . The COUFlszt-Mai.t ,  15 April ,  1963 1 also Peaoe Aation , Vol .  4 ,  No . 4 ,
May 1963 . 
24. Psaoll Aotion ,  Vol .  6 ,  No .  3 ,  April 1964 . '1!he Courier-Mail, ,  5 April ,
1964 , estimated an attendance of 750 at the rally . Thus at least 
250 marched , an impressive figure when it is considered that the 
march permit obtained from the police specified that no more than 
SO persons could walk at any one time and these 50 had to be 
•eparated into qroups of 6 people walking at two minute intervals .
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were taken out of the ir  control and no longer identified as a CND
enterprise. Moreover , as advocates of unilateral disaniament for thoae 
countries already possessing nuclear weapons , they were not in full 
accord with the ' Consultative Committee ' s ' as sertion that "orqaniaations 
and individuals participating or associating with the demonstration will 
be co-operating in the general spirit of the walk while retaining their 
own particular approach to the [disaxmament] question • • •  " . 25 Since the 
Peace Connittee ' •  "particular approach11 meant multilateralian under a 
syatem of " adequate controls and inspection" , in contradistinction to the
traditional unilateralism of Aldermaston, sane CND ' ers felt the statement
gravely caupranised their position .
Another incident provoking friction between the two groups was the 
appearance in June 1963 on the . Brisbane streets of the sensational 
pamphlet , SpWs for' Psaot1 , which had been circulated at the 1 963 Briti•h 
26 Aldermaston March . '!be Brisbane reprint of this pamphlet contained a 
foreword in which Australians were called upon to reveal any secret 
information they miqht have regarding their Government ' s  plans for the 
runninq of the country after a nuclear attack . "Can we be sure" , the 
25. Peaoe Aotion , Vol .  6 ,  No .  2 ,  March 1964 . According to the Peace
Committee the themes of the march were a " support for the partial 
test ban treaty and its extensions to cover underground teats 1 
opposition to the proposed French tests in the Pacific 1 support for
nuclear free zones and the goal of general , total and controlled
disarmament. " (Ibid. ) .  This last theme , of course , was not a CND 
goal . 
26 . This was the pamphlet concerning the Regional Seats of Government 
in Britain which allegedly would take over the qovernmental 
operation of the country after it had been subjected to a nuclear
attack. 
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pamphlet asked rhetorically , " that our Australian Government: , too , has
not quietly accepted the certainty of nuclear war? • • •  If you know any 
official secret then , for your children ' s  sake , publish it . l'or only in 
this manner can we really learn what our Government has done . "27 
'Iha foreword was aiqned by an orqanisation call inq itself " Spies for 
Peace , Australia , Inc . " ,  but CND was immediately suspected of havinq 
28 authored the " treasonable document inviting' people to commit espionage" . 
The CND Executive was interz:ogated by Commonwealth police , and samples 
of their typewriters were taken for laboratory analysis . As press 
publ icity and public antipathy mounted , the :executive felt constrained to 
issue a publ ic disclaimer , affirminq that "Brisbane CND is an
orqanisation which seeks to achieve its aim• throuqh lawful means • • •  [ and]
we do not countenance their [ the Spies for Peace] advocacy o f  eapionaqe 
29 activities in this country" . 
Although the Brisbane " Spies for Peace" were never unmasked , CND 
suspicions were directed at a short-lived qroup known as the Qld. Youth 
campaign for Peace , a group which met in the Peace Canmittee ' s  office , 
and which was qranted the use of Peace camnittae off ice equipnent . Once
again , the Peace Canmittee (thouqh possibly blameless ) had incurred the
disfavour of the CND.
27. Spies for Peace , Australia ,  Inc . , PoztBIN01.'d. , Bri sbane , o. June 1963 .
28. Brisbane Sunday TPuth , 23 June , 1963 .
29 . Press statement of Brisbane CND , printed in Sanity , Vol .  1 ,  No .  1 ,
Brisbane , a. JUJ.y 1963 .
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The preceding incidents were probably just as much the product of 
the strained relations between the two qroups as their cause . It was 
almost inevitable that relations should be tense , when CND persisted in
retaining its independence in the field of mass pol itics , and yet was 
unable to organise a solid , independent base of support to operate from . 
In auch a situation , the centripetal pull of the stronger body was
irresistible. As much as the ' core body ' aiqht have genuinely wanted
to encourage and co-operate with CND ,  its daninant position would appear
to have ensured the eventual demise of the smaller body. Of course , 
factors other than CND ' s relationship with the Peace Committee helped to
contribute to ita downfall - e. g. , the collapse of British CND ,  the 
siqning of the partial teat ban treaty , and the anerqence of the Vietnam
issue . Yet this last factor did not mean the end of the CND groups in 
Sydney or Melbourne , which , in effect , merely chanqed their names to the 
Vietnam Action Conanittee and the Vietnam Day Committee respectively . 
By the time of the 1965 Aldermaston march (also routed from Ipswich
to Brisbane) , Brisbane CND was in the process of winding up its affairs .
Remnants of the group joined an ad hoo body called the Aldermaston Relay 
walk Committee - whose President and Secretary both came from the Peace 
Committee ' s  Executive - and were allotted , together with "youth , students , 
30 miacellaneoua" , one section of the relay for " su99ested walkers " . Soon 
afterwards ,  all identifiable traces of the Brisbane CND di sappeared . 
30. Aldermaston Relay walk Committee , Letter of Instruction fran N.
Chalmer s ,  Secretary , c. March 1965 . 
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YCAC of Qld . and the Brisbane Professional s for Peace differed 
from CND in that they were seeking to rally mass protest from clearly 
defined bases of support: in the first case frau young Australians of 
both sexes , and in the second fran persons of professional traininq . 
Since neither group proved capable of consol idating a strong base , yet 
continued to seek the mobilised support of the public , it was not long 
before they , too , found themselves drawn into the Peace Committee orbit . 
Confronted with the prospects of becaninq mere appendaqes of the Peace 
Committee , both groups decided to chanqe the direction of their appeal s 
and reduce the level of their activities to those of the self-contained
group along the lines of the pacifists and WILPF . 
YCAC of Qld . , which was modelled after similar type groups in Sydney 
and Melbourne , was founded towards the end of 1965 , with the aim of 
enlisting public " opposition to part or all of the National Service Acts 
1 96411 •
31 
By " not qet [ tinq ] involved in the riqhts and wrongs of the war
[Vietnam] " ,  insisted its President, "we appeal to the widest po ssible 
32 section of the community" . Despite this disclabner about debating the 
Vietnam issue , most of YCAC ' s supporters did direct their protests against 
the Vietnam war , including the same offic ial who made the above as sertion . 
Sloqans like ' Why Die for Xy' and ' Stop Viet War ' tended to set the theme
of YCAC demonstrations . YCAC ' s small band of activists appeared 
praninently at Brisbane anti-Vietnam ' demos ' .  Members were arrested on 
31 . Constitution of ICAC of Queens land. 
3 2 .  Jim Beatson , President YCAC , MaPb tes (Newsletter o f  YCAC of Qld . ) , 
Vol . 1 ,  No . 5 ,  May 1966 .  
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protest deputations to the U . S .  Consulate , and on the visits o f  President 
Johnson and Air Vice Marshall Ky to Brisbane . In fact ,  two of Brisbane ' s
most frequently arrested anti-Vietnam demonstrators were officers of YCAC .  
Although the group remained small and isolated , unable to mobilise 
a •ignificant popular following (its ' hard core ' was confined to about 
twenty activists) ,  for a very brief period it captured sensational 
headlines in the local press . In March 19 66 , when the Vietnam Action 
Committee (VAC) staged what was billed as "A Week of Vietnam Protest" ,
33 YCAC joined the protest with a spectacular draft card burning ' dee '  
at one of the city ' s busiest interaections at 5 o ' clock on a Thursday 
afternoon. As it turned out ,  very few draft cards (or their facsimiles) 
got set alight. Instead , the police chased the demonstrators from corner 
to corner in an attempt to prevent them from congregating , and those that 
lingered or uttered ' improper ' comments were efficiently and unceremoniously 
dispatched into one of the waiting police vans .  The entire episode was 
filmed ' live ' on all three of Brisbane ' s  television news channels , and 
hiqhliqhted numerous incidents of rough handlinq by the police . In 
addition , the Brisbane PeZ.gNph pro4uoed a special feature of dramatic 
photographs , depicting so-called ' police brutality ' .
33. Since the Governnent does not issue draft cards , the correct term 
is really registration certificate . In this particular demonstration 
most of the protesters were not even subj ect to the call-up , so that 
they were probably only settinq fire to ordinary pieces of paper . 
Moreover , assuming the protesters were burning their reqiatration 
certificates , it is unlikely t:his act , in itself ,  would conatitute 
draft-dodging , since it would not affect the status of the 
regis tration. 
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Thus the original purpose of the danonatration was soon forqotten in 
a aeries of charges over ' police brutality ' which emanated from diverse , 
even unexpected , quarters .  Among those tenderinq criticisms were P'M 
COUPla-Na:l.1, and the Labor MHR for Oxley , William Hayden. !'h.11 COUPle:r-
Mai.1, ,  while makinq it clear that it did not condone the daaonatration ,  
34 felt that the police had qreatly overreacted . Mr .  Hayden raised the 
matter in Federal Parliament , seekinq a special public enquiry to 
inveatiqate the way in which the demonstration was handled by the police ,  
and callinq for a screening in the House of the television film on the 
danonstration. After making "a fairly exhaustive survey" , explained Mr .  
Hayden , " it seems to me that a number of the police panicked • • •  and were 
unfairly and unnecessarily rouqh with the people who were involved . I 
understand that in one case six policemen - I do not know whether that 
number is exact , but certainly there were more than two - lifted bodily 
a young lad who had a broken arm which was in plaster . One of th• · · ·  
twisted the lad ' s broken arm up his back and flung him into a paddy wagon . 
35 This is not the way to handle a civil disorder" . 
To heighten the embarrassment of the pol ice ,  almost a third of the 
twenty- seven persons arrested were not directly connected with the 
protest. They had been bystanders , trundled off to the City Watch House
for voicing criticisms of the police action , or for not movinq out of the 
way quickly enouqh . The episode can be said t.o mark the beginning of the 
34. 7hs COUPlezt-Mail , 25 March , 1966 .
35 . CPD, HR. ,  Vol. SO , 31 March , 1966 , p. 812 .
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concerted campaign in Queensland to alter sane sections of the Traffic 
Regulations - culminating in the march of September 8th ,  1967 , when 
nearly four thousand students and staff of the University of Queensland , 
supported by the Qld . Trades and Labor Council , conmitted civil 
disobedience in defiance of the Goverrment ' s  refusal to meet their 
principal demands . 
36 YCAC ' s sensational publ ic debut was never sustained . After one 
of its principal founders , a university student , moved to Sydney in April 
1966 , the group was unable to gain a st:rong foothold on the University 
campus . And without an independent base , it began drifting towards the 
Peace Camnittee or its adjunct,  VAC . To avoid canplete absorption into 
the QPCICD , it withdrew by mid 1966 into the cocoon of the self-contained 
qroup - restricting its activities mainly to silent vigils ,  seminars and 
self-educational programmes . By the end of 1967 its demise was canplete. 
Almost unique in composition amonq Austral ian peace groups was the 
37 Brisbane Professionals for Peace . Its membership was " l imited to 
38 professional s" , although this term was never precisely defined . Almost 
the entire membership ,  which reached about thirty-five at its peak , was 
36 . The presence of its members was vociferously felt at a couple of 
important publ ic meetings : via. , the two addressed by Prime Minister 
Holt.  The first occurred in Ipswich in April 1966 ; the other in 
Brisbane in November 1966 at the meeting referred to in connection 
with SOS (see pp. 121 & 122 ) . 
37. It came closest to resembling the Australian Puqwash qroup and the
Vietnam Study Group at the University of N . s . w.
38 . Constitution� Bl'isbane Pl'ofessiona ls fora Peace , c.  late 1963 .
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drawn fran the staff at the University of Queensland . Initiated by an 
39 American , univer•ity lecturer Dr .  Michael ICay , its qeneral aim was to 
40 nunite professional men and women in order to pranote world peace" . 
Its activities were directed along three linea 1 the dissanination of 
information about the danqera of war in the nuclear aqe among its own 
members and interested colleagues , the education of the camnunity on thi• 
41 subject by all practical means , and the participation of its members in 
direct action projects . 42
The first of these functions - self-education - took the form of 
rwiewin9 current literature on the subj ect and listeninq to specialists 
at meetings held once every three weeks. To illlplanent t:he second and 
third functions ,  the Professionals depended heavily on the co-operation 
and aaaistance of the Peace Committee . 
The greater part of 1964 was spent working with the Peace Committee 
on qaining support for the nation-wide Peace Conqress in Sydney fran 
October 2Sth-JOth of that year . Dr . ICay was elected Chaii:man of the Qld . 
Sponsoring Committee of the Sydney Conqres s ,  half of whose sponsors came 
39 . See p .  125. 
40. Constitution , op. oit. 
4l . These means , according to the Constitution , consisted of "talks by 
members before other orqanisationa and over radio and television , 
oampilation of bibl iographies and sources of information , sponsorship 
of public meeting• , sul:mission of letters and articles for publication 
in the press and journals , and distribution of copies of relevant 
articles . " (Ibid. ) .  Although moat of these things were done , it was 
on a very l:lmited scale. 
42 . Brisbane Profeaaionala for Peace , Ci:rautaze , March 1965 . 
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frcm the Brisbane Professionals. Nevertheless , while the ' Professionals '  
provided many o f  the preatiqoua names , almost all of the administrative 
tasks were performed in the Peace Camnittee ' s  office under the supervision 
of its Secretary, Mr s .  N .  Chalmers .  Likewise , the Peace Camnittee 
supervised moat of the post Conqress activities , such as the visit of 
Dr .  Linus PaulinCJ and his wife to Brisbane , and the distribution of the 
papers read at the congres s. 
The ' Profes•ionala '  relied upon the Peace Canmittee for assistance 
on a ranqe of piblic proj ects , inaludinq sane abortive attempts at 
staging direct action protests outside the u . s .  Consulate . Innit.bly , 
on these occasions , the overwhelming majority of demonstrators were 
mustered from the trade unions by the Peace COmmittee , and. only as many 
as two or three ' professionals ' could be counted amonq the truly 
CCIDDlitted. As well , anti-war pamphlets ,  though written by the 
' Professional s ' , were usually distributed through Peace Committee 
ahannels 1 and the public meetings that were always jointly sponsored 
came under the organisational control of the Peace Committee. About the 
only project that penetrated beyond the circle of ' Professional ' 
mmlbership and which was handled independently of the Peace Committee 
was a study and report in 1965 on the political and acientif ic aspects 
of the proposed nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll - a report specially 
prepared for Mr .  James B .  Keeffe (now Senator ) , the President of the 
Federal ALP , and then secretary of the Qld . Branch of the Iabor Party. 
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When Dr .  !Cay returned to the u. s . A .  in 1966 , the orqanisation was 
already in a state of fast decline . Attendance at meetinqs , though now 
bolstered by some students , rarely exceeded ten.  With the base of staff 
aupport diaintegratin9 , it only took the results of the 1966 elections 
to apply the ooup de (ll'QIJ•· And ,  in 1967 , no enthusiaan remained to 
resurrect the body. 
Parity With the Peace Conm1 ttee
A qxoup evolvinq partly out of the ' Professionals '  demise was the 
university based Students for Democratic Action (SDA) 1 its other 
proqenitor was the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC) , a short-lived , militant 
body initiated by the Peace Committee in the early part of 1966 . Althouqh 
many of SDA ' s founders had been active in both VAC and the ' Profess ionals ' 
- repreaenting for most of the young dissenters their political bapti• -
they decided to form a new qroup which would be less restrictive in vision 
and would attan.pt to interrelate a host of contemporary social and 
43 political probl•s. The inspiration for its formation was derived fran 
43 . SDA characterised itself as an orqanisation whose supporters could be
recognised by their "concern for the future of hmnanity becauae of 
the danger of nuclear war , [ their ] axianatic acceptance of the 
sanctity of human l ife , revulsion at the ready use of force as an 
instrument of international policy , concern for the deqrading poverty 
of two out of eJVery three people in a world of potential plenty, and.
[ their ] belief that the individual should be free from the unwarranted 
interference of the state" . It was , continued its founders , "an 
association of individuats united by a belief that democratic freedca 
is sanethinq that must be foU<Jht for , and once having been achieved , 
it must be protected if it is to survive • • •  the password is ACTION" . 
(SDA Ciztoultzze , o. April 1967 - emphasis in the original . ) In his
daily ' forum '  addresses SDA leader , Brian Laver , would incantate the 
measaqe of reordering society ' s values ( " human values before material 
values" ) and of reatructurinq its institutions ( "participation in 
decision-making instead of the i:mposinq of hierarchical orders• ) . 
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the u . s .  group called The Students for a D910cratic society (SDS) - in 
particular fran that group ' a manifesto issued fran Port Huron , Michigan 
in 1962 . 44  
Despite the aggressive proaelytisinq of SDA ' s message by a handful 
of dedicated students and junior staff members , its radicalism was poorly 
received by the traditionally conservative students of Queensland 
University. It was not until SDA ' s  leader , Brian Laver , undertook a 
vigorous campaign for the presidency of the Student Union and was 
mercilessly reviled in the local press that the students became curious 
enough to want to hear what was ' corrupting ' them. And in the process , 
many were converted to the ' new radical ism ' .  Unwittinqly , the mass media 
ware probably largely responsible for Laver ' s  surprisingly good showing 
in the election , enabling him to capture about one third of the atudent 
vote . At the same tJme (mid 1967) the SDA bandwagon 9ained momentum 
from a campaign the group inatiqated for civil liberties . This campaign
originated half in frustration1 half in shrewd , strategical calculation. 
While the SDA ' ers may have genuinely felt thwarted in their attempts to 
45 exercise their rights of peaceable assembly and freedom of expression , 
44 .  For a copy of document , see Paul Jacobs & saul Landau (eds . ) ,  Phs 
NtN Radioa.ls , Vintaqe Books , N . Y. , 1966 , pp. 154-167 .
45. SDA grievances mounted &CJ&inat the Qld . State Government after a
series of arrests and felt harrassmenta . In 1966 members were
arrested at a danonstration on July 4th in front of the u . s .
Consulate , on a march fran the University on October Sth (26
atudents were locked in the city watchhouse ) , and on October 22nd
when President Johnson visited Brisbane . '.the feud between students
and police continued in 1967 . In January , Brian Laver served five
[Footnote 45 continued on next page] 
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they al so  turned frClll Vietna protest to the issue of civil liberties , 
because they saw thi• as a moat effective way of beginninq the task of 
mobiliainq a wide baae of radical student diaaent .
46 
In terms of t:hi• 
last objective , t:hey were rewarded far beyond any reasonable expectations . 
Abetted by an inept Government and some blunders on the part of their
student opponents , the SDA ' ers steered a campaign which reached a climax 
in the ill egal march of nearly 4000 students and staff , and in the arrest 
47 of over one hundred persons. 
The SDA triumph rested , first, on the fact that a fair measure of 
tolerance for radical dissent and direct action tactics had been qained 
on the campus . A new role - incorporating political involv•ent - had 
been defined for tha student. The march had also been a success on another 
level . In SDA jarqon , the march had ' radicalised ' larqe numbers of 
atudents , most of whan came from middle class , conservative homes . 
[.Footnote 45 cont.1nued fran prev1ous page] 
days in gaol rather than pay a fine , and his aympathisera were 
prohibited frClll carryinq protest signs outside the prison walls. 
Later that same month , many protesters were arrested in a
demonstration a9ainst the Brisbane visit of Air Vice Marshall Xy , 
and in April a march fran Brisbane to Ipswich was banned by the 
police until some members of the University staff privately intervened 
on behalf of the marchers . Finally,  SDA members constantly complained 
of bainq harra.ased by police whenever they attempted to hand out 
leaflets or carry aiqna .
46. Fran discussions with Brian Laver ,  c .  April 1967 1 also with other
members of the Civil Libertiea Co-ordinating Camnittee ( SDA ' s ' front
qroup ' ) .
47. For one of the more balanced and non-motive accounts of the march and
it• oriqin• ,  (thouqh the author was instrumental in draftinq the
Student Union ' s demands to the Premier ) , see Colin Hughes ,  'Nuch.1ng
Rule l.n Brl.sbane ' ,  Quadltant , No . SO , November-December , 1967 .
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Bavinq once "comai1:t.ed themselves aqainst the power structure" , these 
students beqan questioninq authority alonq a broad front of ideas and 
issue s .  SDA had created an indeterminate base of power ,  but given the
propitious circumstances and if properly mobilised , it contained the 
potential to erupt into a viable political force .  
Thus ,  by the end of 1967 , there existed a qroup in Qld . concerned 
with peace issues that rivalled ,  if it did not surpass , the influence of 
the Peace Camraittee . In terms of tangible , orqaniaational assets , SDA 
employed three full -time orqaniaera , owned an offset printinq pres s ,  and 
48 turned over funds in excess of $10 , 000. The Peace Comittee , on the 
other hand , •ployed one and a half full-time workers , had no printinq 
press , and averaqed only about $7 , OOO in annual revenue . Yet the QPCICD 
usually had access to resources in the hands of Trades Hall official s .  
Th e  narrative of how th e  rise o f  SDA and qroupa like it redirected 
the course of the Australian peace movanent immediately following the 
1966 general elections iJI pursued more ful ly in the last two chapters . 
48 . While it is difficult t.o unearth orthodox bookkeeping record• from 
SDA ,  thia figure repre sents what the writer considers a fairly
accurate estimate on the basis of statements made to him by various 
SDA leaders , a survey of cheque account records , and on the general 
volume of SDA activity , especially its vast number of publications .  
On the other hand , the Peace COmm.ittee ' s receipts for 1967 were 
foxmally audited at $7 , 471 . 3 7 and its expenditures at $7281 . 34 .  
(fit«Z8Ul'Bl' 'a Rspol't ,• Annual General Meeting , Sth and 6th April , 
1968. ) The 1968 receipts and expenditures were slightly less than 
$7 , 000 . (2'Jtea8UJ'Bl' 's Rspwt , Annual General Meetinq , 2 5th and
26th April , 1969. ) 
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QPC ICD or Peace Conni ttee - I ts Base , Its Act1 v1 t1es , Its Pol i ci es 
Until SDA' a successful •er9ence as an independent qroup , the Peace 
Committee , together with its ' front• ' and ' autonomous fraternal ' branches , 
clearly dominated Qld. peace politics. Moreover , in SDA ' • formative 
stages ,  it also great:ly influenced that body. It often provided SDA with
the use of ita office equipnent and vitally needed materiala 1 it opened
up to SDA its trade union contacts ; and it maintained formal organisational
link.a with SDA through an interlocking of top leadership (two of SDA ' s 
49 founders were al80 members of the QPCICD Executive) .
(1 ) Base of Support 
Throughout the years of this study the Peace Committee ' s  Executive
foxmally reflected a diversity of community representation, a factor which
made it easier for the Peace Committee to extend its influence into some 
of the other peace groups. However , as has already been stronqly
•phasised , the directing and chief influence in the Peace Committee
emanated from a section of the trade union movement - the ai.n. qua non of
its existence . This close relationship was symbolically confirmed when 
the Peace Committee , in 1962 , was granted permission to march in Brisbane ' s
traditional Labor Day Parade , an honour never before accorded a naninally 
49. Although these two SDA leaders continued to serve on the QPCICD
Executive durin9 1967 and 1968 , they assumed an increaainqly le••
active rSle , concentrating almost solely on SDA affairs .
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so non-labour organisation . The practice has been continued in the 
ensuing years . 
The Building Workers Industrial Union (BWIU) constituted the largest
and most consistent financial supporter of the Peace CoDlllittee . The 
union imposed a voluntary peace levy of 25� payable once yearly by the
members at the time of their September half yearly union dues .  From the 
revenue collected in this manner the Union off iciala made disbursements 
throughout the year to the Peace Connittee as well as , on special 
51 occasions , to the other peace groups . The system of voluntary peace
levies was also practised in the Seamen, Miners and Boilermakers unions . 
Another fairly reliable source of finance and manpower came from the 
50 . The granting of this privilege initially aroused considerable 
controversy in some of the unions . Not only did QPCICD 
participation represent a foxmidable intrusion into traditional 
labour exclusiveness , and was therefore opposed for settinq a 
.. dangerous precedent" , but there were political objections as well ,
coming from the right wing and moderate unions . For example , the 
Federated Clerks Union ' s  W . J .  Barry announced that he would not be 
marching in the same parade as the Peace Committee - a decision 
ratified by his Union Executive . The Federated Ironworker& 
Association State Secretary, H .  Peebles ,  indicated he was "not 
happy about it" . However , his union still marched , though under 
protest . The AWU was reported to have received the news with "cold 
disgust " - accordinq to Peace Committee critic John Higgins 
( ' Peace Fronts on �lay Day ' , The Bulletin, 12 May , 1962) • 
Sl . Thua over the five month period from May to September 1966 , which 
saw a proliferation of peace qroupa , the BWIU donated a total of
$ 540 to the following groups : Qld. Peace Conmittee - $300 ;
Southeast Asia and Australia Conference - $100 (this was a Peace 
Committee undertaking) ; Trades and Labor Coun cil to assist the 
above conference - $50; YCAC - $30 ; SOS - $30 ; and VAC - $30 (a
qroup under Peace Colllllittee control) . (Qld . Peace Conmittee , 
'Dry Season Approach1ng' , Ci1'aular', 18 November ,  1966 . )  
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Waterside Workers Federation through ite epeoial peace body , the Waterfront 
Peace Committee .
52 
Between March 1961 and June 1966 the Peace Committee ' s  offices were 
located about fifty yards away from the Trades and Labor Hall . It was a 
relatively simple matter for the Peace Committee ' a Secretary Norma 
Olalmers to keep in daily contact with trade union officials ,  attach 
notices to the bulletin board, and above all maintain close liaiaon with 
the late Alex Macdonald , the Secretary of the Trades and Labor Council of 
Qld . , and the key figure in the Peace COmmittee-trade union nexus . 
Fran the time of the Peace Committee ' s  formation after the Melbourne 
COftC'Jress until his death in 1969 , Mr. Macdonald ,  a member of the 
Auatralian Comnunist Party , held the position of vice-president in the 
Peace CODDittee . In his triple r81a of Peace Committee official ,
Colmuniat, and trade union leader , he channelled peace affairs throuqh 
the maze of union hierarchies , and prcmoted QPCICD policies at the 
numerous conferences he attended in his various capacities . Among the 
many international peace conferences he attended during the first half of 
the decade were :  the World congress for Disarmament and Peace in Mo scow 
in 19601  the Japanese COnferenae Against A & B Bombs , also in 1960 1 the 
International Conference for solidarity with the People of Vietnam against 
u . s .  Dnperialist Aqgression and for the Defence of Peace in North Vietnam 
in 1964 1 and the world Council of Peace meetinq in Europe in 1966 .
52 . The Secretary of this committee , Mr. P .  O ' Brien , was also the 
Preaident of the Peace Camnittee , an office he held fran September 
9th , 1965 until April 26th , 1969 . 
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sane of his outspoken remarks at the 1964 North VietllDl Conference 
for Peace Defence were reported back in Au•tralia and aroused a virulent 
responae in the Central Executive of the N. s . w. Branch of the ALP . At 
the North Vietnam Conference Mr. Macdonald and hi• co-delegate , Mr .  
53 Reginald Rickard , announced that an Australian body called the Coalittee 
for Peace in Vietnam and sponsored by twenty-eight trade unions "has 
orqanieed mass demonstrationa • • •  again•t u.s. aggressions in South Vietnam 
• • •  [and] distributed thouaands of leaflets all CRer Australia• .
54 
When 
news of this assertion and the general composition of the anti-Vietnam 
group reached the moderate Executive of the N . s . w. Branch, it took 
55 immediate steps to proscribe the group to its Labor Party members .  As 
a result of this proacription , the Committee for Peace in Vietnam quickly 
collap11ed ,  but its loss was not particularly detrimental to the OV'erall 
anti-Vietnam campaign, aince it• functions were simply assumed by two 
56 exi•tin9 peace groups , the AICD and Sydney ' s CND .  
Mr .  Macdonald also actively promoted - whenever feasible - the peace 
movement ' s  interests at trade union conferences . For instance ,  at the 
53 . secretary of the Mill and Ice carters Union of N . s .w .  
54. Cited in P . R. Findlay, Pi-oust Po Zitios and Peyoho logioa.1, Wazef<D'e , 
Hawthorn Pre as , Melbourne , 1968 , p. 6 .  
55 . Minuts• of the CtmtM't P!esouti.ve of ths N. s. w. Bztanah of the ALP, 
29 January , 1965 . 
56 .  AICD was also proscribed by the N. s . w. Central Executive - on March 
lOth , 1 967 . In thi s  case , though , an appeal to the Federal 
Executive was lodqed, and the ban was eventually lifted ( see 
pp . 209-210 5 fn. 14) . The Sydney CND was transfomed into Sydney 
Vietnam Action Committee (VAC) . 
145 . 
57 
ACTU sponsored South Pacific Trade Union Conference in Decaaber 1965 ,
he campaigned for stronq union action against the forthcoming French
nuclear tests in the Pacilio . Bia position was akin to that of the
Amalqamated Bnvineering Union , which attempted in mid 1966 to qet the 
AC'l'U to impose a ban on all French shippinq and a ten minute protest 
58 stoppaqe on the day of the nuclear test . Althouqh this proposal failed ,
both within the AC'IU and the South Pacific Conference , the two bodies 
adopted milder reaolutiona , recamnendin9 that " the Trade Union movement 
• • •  consider sanctions or appropriate steps to prevent such tests ,
including the refusal to handle any goods or equipnent or material of any
59 kind used in the erection of the Nuclear Testinq site• . In Qld. , this
resolution was never implemented in any form by the unions affiliated
60 
with the Trades and Labor Council despite the efforts of Mr .  Macdonald .
However , he and his associates , with the aid of the Peace Camnittee , did
manage to have the substance of the resolution propagated through many of 
the union newsletters .  
I t  was under Mr .  Macdonald ' s urging• that the Qld. T. L.C.  and sane
of its affiliated unions usually sent representatives to the interstate
' working sessions ' organised by the various State Continuinq Ccmmittees 
57. This conference , which was orqanised by the AC'l'U and the N. Z .
Federation of Labor , was attended by representatives frcm thirteen 
Pacif ic area nation• , including Sinqapore , Malaysia and Noumea . 
SB. Phs Aiurtzeatlan, 15 June, 1966 .
59 .  Declaration of South Pacific Trade Union Conference , c.  December 1965 .
Later the ACTO endorsed the resolution as its official position on 
the French tests . (The Austztatian , 1 July, 1966 . )
60. Interview with Alex Macdonald , 8 January , 1966.
of the Melbourne COnqrass .  The purpose of these meetinqs was to 
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co-ordinate local campaigns and clarify policy position• . While Mr .  
Macdonald was seldan present himself , undoubtedly hi• vim were known 
and carefully weighed by the Queensland continqent. 
As long aa the QPCICD maintained an intimate association with union 
leaders of Alex Macdonald ' s  prcminenca , it enjoyed an assured base of
aupport. Nevertheless , from the mid 1960 ' s onward , a constant lament of 
the Exeoutive meinbera concerned the relative dealin• in trade union 
support for peace politics in comparison to the rising interest shown by 
other sections of the community . While Vietnam and related issues 
precipitated the mobilisation of thousands of youth , intellectuals and 
clerqymen fran the middle olass , these new issues revealed deep fissures 
in the " solidarity of the workinq class" and complicated the task of 
propaqandiainq peace policies in the unions - not only in Qld. but 
throughout Australia. The ACTU ' s  four page pamphlet supporting the ALP ' s
61 1966 election policy never once mentioned Vietnam or conscription , 
although the ALP ' s  parliamentary leader had declared them to be the 
leading issues. SOme unions , notably the 61 , 000 member Ironworkera 
Aaaociation , the 60 , 000 member Federated Clerks Union and the 17 , 500 
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners , actually endorsed the 
62 Government ' s  decision to send troops to Vietnam . Evidence of the depth 
of division among working class rank and file was confirmed by the outcane 
of the 1966 elections. 
61 . jfhs AustJtati.an , 14 November ,  1966 . 
62. Ibid. 
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The theme of the :l'sZat-Lve decl ine in the support of the class 
dissenters is examined again and in much greater detail in the final 
three chapters .  
(2 ) Peace Comm i ttee Act i v i t i es 
Toward aid decade one of the QPCICD ' s chief activities wa s  co-
ordinatinq the activities engaged in by other groups . This , as a matter 
of fac't , was put forth as one of the reasons for the decline of the 
63 camnittee ' e  own rank and file support .  It certainly was true that 
when the old Assembly for Peace group merged into the Peace Committee in
1960 , there were no paoificist groups whose activities required co-
ordinatin9 . All efforts could be (and were) directed towards changing 
the attitudes of individual workers and householders . Operatinq throuqh 
trade union channels , the organisers were able to devote all their
enerqiea to such activiti es as lunch hour meetings on the work site ,  job 
leafle'ting , and preparing peace articles for the union newsletters and 
journals . 
The tactic uaed to change attitudes and arouse constituent support 
etreaeed personal conaitment , but thia camaitment came primarily throuqh 
involvement in specific proj ects rather than throuqh any underatandincJ 
of detailed and subtle argument .  The types o f  proj ects which fostered 
individual participation included the circularising of national 
63.  Noma Chalmers , Secretary , Qld .  Peace Camnittee , 'Dztaf1; of 1988 
Annual RepOl't , o. Marah 1968 .
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64 65 petitions , joining of cavalcades to Canberra ,  protestincJ of war films 
and war t.oy• , or9aniain9 of Peace Committee dances and barbecues ,  
arranqing for the entertainment of overseas visitors , raisinq of fund•
for the ••nding of Qld. delegates to overseas conferences ,  takinq part in 
66 67 the annual Aldermaston and Hiroshima Day marches awn rallies , 
attending classes in oration and speech , helpinq to promote the 1964 
68 Sydney Congress , petitioning of local manbere of Federal Parliament, 
and countless lesser proj ects . But the principal projects , around which 
the Peace Committee enqaged the canmitment of its supporters , consisted 
of the holding of large scale regional conferences and the aendinq of 
nmnerous protest deputations to the local French and U. S .  Consuls . 
The regional conferences , which functioned like microcosms of the 
Melbourne Congress ,  were held approximately every two years . During the 
1960 ' a  the first of these conferences was conducted in Rookhampton from 
April 7th to 9th , 1961 . called the •congress for Peace and Freed.an" , it 
discussed such topics as 'Effect• of Modern War:Lare and Failure oL Civil 
Defen.e' , 'D1•armament, General , 2'otal and Controlled' , ' What Can We Here 
64. National petitions , emanatinq from the South , were circulated in 
1961 , 1962 , 1963 and 1964 . See PP• 164-165 . 
65 . The cavalcades were annual project. , also orqanised in the South , 
and took place in 1961 , 1962 and 1963 . 
66 . See pp . 127 , 128 & 130 .  
67 . The camnemoration of Hiroshima Day became an annual event after 
1961 , when a meeting sponsored by the Peace Camnittee decided to
aet up an Hiroshima Day Ccamittee. Subsequently, every year ,  the 
Peace Committee resurrected the qroup. 
68. "The 1964 Conqreaa was t:he moat important activity" of that year ,
accordinq to the Peace Canm.ittee Secretary (Minutes of Seczeetatty,
1 966 AnnMaZ. NBeting , 9 September , 1965 ) . 
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Pre•ent Do to Help Peace and Freedom' , and ' Benefits of Peace ' . The
emphasia , as at all these confer ences , was placed on individual 
participation rather than depth of analysis . The chief or9aniaer and 
chairman of the Roclchampton conference was Dr . D. Evarinqham, later to 
beoane an MHR for the seat of capricoxnia . One of the mo•t popular 
conference• from the atandpoint of union support was held in Briabane on 
the weekend of March lSth to 17th , 1963 . The general theme of this
conference - disarmament - led to an enthusiastic endorsement of the ALP ' s
policy for a nuclear-free southern H81isphere . In 1966 a Brisbane
conference , held one month before the Novaaber general elections , att•ptad 
to propagandise radical foreign policies for •Australia and SOutheast
Asian . Its principal • southern' gueets included Anglican Bishop J .  Moyea , 
Mr .  Gordon Bryant (MHR) , and Mr .  Francia James (publisher of the Angtioan) .
None of these conferences elicited wide-spread public interest , except 
over the ' camauniat influence ' issue which waa well reported in the local 
press and which was standard ' ammunition ' for the Liberal and Country 
Party politician• . Typical of these attacks was the stat•ent of Mr. G .  
Pearce , the Liberal manber for capricornia , at the time of the Rockhampton 
conference , who announced ha was "not at�endinq and hope that my absence 
will be correctly interpreted as a protest and boycott of this Communist 
69 
inspired gathering" . '.l'he 1966 conference , which created a tremendous 
furore in the Qld . State Legislature , was debated in the context of what 
69 . QU<>tec! in PMOB Aoti.on , Vol .  2 ,  No .  4 ,  May 1961 . 
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the Country Party maaber for Radcliffe , Mr. Houghton , referred to " as the 
70 lat•t shot in the c�uni•t peace campaiqn• . 
The Peace Camnittee regularly led protest deputations to the French 
and o . s .  Consulates over the issue of nuclear testing . In addition , the 
u. s .  Consulate was repeatedly singled out for protests over United States 
escalation of the Vietnam war ,  and , in 1961 , was picketed for U. S .  
involv•ent in the ' Bay of Pigs ' invasion. In March 1962 , the Peace 
Ccmmittee co-ordinated a protest to the u. s . Consulate with the maritime 
unions over the construction of the w.A. radio base, and the follovinq 
year a daaonatration over the issue of "Ho Nuclear Bases in Auatralia" was 
carried into the Brisbane streets while Federal Parliament was debating 
the ratification of the W . A. radio base agreement with the u . s .  None of 
these demoMtr&tiona provoked acta of civil disobedience until sane 
prot.eater• at a July 4th rally in front of the u . s .  Consulate in 1966 sat 
down on the footpath and bad to be removed by the police . 
Meanwhile , the QPCICD was constantly engaged in attepta to set up 
local peace qroups with aims similar to its own. Between 1960 and 1967 
there existed out.aide Brisbane ' autonomous ' branc:hea of the Peace 
Ccmnittee in Roc:khallpton , Cairns , Townsville , Maryborouqh , Toowocnba and 
Ipswich, but the only group with a reoord of conaiatent . ac:tivity was in 
Rockhampton under the leadership of Dr. Everingham. To stimulate peace 
apport in the provincial towns , the Peace Committee' s  Secretary Norma 
10. Phe Coul'ieze-Mai 'L , 2 September , 1966.
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Chalmers toured Northern and Central Queensland atenaively in 1960 and 
a9ain in 1965 . Branch group• were also enoouraqed in the Brisbane area , 
where periodically suburban peace committees appeared in Noxman Park , 
the Western SUhurbs , the Northern SUburbs , Inala-Darra , West End ,  and 
Wynnum. TWo of the unions fODled qroups to operate in conjunction with 
the QPCICD a the waterfront Peace committee and the Seamen ' s  Union Peace 
Camnittee. 
Another orqanisational stratagem of the QPCICD consisted of 
establishing qroups for conducting sinqle issue campaigns ,  and fosterinq
groups that appealed to special aectional interests . same of the 
sectional groups promoted by the Peace Committee included the world Youth 
Forum Preparatory body whose obj ects were to stimulate discussion of
world peace problans among youth and send representatives to the World 
Youth Forum in Moscow during the week from July 2 Sth to August Jrd , 1961 1
the youth group formed in June 1963 known as the Youth Campaiqn for 
Peace ; and the Ex- Services Human Rights Association (ESHRA , Qld . 
diviaion) organised in early 1967 with Senator James Keeffe as its 
President. ESHRA was founded primarily throuqh the efforts of Mr .  P .  
O ' Brien , th e  QPCICD ' s  President , who modelled the group after a N . s . w. 
orqaniaation of the same name which had evolved the previous year out of 
71 
tensions within the R. S . L. 
71 . see Henry s .  Albinski , Politics and P01!eign PoZioy in Austmlia ,
Duke Univ . Press , Durham , N . C. , 1970 , pp. 139-141 , for a brief 
account of the N . s . w. ESHRA and its struggles with the N . s . w. 
branch of the R. S . L. 
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The ad 1&oo groups promoted by the Peace CODaittee ranged from the
annual Hiroshima Day Committees and the Aldermaston Consultative Camaittee 
to the very brief but mercurial Vietnam Action Ccmmittee (VAC) • This 
latter group originated in a deaision of the QPCICD Executive , in 
February 1966 , " to  act fairly soon due to the rapidly deteriorating 
position in Vietnam and nei9hboring atates • • •  [ and] put forward • • •  & week 
of diverse activity at the end of March • • •  with similar actions by all 
72 interested organiAtions , culminating in sane foz:m of joint activity" . 
'l'he minutes relating to this decision noted that •Executive menbers 
supported idea of an ad hoe , infoxmal form of co-ordination being 
73 continued around this week of activity" . The "foXJn of co-ordination" 
became in reality VAC , which quickly rallied the support of all the local 
peace groups . Under the leadership of VAC ' s elected convenor , Mr .  Brian 
Laver , the week of protest probably generated more interest in the 
canmunity than any previous Peace Committee undertaking . Por Laver , 
himself , and for saae of his friends , the experience of VAC represented 
their firllt foray into the politics of dissent . 'J.hey quickly found VAC ' a
aims and structures too inhibiting , and drifted away to form their own 
group , SM ,  which encanpaased much broader aims and which was outside the 
direct control of the Peace Committee. Their departure fran VAC , by the 
middle of 1966 , precipii:ated its pr•ature demise.  
72. Mimlt.s of t'hs �11autiv• Meeting of the QuBSns Zand Peaos Conrnittse , 
3 Pebruary , 1966. 
73. Ibld..
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(3 ) Peace Conun l ttee Pol i c i es
As has been indicated eupra , the Peace Committee devoted more time 
to organiain9 new qroups and promoting its multifarious projects than to 
carefully formulatinq detailed policies and arquaents . Primarily, it was 
interested in affecting public: values and attitudes rather than in 
brinqinq about specific ch&llCJ•• in policies .  This strategy was dictated 
partly by neceaaity, since the group lacked the political resources for 
it to enter directly into the pluralist barqaininq arena . In terms of 
' interest group ' politics its only power leveraqe existed in the unions , 
yet even here its power ultimately rested on the deqree to which it could 
convert rank and file manbers to a pacif icist outlook. Very few union 
off icials - no matter how sympathetic to QPCICD goals - were prepared to 
jeopardise their union positions for the sake of a radical foreign 
74 policy. 
'.thus ,  the Peace Commi ttee assumed chiefly the role of an ' attitude 
qroup ' , att•pting to mobilise mass support behind a general position. 
such a broad statanent of pol icy had been proclaimed in the Melbourne 
75 Congress ' ' Declaration of Hope ' . Two years later , at an interstate 
meeting of the Continuing COnmi ttees , a series of more specific and 
16 provocative proposals were set forth. Taken toqether , these two 
14. Thus Brian Laver ,  who became a trades hall research officer , soon
found him&lelf out of favour with off icialdan when he tried to press
action beyond ' econanism ' .
75. see Appendix A .
76 . see Appendix E .  
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statements foxaed what came closest to conatituting an official po•ition 
of the Melbourne Continuing Comlittees .  Naturally , ensuinq eventa and 
crises elicited countless press and newsletter statements , yet theae never 
departed significantly fran the earlier proclamations . 
The Peace Committee ' s  response to world events generally coincided 
with the positions adopted by the ' fraternal ' bodies in the South. P'or 
instance , the QPCICD joined the N. s . w. Peace Committee and the ANZ 
Conqress in Melbourne in proclaiminq support for the Statement on 
Disarmament issued by the Comlonwealth Prime Minis ters Conference of March 
1961 1
77 
shared in the denunciation of the United States for its 
'' provocative • policy towards CUba in April 1961 1
78 
"view(ed] with very
grave concern the retnDllption of nuclear teats by the Soviet union" in 
19 September 1961 1 and added to the chorus of praise to IDrd Russell for 
77. The Peace Committee circulated copies of this Statement through its
regular distributive channels. The Statement was al so endorsed and
printed in full in PtKlOB Action , Vol .  2 ,  No . 4 ,  May 1961 .
78. See PBaall Aotion , Vol . 2 ,  No. 4 ,  May 1961 .
79. ' Waterfront Peace Comm.1 ttee Declaration ' ,  printed in Wateztsids flozeks:rs '
Fedtu-ation of Auattta"Lia, Bl'a:noh NetHs , Brisbane , 14 septamber , 1961 .
sane of the other statements fran the peace qroups were not quite so
unequivocal in their denunciation. For example , in P«ZOB Aotion
(Vol. 2 ,  No . 8 ,  September 1961 ) appeared the followinq a "The 
announcement by the Soviet Goverment of the intention to carry out 
a large series of tests and the commencement of such teats has been
received with di.ay, because of the known dangers of an increase in
the atmospheric burden of radiation. "  The statement then went on to
proclaim : "The most important issue today is a peaceful solution of
the danqerous crisis in Ge:rmany which threatens nuclear war . " In the
same is sue of Peace Action were printed a copy of the Soviet Onion ' s
statement at the time of the resumption of tests , and a copy of Prof .
J.D.  Bernal ' a  WPC statement , which contained the much publicised and
contentious obaervation that, " Lovers of peace throuqhout the world
will deeply regret that the Soviet Goverrment has , however
reluctantly , found it necessary to resume testing nuclear weapons" .
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hi• rSle in the CUban missile confrontation of October 1962 .
80 Other 
polici•• were •imilarly attuned to the thinkinq of the southern CJrOUP• · 
The Peace Conmittee opposed in word and dmonstrative action the 
ratification of the W.A. radio base aqreanent; it bitterly criticiaed the 
French Government for its decision to aplode nuclear banbs over the 
Pacific , callin9 upon the Australian GoTernment to impoae stringent 
Bl •anctiona a9ainat the Prench; it repeatedly appealed to the Chinese and 
Indian Gcwerraents to lay down their arms and negotiate their frontier 
dispute; 82 it initiated, aa early as 1964 , a campaign against "the 
83 conscription of twenty year old youths for overseas service" 1 and durinq 
the 1965 ho•tilities over Jtasbnir •urqe[d] the Indian and Pakistani 
authorities to immediately aqrae to a cease fire , so that neqotiationa may 
be c<Bnenced forthwith" , thus qivinq " support [ to] the initiative of the 
84 Secretary General of the United Nations to mediate • • •  n .
The explosion of China ' s first nuc lear banb elicited a blanket 
"condemn[ ation of] the teatinq of nuclear weapon• in the atmosphere [ and] 
• • •  the failure of the great powers to progress towards a full and complete 
85 test ban treaty" . The QPCICD ' s  press statement aleo repeated the demand 
10. See PBaCe Aoti.on, Vol . 3 ,  No .  10 , November 1962 .
Bl . See Peaoelight (Bulletin of Qld. Peace Committee) ,  May 1964 . The 
QPCICD endorsed the radical proposals reqardinq sanctions put forth 
by the AEU ( see p.  145) . 
82. Peaos Aoti.on , Vol .  3 ,  No .  11 , December-January 1962/63 , st •sq.
83. Peaos'Li,ght , October-November 1964 .
84. Peacs Z.ight , Septmber 1965 .
85. QPCICD , &ea• Rstsase (not published) , 17 May, 1966 .
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for " the participation of the People ' s  Republic of China as a partner to
all talks" on diearmament .
86
The Peace COmmittee ' s  Vietnam policy called for the canplete
withdrawal of all foreign troops , and a settlement based upon the Geneva
87 Accords of 1954.  After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in Auqust 1964 , the
Vietnam war overshadowed all other is sues , and it was only until recently ,
in 1968 and 1969 , that the Committee beqan aqain broadeninq its protest 
- this time to such issue s  as conscription and the ' ABC '  weapons of mas s 
destruction . 
Concurrently , with the propa9atin9 of its peace policies , the QPCICD 
joined the atruqgle in Qld . for increased civil liberties . In 1967 , it 
combined with the Qld. Trades and Labor Council in stronqly aupporting 
88 
the student campaign to alter the Traffic Regulations .  The instrumental 
succes ses achieved in expanding the basic freedan of expression and right 
to assemble peaceably in Qld . were duly recorded into the Secretary ' s  
1967-68 Report .  " It is interesting to recall" , noted the Report , " that 
as recently as 1960 it was not possible to obtain a permit for a march.
Since then the Centenary Park forum has been opened , march permits have 
now becane traditional and last year the right to picket , or carry banners 
i 11
89
was ach eved • • • • 
86 .  Ibid. 
87. P8aoetlght , June 1964 , et s•q.
BB. See QPCICD , NtNaLstte:r , August 1967 .
89 . QPCICD , StJOHtal'y 's RepOl't, Annuat M•tlng, S/6 Apl'it 1968.
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Deapite the many campaiqna and public stands taken by the Peace 
Ccmnittee , civil libertiea proved to be the only area in which any tan11ible 
results were achieved - not much ' output reward ' from the pluraliat 
•Y•t• after seven years of hard and oonaiatent ' input effort ' .  Still , it
i• perhape unfair to evaluate the Committee ' • success in tu:ma of concrete 
aahiev•enta. On the level of ' expre•aive politic• ' - an important but 
non-measurable and quantifiable function of politics - many of the peace 
participants appeared to have been aply rewarded . Furthermore , since 
the Peace Cmanittee acted primarily in the rSle of an ' attitude qroup ' , 
it is larqely meaninqleas to attanpt to assess the .immediate and direct 
effects of its actions in the foxmulation of policies . 
Compari son Wfth N . S. W. Movement
While the Qld . ' core body' paradigm was duplicated in N . s . w. , the 
circuaatances surrounding the relationship there were valltly different . 
In Ql.4. , before the advent of SDA , the Peace Comittee dominated the 
mov•ent by virtue of the weakness or absence of potential rivala , and 
because it was linked so closely to powerful figures at the Trades Ball .  
In N. s . w . , on the other hand ,  the Continuing Ccmmlittee of the Melbourne 
COft9r••• ' access to the trade union hierarchy was partially blocked , and 
Sydney' s  more dynamic political climate produced a series of worthy 
rival• , beqinning as early as 1962 with the formation of Sydney CND . Yet
the N . s . w. Peace Committee and particularly its successor , the AICD , 
proved extremely resilient in adapting to new ideas and in acctw11odatin9 
the new types of peace dissenters , so that its ' core body' position never 
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was seriously challenqed prior to the 1966 election defeat. As major host 
and orqaniser of the 1964 Sydney Conqreas , it qained an effective platfom 
from which to coalesce the diversity of new forces caninq into the 
movement . It adroitly seized the ' opportunities of the mcaent ' and set 
up the widely based AICD , which almost immediately became the most 
influential of all the Australian peace qroups . 
Much of this story will unfold in the remaininq chapters .  
CHAPTER V 
POST 1 959 MELBOURN E CONGRESS
The four r•aining chapters of the thesis examine the broad 
develoiaental pattern of the Australia-wide movenent during the years 
that followed the Melbourne Congress and that ended in the movement ' s  
bifurcation after the 1966 General Election& . This time span of 
approximately eight years ia divicled into three general and aanetimes 
OYerlappinCJ periods • (1 ) the years immediately followincJ the 1959 
Conqreas 1  ( 2) the period preceding the 1966 election 1 and (3 ) the post­
election response to the crushing defeat suffered at the polls.  Each of 
the three periods is aet forth in a separate chapter , while a summary 
analysis of the movement ' s  evolv•ent and characteristics is contained 
in the thesis ' final chapter. 
The movement ' s  tri-daaarcation has been devised as a comprehensive 
way of encanpaaain9 and elucidating the many changes that took place in
the movement ' s political techniques ,  organisation, canposition and policy 
orientation. The moat salient of these changea ,  which pertain to 
tactic s and personnel , have been highlighted against a theoretical 
perspective of the two prototypes of political behaviour - militant and
moderate - outlined in Chapter I.  
Since pacificiam, rather than pacifism , has proved to be the 
dcainant pacific doctrine of the past decade - by far the more dynamic 
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ccaponent in the Auatralian social and political context - the en8UincJ 
material concentrate s almost exclusively on the paoificist section of the
mov•ent . That growth and change should be much more pronounced among
the pacif icists is not too surprising when one con•iders that qenerally 
they seek less inclusive 90al s than the pacifists and tend to concretise 
their issue s .  Thus the probl ems they raise ar e  more apt to be solved ,
taken up by ' third parties ' , or fade away 1 and their groups are more apt
to develop in response to new and specific problans . 
* * * * * 
A few years elapsed before the enthusiasm and propaganda qenerated 
by the Melbourne Congre ss were viaibty transformed into a wider based and
mor e active movement . In 1960 , 1961 , and during much of 1962 , the
movement was still confined to a small , solid and dedicated core of ALP
dissenters , members of the CPA, an insignif icant assortment of political 
and soc ial non-conformists , and various ahadinga of pacifiata - sane 
Christian oriented and other s motivated by non-religious , humanitarian 
oonaiderations . In te%'Dla of the five type• of diaaenters l isted in
Chapter I ,  the movement exemplified , in descending order of importance ,
the characteristic s of the cla ss , relig ious , humanitarian , intellectual 
and youth dissenter . Whilat the support of the religious dissenters 
remained relatively constant ,  the movement was clearly daninated by the 
clasa dissenter s .  Yet the sum total o f  movement supporter• represented
a group of only minor influence ,  certainly not one that threatened 
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establishment policies or approached anything like the massive scale of 
the CND mov•ent in Britain . 1
During the heyday of British CND and the beginnings of the civil 
rights and peace movements in the u. s . , the Australian peace movement 
(which meant primarily the various permanent state canmittees formed out 
of the Melbourne COnqress ' state preparatory comittees) engaged mainly 
in unobtrusive and innocuous activities ,  whose only function seemed to 
be the reinforcanent of the existinq membership ' s  views . Apparently the 
Cold war animus had not abated enough for the movement ' s  l eaders , in the 
early 1960 ' s ,  to be emboldened to resort to militant tactics .  Manories 
of the bitter trade union defeats in the late 1940 ' s were still too fresh
in the minds of many peace dissenters . As well , they remembered the 
narrowness of their victory to keep the CPA from being banned ,  the 
imprisonment of the three Communist leaders under the Crimes Act , and 
the way in which the Menzies Government was constantly able to make 
' political capital ' out of the communist issue such as in the case of 
the Petrov affair in the 1954 election. Their own peace orqanisations 
were under the clo se scrutiny of the security pol ice 1 and the peace 
movement generally , as demonetrated by the pressures brouqht to bear at 
the time of the Melbourne Congress , came under the virulent attack of
l .  Two major works have been published on the CND movement : 
Chr istopher Dr iver , !the Disal'ffltntB, A Study in Pl'otest , Hodder &
StoucJhton, Iondon , 19 64 - a detailed and highly factualiaed account 
of CND1 and Frank Parkin , Middte Class Radioati.,, , Univ . of 
Melbourne Press , Melbourne , 1968 - an examination of the aocial 
bases of CND. 
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the press , Liberal Party , and all parties and qroup• to its right. An 
unsympathetic press stressed the pro-soviet bias of the pacif iciat 
a aection of the movanent , overlooking the iasuance of such preas releases 
as the N. s . w. Peace COllllittee' •  protest against the Soviet Union ' s
3 resmaption of nuclear testing in 1961 . 
In the light of all the above circmtstances , for the movement to 
proceed cautiously and adopt moderate tactics ia at 1.-st explainable 
(thouqh the New Leftists would insist there were more endanic reasons) .  
4 Other than the occasional police sanctioned ' open air ' meeting or march , 
the movanent ' s  leaders shunned direct action and any direct confrontation 
with the Government. Instead , they pranoted unprovocative projects like 
state and local discussion qroups , interstate organisational committee 
meetinqa , public conferences , international peace conference trips , film 
screenings , ' job meetings ' , ' job ' distributions of 1 i terature , raff lea , 
bazaars , and the like . Aa a means of consolidating the gains of the
Melbourne Conqress , the leaderahip devoted its skills and enerqiu to the 
holding of count.less  area meetings where the peace issues could be 
2 .  For example ,  see comments o f  Peter Xelly , 'Peace Movement• 1n 
Au•tral1a ' ,  !fM But'Ultin , 23 June , 1962 .
J. This oversiqht on the part of the press prcmpted a particularly 
bitter denunciation in one of the peace movement' s official 
journals . Sae P(J(JIJB Aotion , Vol . 2 ,  No . 10, November 1961 . 
4. For instance ,  in Auqust 1961 , an ' Hiroshima Day ' march in Sydney 
attracted between s , ooo and 6 , 000 marchers (SydntlJI Mom.tng BtlJ'(Jtd ,  
7 Auqust , 1961 and Sydney Telsgzeaph , 7 Auqust , 1961) 1 and in 
Melbourne on the same day about 3 , 000 persons and 400 decorated 
cars transformed a march into a parade (Melbourne Age , 7 August , 
1961 ) . 
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discussed among the regular supporters of the movement. Typical of these 
discussion meetings were the CUmberland Zone Conference ( 21 March, 1961 ) , 
the N. s .w .  state meeting ( 4  March , 1961 ) , and the Victorian Peace Council 
meeting (17-19 March, 1961 ) . The leadership of the various Melbourne 
Congress COntinuinq Committees attempted to co-ordinate activities by 
meeting nationally at least once a year. At these maetinqs arrangements 
for the circulation of national peace petitions were discussed , the 
holding of public conferences planned , and the sending of deleqate• to 
overseas peace conf erances finalised. so many peace activists attended 
international peace conferences during the first par·t of the 1960 ' a that 
one peace official was led to comment wryly : "Join the peace movanent 
5 
and see the world. " Australians travelled to peace conferences as far 
apart as the World Peace Council (WPC) in New Delhi , March 24-28 , 1961 1
the All Christian Peace Assembly in Prague , June 13-18 , 1961 ; the WPC 
Delegates ' Conference in Stockholm, July 16-19 , 1961 1 the World Youth 
Forum in Moscow, July 25-August 3 ,  1961 1 the World Conference Aqainat 
A & H Bombs in Tokyo , August 6-15 , 1961 1 and the London Peace Conference , 
Septaaber 14-16 , 1961 . And this particular series of conferences only 
represented the international itinerary for ons year ! On the local 
scene , the larger public conferences included those held in Sydney and 
Melbourne on May 15 , 1960 , in Sydney on November 19 , 1960 , in Melbourne 
and Richnond , Victoria on December 2 ,  1960 , in Rockhampton , Queensland 
on April 7-9 , 1961 , Hiroshima Day Conferences on August 6 ,  1961 in three 
5. Jack Sherrinqton , Treasurer of QUeensland Peace Canmittee , to the
author .
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of the capital citiee , conferences in Sydney on October 27 , 1961 , in 
SUtherland , N. s . w. on October 7 ,  1961 , and in Hurtsville , N. s . w. on 
October 14 , 1961 . In addition , an anniversary conference was held in 
Melbourne a year after the 1959 Congress . However , despite all these 
attmpte at ·involving the public in a debate of the peace isaues , the 
attendance at the•• conferences was drawn chiefly fran the regular peace 
movanent supporters ,  and preas camnent was limited almost exclusively to 
the iaaue of covert camnuni•t control . 
In another attempt to open up public debate and achieve wider 
aupport - yet still operating within the channels of accepted political 
activity - the movement devoted a major portion of its energies in 1961 , 
1962 , and 1963 to the circulation of national peace petitions . The first 
of theae, which was launched from the Australian Peace council ' • national 
headquarters in Melbourne , pertained to the issue of general am universal 
disarmament, and was designed to coincide with the 1961 Federal election. 
The petition ciraulated the next year , by far the most successful in terms 
of aiqnature• obtained (over 200 , 000) , endorsed the Federal Parliamentary 
Leader of the ALP ' s proposal to extend the nuclear-free zone in the 
Antartic to embrace all the southern B•isphere. It also beseeched the 
Government not to manufacture ,  teat, station, or acquire nuclear weapons 
or bases in Australia. . This petition and the one the following year were 
initiated by the N. s . w. Peace COmmittee. The 1963 petition , which 
differed only slightly in content from the previous years ' but which 
contained fewer signatures ,  was linked to the 1963 Federal election. 
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Although the peace movement ' s big project of 1964 was the orcJ&niein9 of 
the Sydney Congra•s , tw petitions - one emanatinq fran the ANZ Congress 
on behalf of Mr. Gordon Bryant (Labor ,  MBR) and the other from the 
offices of the H. s . w. Peace COlmlittee - were circulated call ing for the
Government to increase its efforts to prevent the propo•ed Prench nuclear 
tests in the Pacific . Nationwide , mass petition• were abandoned in 
subsequent years , as the established peace qroups switched their tactic 
to assiatinq special occupational qroupinga like academics and clerics to 
obtain aiqnatures for their statements .  
The peace organisations constantly endeavoured to secure th e  names 
of 4i•tinguished persona as sponsors of their proj ects and as speakers on 
their platfoma , thus hoping to 9enerate a more ' reapectable ' public 
image .  l'or instance , at rallies held concurrently in Sydney and Melbourne 
on May l Sth ,  1960 , messages of aupport were read from such diverse 
personages as Sir Mark Oliphant , Tom Lehrer (American entertainer) and 
6 Sir Malcolm sarvent. Likewise , efforts were directed at involving in 
peace politic• Federal ALP parliamentarians like Dr .  J . F .  Cairns , Mr .  Tom 
Uran , Mr .  Leslie Johnson , Mr .  Les Haylen , and Senator Douglas McClelland ,  
who were reqularly invited and often appeared at pacificist meetinqa . 
De•pite the modest success which had been achieved at the Melbourne 
Oongr••• in widening the socio-economic base of the movement , the bulk 
of it• financial support continued to come from the lef t-win9 trade 
6 .  P.aa• Aotton , Vol . 1 ,  No . 1 ,  June 1960. 
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unions . Ostensibly , it was among the officials and members of these 
unions , through personal contacts and by means of lunch hour meetings , 
notices and articles in the union newalettera , that the peace leaders were 
exercieinq their greatest influence. Yet the inroads they were malting into 
these areas were minimal , for moat of the time it was a case of preaching 
to the converted. 
In abort , the movement ' s  failure to reach a wider public , gain media 
coverage , and make an impression on the society , can , in scme measure , be 
attributed to the restrictive and unimaginative nature of ita activities. 
If the tactical problm of the dissenting mov•ent is to be provocative 
without inciting disastrous reprisals and to gain new supporters without 
sacrificing basic tenets , then the peace movement of the early 1960 ' s  was 
overbalanced on t:he moderate side of being unprovoeative and oriented 
towards a ' fortress existence ' .
However , whilst the movanent' s  aotions conformed to the moderate 
paradigm, sane of its :rhstO'l'io occasionally struck a highly militant 
note. Thi• was particularly true among sane of the rank and file class 
disaenters who agqreaaively denounced the capitalism and imperial!• of 
the United States as being the root cause of the threat to world peace . 
And throuqhout the movement , the printed and electronic media were almost 
uniformly singled out as ' the enemy' for their alleqedly unfair reporting 
of peace is•ues and the activities of the peace groups . Reqarded as an 
inteqral part of the power structure , they were even maligned for 
deliberately inciting war tensions . Thus one peace supporter ' s  attitudinal 
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"""' ideological philippic against the press took the followinq extr•ely 
militant fona s 
HDa1ly ntJW11papers of the world are a menace to mankind. 
!'hey are enemies of the l'fl01>le . !'hey .tir up strife 
1n a LashJ.on more cold blooded than any other 1nva.ld.on 
aga1nllt the welfare of the human race , creatJ.ng 
nat1onal emn1t.1es and fostering warmongery. Peace J.s 
not �J.r vocabulary. t;rbere ' s no money J.n J. t • • • •  " 7 
Althouqh such sentiments were more apt to emanate from the movement' s
rank and file (particularly the trade unionists) than from the leadership , 
they occasionally slipped into the official oratory and into publications 
sanctioned by the leaderahip. Yet whenever it came time to translate the 
militant rhetoric into militant action , the leadership inevitably balked . 
The attitude expressed at the trade union sectional conference of the 
1959 Melbourne Conqress - an attitude which carried over into the first 
part of the decade - is a qood case in point. Some of the deleqates at 
thia oonf erence had advocated from the floor stronq workinq class action 
to effect peace policies . Their calla for industrial militancy included 
a ' black ban '  on nuclear tests and a twenty-four hour atoppaqe , after 
President De Gaulle exploded a French nuclear baub in the sahara Desert,
to commemorate ' Diaaxmament Day' • One speaker recommended that the 
wrkera leave the Congress dedicated to the slogan , "Down Bomb - Down 
Tools" . Another worker rhetorically asked the meeting , "How many of us 
are lending our muscles to the cause of war? Let us take steps now to 
8 progressively withdraw our labour from war plants" • A further auqgeation 
7 . Oscar Walters , Peace Action , Vol . 1 ,  No . 6 ,  Sydney , November 1960 .
B. Cited in Outlook , Vol .  3 ,  No .  6 ,  December 1959.
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( although it had been tried uneucceaafully in 1947) was made to declare a 
' black ban ' on all equipment and weapons for the Woomera Rocket Range . 
In raplyinq to these proposals the peace and union official• sounded 
a typical note of caution and warning . The Secretary of the Waterside 
Workers Union and a leading OOD1Dunist , J .  Healy, for example ,  had this to 
say about the call for a twenty-four hour stoppage s  
"rbJ.s proposal would be 1mposs.1ble ror t:h1s oonLerence, 
not bec•use I am afraid o� .1ndustr1al act.1on, but because
there are un.tons •nd un.1on leaders who are aLrdd o� such
• move. We shouldn ' t  get d1v1ded on th111 quest1on . We 
want to get t:he workers ta.lk1ng about thJ.s . Such a aall 
would not be b1nd1ng • • • •  •9
The final resolutions of this sectional conference clearly reflected 
a vict�ry of the leaderahip ' s  moderate position over the more militant 
posture adopted by some of the rank and file . After noting that 
"experience shows that wars arise from conditions created by the profit 
making ays�em111
0 
(militant rhetoric) , the trade union conference merely 
proclaimed itself in favour of ' Summit Diplomacy • ,  international 
exchanges of representatives of trade unions , cultural and sporting 
bodies;  Australian recognition of the People ' s  Republic of _China and 
support for her admission into the United Nations r and preparation for 
ll the transition from war production to peace production (moderate 
9 .  Ibid. 
io . Doouments of Ths AustJtatian and New Zsa'Land Congitess fol' IntePnationa.Z. 
Co-op•mtion and Disannanent ,  Challenge Press Pty . Ltd. , Coburq ,
Vic . , p .  4 .  
ll. Ibid. , p .  s .
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r•edies ) • The conference added a call for " improved social services ,
full •ployment , increased wages ,  aborter hours , longer leave , more homes , 
l2 
llChoola and hoapitala" , which - it noted - "will be asaiated by the
division of resources now devoted to war preparations• .lJ 
In line with the above emollients and the broad guidelines laid down 
l4 in th e  Melbourne Conqres s '  manifesto , the Declaration of Hope, the 
policies and remedies of the peace camittees in the early ' Sixtiea ' were 
related to distant and/or inclusive issues - e. g. , peaceful co-exiatence ,
universal disaxmarnait, abolition of all nuclear testing , Cuba , Algeria , 
Berlin , and the Conqo , u-2 fliqhta ,  and Japanese and German re-axmament -
isaues which must have seemed geographically and politically remote to 
most Australians , who traditionally have been concerned chiefly with 
incr•ental ' bread and butter ' pol itics and have left the grander global 
prcbles to the ' Mother Country ' or to ' Uncle Sam ' . A major preoccupation 
of the movement in the early ' Sixties ' was the rise of neo-Nazi• and 
irredenti• in West Germany. Mr .  Sam Goldbloan , the Secretary of the 
ANZ congress , spoke tireleaaly on the subj ect and authored a widely 
circulated article called Gezrman Rs-amament - f'hs GPt!Jat Betzeayat and a
pmaphlet entitled Peaos and ths Gtarman Pztob Zan. In the months iJmaediately
succeedinq the 1959 Melbourne Conqress , the APC responded to an appeal 
fran the WPC for mpport of seven German peace workers accused by the 
12. Ibid.
lJ. Ibid. 
l 4. see Appendix A.
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West Guman Federal Republic of undermining •the constitutional basis of
the Federal Republic" . The APC organised the senc!inq of a series of
cables and letters to the Special crminal Court in Dusseldorf and 
messages of support to the solicitors of the accused. other manifestations 
of the movement ' • concern over the so-called ' German Problem ' included
the hol4in9 of a apecial public meetincJ in Sydney on October 27 , 1961 to 
•alert the public" , the distribution of a film Gaman Stoey !1.'oday for
shoving among the wpport.era of the various peace qroups , the printing of 
article• such as !fM Elohmann fttia.Z and His Aooanp1:£ou !today in the
regular peace outlets of newsletters and journals , and the handin9 out 
of pamphlet• declaring Neve Again outside screening• of the camnercial
film i.ln Kampf. 
A typically general and r.aote peace programme was that proclaimed 
by the N . s . w .  Peace Cclmittee, an important voice for the whole mov•ent. 
Following the collapse of the May 1960 ' Summit Meeting ' in Paris , the 
N . s . w .  body declared that "essential great-power agreement.a for 
disa.rmmaent and peaceful coexistence can be reached only throuqh greater 
popular pressure to ' smother ' specific Cold war activities and to create
1 5  
conditions o f  trust essential for a successful ... ting" . This broad 
objective of counter-acting " establishment Cold War propaganda" by 
fcaenting "positive grass-root• pre•aure" was to be achieved by directing 
the attention of the Australian people to such matters as "the
l5. Peace Action , Vol.  1 ,  No .  1 ,  June 1960 . 
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ranilitarization of Japan" , " the unconcealed acceleration of re-armament 
in West Genlany" , • the danqer of provocative statements and military 
activities associated with SEATO" , and " the need for a positive stand by 
the Federal Governnent for world disarmament and peaceful coexistence and 
for aucceasful aqreement in the negotiations to end nuclear weapon• 
16 
taatin9 and in the East-West disarmament talks" . Since all these issues 
were either abstract or rauote - not to mention one-aided in their 
' qaeetion b999in9 1 - it ia not too surpriainq that the pragmatic and 
insular Australian responded indifferently. Only the small band of 
ideologues on the Riqht bothered to reply to the issues and policies 
raised by the Left. 
When the movement did turn to issues closer to home and directly 
affecting Australia , such as SFA'l'O and the u. s .  radio base in Western
Auatralia , it tended to formulate its policies i.n toto - that is , 
rej ecting piecemeal and proximate solutioo s in favour of distant and 
inclusive goala . Thus the issue of coloniali am demanded n immediate action 
to encourage the independence movement of the Conqolese , Laotian and 
other peoples , and the emancipation of the New Guinea and Aboriginal 
peoples of Australia"1 7- i. s. , support for insurgency qroups . The
movement ' s  foreiqn pol icy , intsze al.i.a , stipulated "withdrawal fran existing 
pacts and alliance• based on interference , including armed intervention , 
16 . Ibid. 
l7.  'Interstate Peace Comm.ittee Resolutiona ' , 18 February , 1961 , published 
in Peacs Action , Vol.  2 ,  No .  2 ,  March 1961 . 
in the daneatic affairs of south East Asian peoples "1 8- i. •. , the
renunciation of SF.ATO' s military sections . 
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When the movement attempted to graft these sorts of ' advanced ' 
objectives on to the body politic of Australia , not unexpectedly it 
encountered rejection problens . 
Within the movement itself there appeared in the first years of the 
' Sixties ' the nascent signs of an enerqinq activist directed New Left . 
In 1960 , a Victorian Cmnpaiqn for Nuclear Disarmament (VCND ) was formed 
in Melbourne by a group of young intellectual dissenters inspired by the 
British ' unilateralists ' and condemnatory of the way in which peace 
politics was conducted in the ANZ CoftCJX"e&a . Their central critician 
foc:used on ANZ ' s operation as a personal machine for a few individuals 
whose political biases were scarcely disquised , but they also denounced 
the ANZ Conqress for its moderate tactics which they contrasted 
unfavourably with the acts of confrontation and civil disobedience 
caamitted by the expandinq CND movement in Britain . Althouqh the 
Australian CND ' ers could not call upon their Govermnent to relinquish 
nuclear weapons that it did not possess , they joined their British 
ocunterparte in stressing the importance of non-alignment for their 
country in the nuclear age.  They wanted Australia to renounce any 
involvtlllent in nuclear strategy , to pursue a more active rSle in the
attainment o f  a universal test ban treaty ,  and to undertake never to 
18. Ibid.
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4.velop an independent nuclear force .
1 9 
The nucleus of the VCND was
located at the University of Melbourne where a campus chapter helped to 
raauscitate university politic s from the doldrums it had slipped into 
durinq the late 19 SO ' s .  A highlight o f  the University' s  activities was 
a loDCJ and vitriolic exchange of leaflets with a radical right continqent 
led by Dr .  Frank JCnopfelaacher . 
At Sydney , a CND with s imilar aima20 was founded in March 1962 , and 
- together with the VCND and the CND qroups formed in 1962 in Western 
21 Australia and Queensland - qave Australia its first preview of the 
political flamboyance that was to becane a trad.ark of dissenting 
pol itics in the latter half of the decade . Drawing its support mainly 
from humanitarian and intell ectual dissenters , with a heavy accent on 
youth , the CND stres sed mass direct action and a politic• of personal
commitment. Its supporters marched and sang . '!'hey developed a special
sub-culture of defiance symbol ised by the famous emb lem of the drooping 
cross and by an unconventionality in hair and dres s styl es .  EVen in the 
midst of fellow peace dissenters , the CND ' ers stood out as a frinqe qroup.
In Australia , they always remained outs ide the main stream of the peace
19 . VCND oizeoutar , August 1963 . 
20. The aims of Sydney CND , as exprea•ed in its constitution , were " the
adoption by a Federal Government of a foreign pol icy by which
Australia will : (i)  Refuse to possess , manufacture or use nuclear
weapons , ( ii )  Refuse Australian-administered territory for use by
other nations as nuclear bases , ( iii ) Refuse ,  also , the use of
Auatralian-adlllinistered territory for nuclear tests and withhold
u•istance to nuclear tests anywhere" .
21 . See preceding two chapters . 
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movement , thouqh they did modify ita course and they were the styl istic 
forerunners of an important peace faction that grew out of the Vietnam 
and oonsc:ription issues. In fact , they also were this faction ' s  
organisational forerunners ,  because in 1965 both the Victorian and Sydney 
CND' s dissolved into major anti-Vietnam bodies - the VCND providing the 
Vietnam Day Committee with the majority of its executive and channellinq 
most of its energies into that new body, while SCND was doinq the same with 
the Vietnam Action Committee in Sydney. 
CHAPTER V I  
PRE 1 966 FED ERAL ELECT I ONS
Movement ' s  Trans i ti on to a More Dynami c  Rol e 
To the casual observer , who saw only the visible part of the iceber9 
composed of the peace mov•ent ' s personnel , activities and policies , 
little impact seaned to have been made by the 1959 Melbourne congress.  
Yet beneath the surf ace some siqnif icant transformations were taking 
place. Foremost amonqat these were the inteqration that followed fran 
the movement ' s  re-orqaniaation, the germination of a policy re-orientation 
as the moveent turned to issues of a more specific and local nature , and
the gradual appearance of a qreater diversity in types of dissenters and 
sources of financial support. Concurrently , the movement also beqan to 
manifest a greater range and flexibility of tactics , becoming far more 
militant in the way it expressed its dissent and pressed its demands . 
In terms of re-organisation , the most important event was the 
eatablishnent of the permanent state camnittees out of the Conqress '  state 
preparatory committees. These canmitteea supplanted the various Assembly 
for Peace groups , the S . A. Peace Convention Bureau , and the remnants of 
l 
the old APC , and they generally performed the service of mobilising the 
l .  In Victoria , the Australian and Victorian Peace Councils continued to 
exist in a fairly moribund state alongside the newly formed ANZ 
Congress , and were not fomally diahanded until 1967 . Also in 1967 , 
the ANZ Congress changed its name to the COnqreas for International 
Co-operation and Diaamament (CICD) , largely as a result of the 
attempts in N . s . w. of the Labor Party to proscribe AICD. 
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peace eentiment apreaaed at the O>nqreas into a potentially effective 
future outlet. By developinq strong intJta and inta state consultative 
and ' fraternal' ties , the peace bodies laid the quaai-foxmal and 
efficient orcJaniaational framework that later enabled them to co-ordinate 
so effectively their state and national activities into a protest 
movement against the Vietnam war , conscription, and the re-election of 
the Holt Government. That they undertook these campaigns with some 
degree of efficiency and becmne a force of some saliency can be attributed, 
in no mall measure , to the fact that the machinery had larqely been 
erected beforehand. 
In the early years of the decade , the national leadership tended to 
ananate from Victoria ' •  ANZ Congress in the persona of Mr .  Sam Goldbloom 
and the 'peace par110JU1 1  - that ia , the Rev . Alf Diclcie , the Rev. Frank 
Hartley , the Rev . Victor James , and before he moved to Sydney , the Rev. 
Noman Anderson. In due course , however , the Victorian qroup was
superseded in the role of de faoto national leader by the N. S . W. Peace
Colmittee. The shift in influence became especially evident after the 
holding of the 1964 Sydney Congress and the creation of the N. s . w. Peace
Committee' s  successor , the Association for International Co-operation 
and Diaaxmament (AICD) . The central orqanisational figure associated 
with both the Peace canmittee and AICD was Mr. Geoff Anderson, a winner 
of the DFC and twice mentioned in dispatch•• in the last World War ,
whoae fozete as a peace leader (as he , himself , once described AICD ' s
achiev•ents )  lay in " asaiatin9 the pranotion of independent and co-
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ordinated initiative• by the various components of the mov•ent • • •  without 
2 in any way aubnerqing the identity of the oanponent parts" . In other 
words , under hi• leadership , AICD aucceallfully managed to assume the rSla 
of ' core group ' without giving offence to the other groups - at least not 
initially. 
In addition to atrenqthening its organisational bonds , the movement, 
after late 1962 , gradually began to discard peace abstractions and distant 
goals for the tackling of apecif ic , local issues . This shift in policy 
orientation was probably due not so much to a deliberate , strategical 
choice on the part of peace officials aa to a series of fortuitous , 
outside events forcing the movement into new areas of concern. The crisis
in West Irian, the general worseninq of Australia ' s  relations with 
Indonesia due to the confrontation with Malaysia and the rise in power of 
the PKI , the Opposition Leader ' s advocating of a nuclear-free zone in the
Southern Hemiaphere , the decision of the French Goverment to teat 
nuclear weapons in the Pacific , the pall iative effect of the signing of 
the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty on the general disarmament
queation - all these events and others compelled the movement to turn its 
dis sent toward• more apecifio iaaues of a local nature. And from the 
moment the Australian Government announced , in 1965 ,  that it was sendinq 
a mall continqant of combat. troop• to Vietnam , all issues became 
subordinate to the twin issues of Vietnam and conecription. 
a. G . R. Anderson , �ONtary 's RllpOztt to Annual. Gena:ral MeBting of 
AICD - May 86, 1966 , p. 7 . 
178 . 
Closely related to the conaretiain9 and segmenting of issues and 
goals were aane aajor structural and social ch&J¥le& occurrinC) to the 
broader mov•ent. A spate of new organisation• aroae , built primarily 
around apecific issuea . '.lhe more prominent of these new qroupa included 
the Save our Sons (SOS) and the Youth Cmnpaiqn JMJainst Conacription (YCAC) 
which were foJ:Dled in oppoaition to con8Cription for overseas service but 
generally extended their activities beyond this limited aim 1 the 
Conacientioaa Objector• Mviaory Cosmaittae (COAC) which offered counsel 
to potential conscript• 1 the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) , the Vietnmn
Action ca-tttee (VAC) , the Comittee for Canberra Viqil , and the Project 
Vietnam Committee , all four of which were organised to foment leqal and 
illeqal agitation 89•in•t Australia ' • Vietnam policy1 the Ex-Services 
Human Rights Aaaociation (ESHRA) , which was designed to counter-balance 
the militarism of the RSL and oppoae the war in Vietnam 1 and countless 
ephaneral organisations , not.ably in the universities , which received their 
impetu• from the Vietnam and conscription issues . Only one new qroup 
foJllled after the 1964 Sydney Congreas concentrated on an issue other than 
one related to Vietnam : the Sydney based Committee Against Atomic 
Teatinq (CAAT)  set up in December 1964 to counter the French nuclear 
tasting at Mururoa atoll . And its moat publicised action proved to be a 
hoax and sanething of an embarrassment to the rest of the movement , for 
on July 2 ,  1966 , when the French exploded their first N-bomb , CAAT falsely 
reported to the mass media that it had sailed a ketch into the testing 
area . 
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The myriad of new groups reflected a chanqe in the eocio-economic 
base of the movement from a dependency on the left-wing trade union• to
a greater involv•ent fran the middle class .  The movement became much 
more diverse in a number of areas a in occupational groupinqs ,  in the 
political affiliations of it• supporters , in the increased participation 
of wamen , and in the upaurqe of a wlatil• younqer generation. Thus sos
J 4 was canpoaed primarily of middle clu a ,  middle aged housewives ,
professional and business women with an admixture of political and 
5 apolitical backgrounds . Actinq out of what they construed to be a sense 
of civic reaponsibility and believing atronqly in the amenability of the 
political attitudes of Australian women through education ,  the SOS qroups
6 undertook to explain the history of Vietnam , the reasons for Australia ' s  
presence , and the qreat moral issue associated with conscription. The 
major reason •why • • • the Menzies-Holt government canmitted Australian 
troops" , explained a Victorian SOS pamphlet , " [ is ]  becau ae the government 
J. Most of the SOS founders and the initiators of its activities , in
both Melbourne and Sydney, came frm. upper-middle class suburbia , 
such as Beaumaris in Victoria and Pennant Hills in N. s .w.
4. A survey , conducted by the author , of the ten-woman executive camnittee
of Victoria SOS disclosed that their average aqe was forty-four ,
ranqinq from thirty-two to fifty-six ; and the same general age group
was observed by the author to be the case when he interviewed the 
N . s . w. sos leadership . 
5. survey, eupzta. Frcm the author ' s  own observations and on the basis
of information supplied to him by the Victorian executive , only
minor differences existed between the leadership and rank and file
with regard to occupation, age and political party affiliation. The 
leadership did tend to come fran •l ightly more affluent section• of
the camnunity. ( See R. Stmuay , 'A Reply to Fred Wells ' , in R. Forward
& Bob Reece, op. oit. , pp . 203-204 .
6 .  Por example , printed pamphlet by Jenny Teichnann, !I'hs riCD' in Vutnam ,
Victorian SOS , o. 1966 .
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believes that Australia must blindly follow American policies in order to 
oonaolidate the Australian-American alliance , which the qovernnent regards 
7 
aa necessary to Au•tralian security" . The conacription issue contained 
high moral overtones , and a fairly typical approach was that once 
expressed by a N. s . w. leader , Mrs.  A. Gregory, in answer to a dictum of 
the Minuter for the Army , Dr .  Porbes , that the National Service Act 8hould
be obeyed because it was the law of the land. She replied , as the SOS 
waaen frequently contended , that "the citizen had the duty to oppose the 
law if it was imloral , and that the arg'Ulllents of loyalty to the law were 
uaed. to defend war criminals at Nuraaburq , but were not accepted as 
8 valid" . By conducting a protracted educative campaign alonq the above 
lines , the SOS waaen were hopeful of hrinqing pressure to bear on the 
government . An SOS official stat•ent argued : "Aa individuals we may
feel powerl•••· But a nationwide mov•ent of earnest determined women 
9 could force our Govermient to review its legielation . •  Whilst such an 
objective in no way departed from the noxms of middle class conventionality, 
some of the tactics the wanen were prepared to adopt to achieve this end 
were not only unorthodox but threatenin9 to the moral authority of the 
Government. 
1. '.fht1 Moztal and Po'ti.tioaZ Issues Involved i.n Vi.stnam and Consonption ,
Victorian SOS , o. early 1966.
1. l'zt••• Rs �se , sos , N. s .w. , 21 May, 1965 . It was issued after a
delegation of SOS supporters had received an interview with Dr .
Forbes at Parliament Bouse .
t. Sta.tsment , sos , N . s . w. , o. late 1965 .
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YCAC ' s membership , of course , came fram younq people (both sexes) , 
many of vhom belonged to Young Labor Asaociations . YCAC branches were 
established at the Melbourne and Sydney univereities , and the aims of 
YCAC were taken up by many of the other left-wing clubs at the 
univers ities - s . g . , by the Monash Labor Club in 1966 . Strictly apeakinq ,
the aims of YCAC were confined to oppoeinq conaaription for overseas
aerYice , but s ince the issue of Vietna could hardly be dissociated from 
conacription, YCAC officials rarely , if ever , left any doubt where they 
stood on this issue . Thus a Sydney YCAC circular in enlietinq support 
for a ' dmo '  at Central Station protested " against conscription and the 
10 dirty war in Vietnam" . And an advertisement p�aced in TM Auatm'Z.i.an
by YCAC and signed by about one hundred and fifty young men liable for 
ailitary service stated : "We oppose overseas conscription because we 
believe that we may be sent to fiqht in Vietnam [and] • • • •  'l'hia would be
a moral wrong and an unjust call upon our lives by the Govermnent of our 
ll country. " As in the case of SOS , YCAC was dedicated to brinqinq about 
chanqe throuqh the parliamentary aystan , especially by assisting the
Labor Party in its 1966 election caapaiqn , but the tactics which it used 
in pursuing this general strategy were probably the most militant of any 
of the peace movement groups . 
COAC (as was indicated in Chapters III and IV) was instigated by the 
pacifists whose main efforts fran 1965 onward were directed towards 
lO. (){,zeou Zalt ,  authorised by YCAC , 2nd Flr . , 96 Phillip St . , Sydney ,
o. Septaaber 1965 .
ll . � Auatztatian , 19 June , 1965 .
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aa•istin9 the conscientious objectors and the potential conscientious 
objectora . The pacifist journal 1'ha PBQO.mttksl' , throuqhout the second
half of the decade , maintained an excellent record of the conscientious 
objector court cases being conducted in Au•tralia. 
Both Sydney VAC and the VDC in Melbourne were co-ordinating bodies
of action again•t the war in Vietnam. Descendants in large part of the 
am groups , they drew much of their wpport from middle class youth , and
they were in the forefront of move• to introduce more militant tactics 
into the movement.
The Cclmittee for Canberra Vigil was strictly a churchmen ' s  
organisation. Instiqated and lad by the Rev . Alan Walker , this qroup 
expreaaed it• oppoaition to the Vietnam war through auch activities as 
the lobbying of parliamentarian• , circulating petition• among clU'CJYlllen , 
and engaging in prote•t vigils .  '!h e  Ex-Services Association of Australia , 
later renamed the Ex-Services Buman Riqhta Aaaociation of Australia 
(ESHRA) , was formed in Novanber 1966 , as a servic•en ' s  orqaniation to
pranulqate a pacificist position, at the time the N. s . w. branch of the 
RSL was celebrating its CJOlden jubilee. Six months later , ESBRA gained
nation-wide attention ,  when one of its leaders , Mr .  L. Waddington, was
expelled frcm th e  RSL and another , Mr. A. Pascoe , was suspended for five 
years ,  because of their opposition to the Vietnam war and to conscription , 
which was judged subversive to the objects and policy of the League. 12
1 2. � Aust:ratlan , 2 JUne , 1967 . Alao see John Philip Goode ,  ' "11!1 500
J'eople Are Ready '.to Do Battle w1 th the RSL ' , I'M AustJtati.an , 15 June , 
1967 1 and B. Albinski , op. oit. , PP• 139-141 . 
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SUbsequently , they were reinstated , but in November 1968 , Mr .  waddinqton 
ruiqned in proteet aqainst attitudes expressed at the RSL ' s 1968 
l 3 
national congres s . ESHRA ' s initiators ,  besides Mr .  Waddington and Mr .  
Pascoe , included such well-lmown fiqures a a  Mr .  Allan Aahbolt o f  the ABC
who became the first president o f  the N. s. w. branch ,
l 4  
Senator James 
JCeeffe who as sumed a similar position with the Qld . branch , and Mr. 
Pranci• James of Ths Angtloan. 
As long aa the peace mov•ent co-ordinated activities around a sinqle 
and immediate goal , auah as defeatinq the Government in the 1966 General 
Elections , differences maonqst the prol ifaratinq qroups were muted and 
raised no insuxmountabl e probl••· It was only afterwards , in the wake 
of the movement ' s  election rout and when the qoal s became diffuse , 
distant , and more sweepinq , that sane of the differences turned into 
tensions stronq enouqh to create schisms . 
Durinq the pre-election period of the movement ' s  expansion some of 
the old peace organisations acted as stronq unifying forces , eo-ord inatinq
peace activities in their respective areas , offering equipnent and 
facilitiea to the newly fomed smaller qroups and qenerally encouraqinq 
the prol iferation of new qroups . On a few occasions they even initiated 
the formation of ad hoo qroups themselves - for example ,  the Hiroshima 
lJ. Brisbane f'•Ugmph, 18 November ,  1968 . 
1 4 . Mr .  Ashbolt is currently writing a book on sane of the theoretical
probl81S oonfrontinq the peace movement . See final chapter of 
thesis. 
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Commemoration Committees organised in the various states , the Project
Vietnam C<>Pnittee in Sydney , and the ehort-lived Vietnam Action Conaittee 
in Brisbane . 
Of all the established peace organisations the AICD and it•
predecesaor , the N . s . w. Peace Ccamittee , were particularly adept: at 
mobilisinq wider support,  both within their own orqanisations and in the
mov•ent at larqe . '!heir leadership seemed quick to recognise the 
potential of a movement based upon the moral z eal of the middle class and
the enthua iamn of youth for its drive , partiaalarly when thi• was combined 
with the traditional forces of the Left and Chriatian paoifi•. Tbua , as 
early as mid 1961 , when the peace committees in the three eastern mainland 
states were approached by the British Committee of 100 (Iord Russell ' s
break-away qroup from CND) for assistance in " a  world-wide movement of
resistance which will make it impossible for any government , Fast or West ,  
1 5  to have nuclear bombs or bases" , the N . s . w. leadership indicated a
perception of •erging tactical trends in dissent movements , and the need 
for the established peace groups to acconauodate to them. Wrote the N . s . w. 
Joint secretary , at that time , in an interstate letter : 
• we feel 1t td.ll be 1mpo.rtant for us to respond to th1•
appeal , so as to l.1.nlt our movement wi th  the ant1-nuclear
canm.tttees and also to ta.ke appropr1a.te steps to
accamnodate w1th1n our movement the type of act1ona
wh1ch have chllracter1"8d the work of the anti-nuclear
comd. ttees, •uch a.s walks and marches agai.nat weapons 
and ba11es , etc.
15. Michael Randle, secretary of British ccmmittee of 100 , Letur to fl. 
Monaow, Joint Seaztsta:zty of N. S. fl. PBflCe Cowrnittss , 13 July , 1961 . 
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"Mt feel that unless we take .ane 1n1tiative about this type 
of aat1vity, 1t will , before very long, be 1nJ.t1ated 
independently or our movement. 11l6 
The upshot of the overseas appeal was that the Australian groups 
arranged a motorcade aum relay march to Canberra where deleqates were 
selected to call on members of Parliament and make the rounds of the 
anbusiaa - a •ery tamecat demonstration compared to some of the militant 
tactic• adopted later. However , what was important was the cognisance of 
the H . s . w. Peace Colllllittee of the emerging militant tactics popularised 
abroad - as well as by the local variants of the CND - and the necessity 
for incorporatinq than into a viable ,  broadly baaed Australian movement . 
Aa a result, when militant tactics were forced upon the N . s . w. body in 
late 1965 , it utilised rather than perversely reaisted the new techniques . 
Meanwhile , the 1964 Sydney CoD!Jresa , which was deaiqned on the model 
of the Melbourne Conqrua except that it was divided into sections by 
topics as well as occupational groupings ,  prOV'ed to be an important 
watershed in expanding the base of the mov•ent and inteqratinq peace 
sentiment throuqhout the nation . In retrospect , the Sydney Conqresa 
managed to achieve three major tangible results . It helped to establish 
inc!irectly the YCAC 1 it provided sane of the impetua for the formation of 
VAC in N . s .w. 1 and , most importantly , it led to the foundation of AICD , 
an organisation which achieved great success in amalqamating d iverse 
16 . G . R. Anderson ,  Joint Secretary N. s . w. Peace Committee , Lettezt to 
N. Chatma-a, S.Ol'etal'ty Qt.d. PBaCe Cormrlttee , 11 Auqust , 1961 . 
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sections of the ocmmwiity through a more representative membership and 
executive committee . 
Bishop J . S .  Moyes ,  the former Anglican Bishop of Armidale , 
repraaented the most notable acquiaition to the front-line ranks . His 
association with AICD , as we ll as that of Mr. Francis James , the Chairman 
of TiuJ Angtioan newspaper , was related , in part , to a series of events
concurrently taking place within the Anglican Church . The much-publicised 
exchange of letters in 1965 between almost half of the Australian biahops 
and the Prime Minister was initiated and facilitated , to a large deqree , 
17by the AICD staff . 
The moderate tactic of enlisting the support of prestigious community 
leaders was extended into many areas : into the universities , the ALP ,  
other churches ,  and additional trade unions . The six officers and 
nineteen executive committee members of AICD came from a croas-aection 
lB of the coamnity ,  both occupationally and in terms o f  party politics . 
In addition to Bishop Moyes and Mr .  James , they included, in 1966 , 
university professors and academics , a dental surgeon , housewives , 
l9 seconc5ary school teachers ,  a p•ycholoqiat , a company repreeentative ,
17. G . R. Anderson , General Secretary of AICD , in interview with author ,
18 January , 1966 .
lB.  See Appendix D for a list o f  the AICD Executive an d  their 
identifications . 
l9 . She was Mrs . A. Michaelis . Her son , Robert Michaelis , became a 
' cause cel8bre ' in the hectic month preceding the 1966 general
elections , when he preferred to leave Sydney Grammar School rather 
than remain in the school ' s oompulaory cadet corps . The case 
[Footnote l9 cx>nt1nued on nert page] 
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atudents , and trade unionists . In party politics they ran the gamut fran 
20 21 a Liberal party branch executive and another Liberal party member to 
22 two members of the CPA . Between these two extremes lay eight ALP 
members , one Liberal RefoJ:m member , and a balance of non-party clerical 
and aecular pacif ist and pacificiata , as well as non-party radical and 
moderate democratic socialists . '!'ha membership , which rose to one 
thousand by early 1966 also represented a diversity of backqrounds .  
According to infoxmation furni shed by the General Secretary ,  it was 
canposed of : 18% profes sionals 1 17% trade unioni8ts 1 16% women (bane 
dutiea ) 1  15% self-eaployed ( shopkeepers ,  parliamentarians , farmers , 
[l'ootnote 19 cont1nued from prev1ous page] 
gained national headlines ,  was the subject of an editorial in � 
AustJta.ti.an (1 October , 1966 ) after t:he Army Minister , Mr .  Fraser , 
used a Security dossier in Parliament to verify the Government ' s  
claJm that the boy ' s mother was a member of a peace orqanisation 
regarded as being under Communist influence. '1'hs Austl'at:lan
condanned this political climate which reduced debate on politics 
to the "hysterical talk of • • •  crypto-camnunists , patriots and 
traitors" . (Ibid. ) 
20 . Dr . I . V. Newman , Department of Botany , Univer sity of Sydney . As an 
officer of a North Sydney branch of the Liberal Party , ha offered 
to step down because of his compromising position on the executive 
of an organisation which had been attacked by the Federal Attorney­
Genaral as "Communist influenced" . However , Dr . Newman ' s branch 
refused to accept hia resignation and re-elected him to the branch ' s
executive . Dr .  Newian was one of the chief initiators of the 
acadanics '  petition on Vietnam which was sent to sir Robert Menzies 
in 1965 with sl ightly more than 500 signatures . 
21 . J. Mackay Sim , also fran a North Sydney branch . 
22 . w. Gollan and E .  Boatswain . Mr .  Gollan was a very important member
of the party . According to the communist press , he served on two of
the three highe•t national bodies of the CPA - the PO litical Connittee 
and the Central camnittee ( the third body , the top committee , i• the 
Secretariat) . Of the fourteen important subcamnittees acting d irectly 
under the control of the Political COmmittee , Mr. Gollan headed twos 
Peace and Friendship , and Fliucation. Mr .  Boatswain was an official 
of the Building Workers '  Industrial Union . 
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miaoellaneoua) 1  12% clerical workera1  9% retired1 5% clergy and laymen1
• 23 4,- acadaaics 1 and 4% youth and students. 
A concanitant of the canprehenaive representation was an increased 
diversification in the sources of financial support ,  resulting in less 
dependency upon the traditional left-wing trade union backing . The N. s . w. 
qroup - by whatever name it went - had been movinq in this direction for 
a long time , but the f0%'Dlation of AICD brought about a drastic reduction 
in the pl'Op01-tiona1. amount of funds received from trade unions. 24
SUch an assertion is verified by a canparison of the Statements of 
Receipt• and Payments of the N . s . w. body over a period that qoes back as 
far aa the pre-Melbourne congress ' Assembly for Peace qroup and concludes 
with the second fiscal year of AICD . While it is not always easy to 
discern trade union donations from those of other sources , the same 
qeneral accountinq form has been retained , so that a trend , if not 
abaolute percentaqe , can be accurately ascertained . Through the years 
the N . s . w. body has denoted such it•• as 'mines ' ,  ' ships ' ,  ' wharves ' , 
' ahop CODlllittees ' , ' trade union collections ' ,  •to. in its accounts , thus
23 . G . R. Anderson , SBozteta:FJI 's Rspoztt to Annual Genezta.Z Meeting of AICD , 
25 May , 1966 . 
24. In interviews with countless peace officials they constantly 
deplored the failure of the ' reliable ' old trade unions to contribute 
as maqnanimously as they once had. such remarks were heard not only 
in N . s . w. , but also in Qld . and Victoria . When queried why trade 
union support: was not increasin9 , despite the Vietnam and 
conscription is sues , these officials usually attributed this to rank 
and file ignorance and disinterest in international affairs. Rarely, 
did they seem prepared to follow the matter further by condemning 
the conservatism of the union leadership which was opposed t.o union 
involvement in non-economic affairs . 
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pexmittinq a unifozmly cc:mpited percentage of trade union contributions 
to total revenue to be made. On this basis,  the Assembly for Peace between 
l January, 1958 and 30 April ,  1959 received at l.«ZSt 31 . 7% of its funds 
fran trade union sources , the N. s . w. Peace camnittee during the twelve 
months ending 30 Nov.aber , 1962 received at lsaat 29. 6% of its income fran 
the trade unions 1 but the AICD during its first year of operation endinq 
31 March , 1966 recorded at teast l0. 6% of its finances as specifically 
ccming frcm the unions . This lower AICD percentage was subsequently 
25 
sustained, thouqh it rose slightly to 11 . 2% in fiscal year 1966-67 . 
TABLE 1 26 




$12 , 000 
3 ,800 
31 . 7% 





6 , 800 
29. 6% 
[cont.1nued on next page] 
25. The higher percentage in 1966-67 resulted. fran the fact that sane 
of the union contributions in the preceding year were siphone:i off 
to the N. s . w. Peace Committee which did not officially close its 
hooks until 31 December , 1965 . 
26 . Pounds have been converted into dollars and numbers rounded off to 
the nearest $100. Aqain , note that the percentages repre•ent only 
known union contributions .  Some of the individual donations and 
the monies collected at meetings and rallies tJto. would , of course , 
also cane from trade unionists .  
[TABLE 1 (Cont . ) ] 
AICD (N. S .  W. ) 
AICD (N. S .  W. ) 




$23 , 500 
2 , 500 
10 . 6'5 




$32 , 900 
3 , 700 
11 . 2\ 
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When the breadth of support of AICD , the largest of the state 
continuing committees or their successors , ia coupled with the expanding 
base of support that reaulted from the fonnation of the multifarious new 
groups , the full extent of the movement ' s  social transformation be comes 
apparent. 
However , the Qld . Peace Committee ( as noted in Chapter IV) did 
continue to rely heavily on trade union backing , and in Victoria the ANZ 
Congress failed to expand its base of support due to a host of problems 
unique to the Melbourne scene . Firstly, it was beset with a qrea.t deal 
of factionalism. Since it received stronq but sporadic support from the 
left-wing Trade Union Defence Committee , it incurred the enmity of the 
m.�derate-aontrolled Melbourne Trades Hall Council under the secretaryship 
of Mr .  M . C .  Jordan , and even became a symbol of the latter ' s opposition
to the radicalism of the Trade Union Defence Committee . As well , the 
Congress became caught in the cross-fire of ALP politics ,  receiving the 
endorsement of the State Executive of the ALP but the abuse of many of
the branches and their members . Within the peace movement itself ,  some 
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of the peace dissenters criticised the congress for soft-pedallinq its 
condaanation of unpeaceful actions by communist bloc nations aJ¥i for 
trumpetinq almost exclusively the 'militant imperial ism ' of the West . 
SUoh criticisms were exacerbated by the communist schism between Moscow 
and Peking winqa that was acted out within the congress ' executive 
ca111ittee . A ' Hillite ' or pro-China faction represented by Mrs . Betty 
27 Little and Rev . Victor James (Unitarian) was practically driven off the 
executive and forced to set up a parallel qroup , the moribund Australian 
Peace Liaison Committee , on May 19 , 1964 . Finally , mnonq potential peace 
supporters and the peace activista in the other peace orqanisations , a 
strong resentment was expressed against the ANZ Conqress not only for its 
party political !n-f ighting and ideoloqical warfare , but for the leadership 
of its _ Secret.ary , Mr .  Sam Goldbloan , who , many maintained , manaqed the 
Congress impervious to the wishes of those with differing views . 
For theae reasons the task of co-ordinating much of the frenetic 
peace activity in Victoria during the year precedinq the 1966 General 
Elections fell to the VDC . 
The 1966 E l ecti on Campa i gn 
Despite an undsl'OUJ'J'tntt of divisive forces that ex isted throuqhout 
the expandinq peace movement (not only in Victoria) , the qoal of winninq 
17. Although Mrs . Little continued for some time to attend ANZ Executive 
Committee meetinqa , one member of the Executive informed this writer 
that she was treated very " coldly" and " impolitely" by some of the 
non-clerical members . 
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the election proved t.o be a unifying bond. "A alight wiap of hope 
appeared • • •  " ,  •plained one newcomer to the movanent. "There seemed at 
least a possibility that Labor could vin • • • • " 28 Thue most difference•
were submerged in the pursuit of the one , ilmediate , proximate and 
tangible CJOal . While it aiqht be impossible to bargain and reason with 
the holders of power , there was the distinct possibility of appealing
over their heads to the people directly and turning the "bastards" 
electorally out of off ice . For the first time in the post-war hiatory of 
the movement the peace diaaentera felt they were spearheading a popular
protest where the outcome aiqht be favourable to their side. As AICD 
Secretary Anderson commented in May 1 966 : "Without a doubt the Movement 
has played a major part in bringinq the Governnent into eerioua 
difficulties over its Vietnam polici•• · There is now a real possibility 
that the Governnent could be defeated in the Federal election • • • •  •29
Even the Defence Minister , Mr. A. Fairhall , was prepared to 
aoknowledqe the potential efficacy of the protest voices on the Left , 
as he told a parade of con•cript soldiers that ,  " It would be fooliah of 
me not to be aware of the criticism rife in the land today of national 
30 servicemen and the question of service overseas" . 
28. Michael Hamel-Green , ' V1etnam1 Beyond P1ty' , Austztal.lan Lsft 
R"1Ji4w , No .  24 , April-May 1970 , P • SS .
29. S.oz-etaJty 's Repo:rt to Annual GtmsN'L Meeting of AICD , 25 May , 1966 .
30. 7!hs Australian , 13 April , 1966. 
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The buoyant mood that pervaded the peace movement, the militancy of 
their tactics , and the proliferation of so many new peace groups probably 
did rekindle fond ALP manories of World war I anti-conscription cmnpaiqns 
and help to pave the way for the ALP to declare Vietnam and conscription 
31 the principal issues of the election. In return, the Federal ALP 
leader , Mr. Arthur Calwell ' • , call for "protests and demonstrations fran 
32 one and of the country to the other• did not qo unheeded in the peace 
movanent. During the election caapaign a cordial and co-operative 
relationship existed between peace movement activists and ALP left-wing 
Jl . The Parliamentary Party of the ALP made known as early as May 1966 
that con8Cription would be a major iaeue of the election (Sydnsy 
Noming Hsz:eaZd, 13 May , 1966) . Mr .  Calwell , in his motion of dissent
fran the policies outlined by Mr .  Holt in hie first statement as 
Prime Minister , cited as the first item " emphatic opposition to the 
despatch of conscripted youths for service in Vietnam" (CPD., BR ,  
Vol .  50 , 15 March , 1966 , p .  238) . Labor ' s  opposition was not 
confined BOlely to the conscription issue. A Labor government 
would insist upon the return of all forces fraa Vietnam as soon as 
practicable (Sydney Naming Htatald ,  13 May , 1966 1 rhs AuetNtian , 
13 May , 1966) . Mr .  Calwell ' s  election policy speech, delivered six 
months later , continued in the same vein : proposinq that a Labor 
government would withdraw conscripts first and regulars later fran 
South Vietnam . This challenge was accepted in the Policy Speech of 
the Prime Minister on 8 November , 19669 when he declared he too 
wanted to make conscription and foreiqn policy the key issues . 
However , for the voters there is sane question whether conscription 
and Vietnam were the principal issues . The Gallup Poll of 1 November , 
1966 discovered that health services , education , pensions and prices 
ranked ahead of conscription and Vietnam (Roy Morqan , Australian 
Public Opinion Poll ) . Offsetting the results of this survey is the 
careful analyais of the voting in the Melbourne area done by 
Denia [aio ] P .  Altman - which concludes that " in  so far as the 
election was fouqh� on issues , it was foreiqn policy/defence that 
was important. "  ( ' Fore1gn Pol1cy and the Elect1ons ' ,  Potitios , 
Vol.  II , No .  1 ,  May 1967) . 
32. Th6 AustJtati.an , 10 May , 1966 .
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politicians - the latter beinq only too willing to appear at the protest 
meetings of the peace groups, to present anti-Vietnam petitions in 
Parliament, to fight for the civil liberties of the demonstrators, 33 and 
to call upon the peace movement to reciprocate by supporting unofficially ·. 
meetinga sponsored by the ALP. 
The tactic popularised duri119 the election was the ' demo ' • While 
not all peace activists condoned confrontations that might elicit strong 
counteractions from the 'Establishment' , the demonstration definitely 
set the tone o f  the peace movement' a campaign. It injected a new verve 
into peace politics, becoming the chief means for expressing a counter 
commitment of principle to the Government • • ccmanitment to send troops to 
Vietnam and conscript twenty-year olds for overseas military service. In 
its most militant form, this counter caamitment took the form of street 
demonstrations during peak hours, rowdy interj ection• and scuffles at 
Government sponsored meetings, and deliberate acts of civil disobedience. 
Many of the women of sos resorted to the tactic of holding hour-long 
silent vigils every week; some students went to gaol in preference to 
paying their fines1 a few protesters staged hunger-strikes outside the 
u.s. Consulates ; a twenty-one year old typist, Miss Nadine Jensen, poured 
a mixture of red pigment and mineral turpentine over her head and clothinq 
and, running between the ranks of the 1st Battalion RAR on parade after 
a tour of duty in Vietnam, smeared the red liquid on some of the soldiers, 
33. For example , aee wm. Hayden, (JPD .. HR., Vol. so, 31 March, 1966,
pp. 811-8131 and Senator J. Keeffe , c.PD., 8., Vol. 32, 12 October,
1966, p. 954. 
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and throuqhout th e  election campaign students , workers ,  middle-aqed 
housewives booed., j eered and ' cat-called ' Governnent speakers in one of 
the stormiest elections in Australia ' s  history. The climax came with the 
visit of u. s . President Johnson one month before the election , when about 
34 20 ,000 demonstrators reqistered their protests in the streets . 
The beginning to this year of militant tactics dated from a peace 
d•onstration held in Martin Place , Sydney , on October 22nd , 1965 . 
Althouqh AICD very quickly recoqnised the mobilising potential to be 
derived fran this hiqhly publicised demonstration at which over fifty 
people were arrested , it was almost solely conceived and organised by the 
newly formed VAC . Yet the civil disobedience of sitting down in Pitt St. , 
at S .  00 p.m.  , on a Friday afternoon was something which the orqanisers 
claim was never aontanplated . " It ju•t happened as an emotional thing• , 
explained V'AC ' s  leader , Mr .  R. Gould . "People were tired of verbalising 
. 35 their political and moral impul ees . •
34. The 20 , 000 voices of protest were pitted aqainet crowds probably
numbering close to one mill ion , who cheered and clutched
ecstatically at the hand of the President . Electorally , the
President ' s  visit was an unqualified success for the Holt Government ,
while the publicity accorded the protesters was highly
uncomplimentary. The large amount of mass media attention was also
disproportionate to the number of protesters , although the impact
of the protest was heightened by the fact that the demonstrators
could concentrate their forces in one area . All that was necessary
was to out-manoeuvre the pol ice . The approximate figure of 20 , 000
is arrived at by dividing the protest between cities visited by
President Johnson in the followinq manner : Sydney - 11 to 12
thousand 1 Melbourne - 6 to 7 thousand ; Brisbane - SOO to 1 thousand 1
canberra - about 5001 and Townsville - o .
35. Interview with Robert Gould , 4 January, 1966 .
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As thia • 810tional thing" gripped the peace protesters of Sydney, 
the AICD , in conjunction with VAC ,  arranged for a follow-up 'monster 
rally' at the Sydney Town Hall , to be preceded by another mass street 
demonstration on the same day. This time the demonstration , though 
larger , involved no mass civil disobedience. The rally at Town Hall 
attracted an estimated 3 , 000 - an unusually large audience for less than 
a fortni9ht before Christmas . The rally, which had received the 
endoraanent and support of nine other local pacifist and pacif iciat 
36 groups , besides that of its sponsor , AICD , was reported by sane of the 
participants to be the most enthusiastic in memory . Thus the peace 
movement had been mobilised to make election year 1966 the annus mll'tlbi'Lis 
- the mood being militant, and morale at its highest since the anti-
aonaoription cmnpaiqns of World War I .  
The situation in all three state capitals on th e  East Coast was a 
movement poised to utilise the election as a platfoza for broadcasting 
its views. While the immediate goal had been lowered to the winning of 
the election , which meant identifyinq with the election cuipai9n of the 
Labor Party or with the belated campaiqn of the Liberal Reform Party, the 
movement genszaaZZy was not prepared to achieve this end by reducing its 
set of maximum dananda on the two key issues . Thus the strategy of 
36. The supporting organisations were Wanen ' s  International Leaque for 
Peace and Preedom 1 Australian Quaker Peace Conmittee 1 I<llrinqai Study 
Group1 SOS 1 CND1 YCAC ; Fellowship of Reconciliation; CAAT J  and VAC 
(AICD lftlWB'Lsttw , November 1965 ) . These groups , toqether with AICD
and the ad 'hoo orqaniaatione in the univereities , constituted
almost the entire N . s . w.  peace movement that engaged in the election 
campaiqn. 
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electioneerinq in parliamentary d•ocracies , which entails the compromiainq 
and modifyinq of policiee for the •aka of gaining power and po•ition , 
played little part in the movement ' s  strategy. This does not mean that 
the mov•ent renounced ccapletely the more orthodox and socially accepted 
forms of election campaigning . 
Some of the more pragmatic groups like AICD enqaged in a wide range 
of activities that included door-knock and letter-box electioneering in 
marginal electorates , as well as the better publicised street marches , 
demonstrations and maald.ve rallies.  The •erie• of activities specifically 
linked with the election caapaign began in 1966 with the March 16th 
' Mobilisation Project' and concluded on the eve of the election with a 
spectacular canbination demonstration and indoor rally. 
'!he Victorian SOS helped to produce a satirical rcwiew of the Vietnam 
war , which was staged by a professional theatre canpany , the Emerald Bill 
Theatre Company. Entitled A Fwnny J!hlng Happsnlld on t1uJ Way to thB Front ,
the revue , amonq other things , poked fun at the RSL, showed Lawrence of 
Arabia •• a camnercial traveller for bed sheets and depicted a Chinese 
invasion of Australia. One of the best songs to come out of the revue , 
later pressed into a record , was ' '£he Ballad of Bill White ' , which was 
written and perfoDled by Mias Glen Tanasetti , an executive member of SOS . 
Al•o in the artistic oum cultural milisu , the peace orqanisations 
gave over their lbaited reaources to the publiciaing of Alan Hopqood ' s
play, PZ'ivat. Yuk ObjtlOtB , and arranqed theatre parties to the
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performances both in Melbourne and Sydney (in the latter city under the 
aponaorahip of the Elizabethan Theatre Trust at the Phillip Theatre) . 
Tald.n9 as it• subject Australia' s  involvement in Vietnam , the play 
depicted , in the author ' s  words , the thene •that in a country like this , 
which has never had any serious internal upheaval - such as civil war -
there comes a time when there is di&Hnt and argument which may herald a
37 
fundamental chanqe in the growth of the national oonacience" .
To nurture that " national conscience" sane of the peace qroups , 
partiaularly the continuing cQllll!ttee• of the Melbourne Conqress and 
their successors , assisted groupinqa of Auatralian intellectuals and 
artist• in channelling the expression of their dissent into the 
mainatreaa of anti-Vietnam protest. In Melbourne , paintinqa by some of 
the country ' s best known artiata (yet falling into Parkin ' a cateqory of 
•unattached artists" ) were displayed in an anti-war protest exhibition
at the Princes Hall Gallery - including an oil painting by Clifton Pugh 
called ' !'he BodJI Count 1n V1etnam' . Fifty-eight of Australia ' s  leading 
writers signed a statauent which concluded that " it is morally wrong 
that young Australians should be canpelled to fiqht and perhaps die in 
Vietnam , and we ask the Govermnent not to continue with the dispatch of 
38 conscripts" . In addition , the peace groups helped to collect the 
aiqnaturas of acad•ica and profeaaional people for a 'Statement on 
31. Pranc:is Evers , 'Alan Hopgood Objeata • • •  ' ,  !I'hs AustJtal.i.an ,
15 OCtober , 1966 .
38. f'M Bul.'Ultin , 2 July, 196 6 .
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V1 etnam' that was published in the Me lbourne BeNZd and 'l'he Austz.al:lan , 39 
and enthusiastically lent whatever assistance they could to the promotion
of the so-cal.led ' teach-ins ' on Vietnam at the universities . Since the 
' teach-ins ' were often attended by ranking Govermnent members - thus 
widely reported in the press - they were particularly viewed as an 
excellent means of evoking public doubts about the sagacity of the Vietnam 
camnitm.ent. 
While all of these relatively moderate activities were as sociated 
indirectly with the winning of the election , the most direct method 
consisted of approaching each voter individually. An intensive door-knock 
and letter-box campaign was undertaken by sane of the N . s . w .  organisations . 
concentrating on the marginal electorates - such as Parkes , Lowe , Evans 
40 and Phillip - the peace workers ,  according to one peace official , 
distributed over two hundred thousand leaflets of peace literature in 
these areas . A8 well as approachinq the individual homes , sane of the 
women participated in protest parade s at the shopping centres , while their 
41 
cohorts handed out leaflets to the passers-by . 
39 . This statanent was an extract fran a similar advertisement which 
appeared in f"hs NlllU Yol'k !rimes . It called for the cessation of all 
bombing , negotiations with the NLF , and consideration of Australia ' s
withdrawal fran Vietnam. It was initiated by Dr .  M.J. Charlesworth, 
Bruce Anderson , Rev. Arthur Preston and Max Teichmann in Melbourne , 
and received the endorsement of approximately two thousand 
academics and professional people . 
40 .  Interview with Mrs . Phyllis Latona, Vice-President of AICD and also 
an official of WILPF and Wanen for Peace , 9 January , 1967 . 
41 . See AICD NSfJB tstuz- , October 1966 . 
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Despite the enerqiee expended on so many moderate type proj ects , the 
movement ' s public image undoubtedly was identified with the extremely 
militant tactics of the draft card burninqs , throwinq of paint at 
President Johnson' s  car , and the like. Perhaps , too , the public sensed 
that the moderate proj ects were only moderate qua projects . For the way 
in which they were carried out often placed them outside the praxia of 
plurali•t d•ocracy . Inevitably , the prcmulgation of maximum d•ands at 
' grass roots ' level tended to predominate over the winning of office. 
No matter what type of project was being undertaken , the militant ' s 
•pouaal of principle , oha.llen9e to authority , and mobilisation of mass
consciousness prevailed over the seeking of access to pluralist centres 
of power or bargaining with policy makers . 
The peace activists unifo%ml.y conducted their election campaign in 
the manner of populists rather than politicians . They believed in victory, 
if only they could get ' the facts ' to the people and break throuqh the 
barrier of institutions •eparating the people fran their governnent. 
Thus when the mov•ent went down to its resounding election defeat , the 
chief explanation given was that the movanent was unable to match the 
government ' s propaqanda machine and reach the people with ' the truth ' . 
The text of a call for the holdinq of a post mozrt.11 conference put the 
case as follows 1 
"A number oL reasons for the defeat we suLfered are 
obvjou11 , the most s1.gn1f1cant being the v1c1ous and 
hy•terjcal C1UDpa1.gn in ravour of the Vietnam war 
conducted, on Government behal:f, by ever9 concetvable 
medJ.wn of proJ>aganda, J. . e. , the Press , Radio, T. V. ,
etc . WhJ.le the �orcu opposed to the war made a 
determ.tned and reuonably 1maginatJ. ve effort to
explain the 1ssues to the people ,  the r•ources 
in th.t s  •Pb.ere or the ant1 war .movemen t proved to 
be .marg1llal ,  compared to the enormous J.mpact on 
popular t:h:l.nJd.ng o� the established med1a . n 42 
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Yet durinq the election campaign the peace activists had some cause 
to think they were making progress in challC)inCJ public attitudes . Numerous 
favourable public opinion poll.a on the overseas conscription issue (but
never on the Vietnam issue) , together with the responaiveneaa of the ALP ,  
kept encouraging the movement . The Roy Morqan polls (Gallup) of
December 1965 , February 1966 , April 1966 , and November 1966 indicated 
fairly stronq public opposition to conscription for overseas duty . These 
f indinqa were conf il:med by the Mercantile Public Opinion Poll of April
1966 , alao by a special pol l for the ALP which was conducted in October 
19 66 by a group of Melbourne advertisers , and by a write-in poll run by 
the Brisbane Sunday !&uth in April 1966 . However , the public opinion 
polls convincingly demonstrated that most Australians supported the 
country ' s  involvement in the Vietnam conflict - B. g. , Roy Morgan poll s  
of May 1965 , July 1965 , OCtober 1965 , February 1966 , and a special youth 
survey of February 1966 , as well as the findings disclosed in the above
special poll for the ALP and in the Mercantile Public Opinion Poll . A
Vietnam and conscription referendum supervised by the SRC at Sydney
University ahowed that among 5 , 547 students "most students (63%) oppose 
the use of conscripts in Vietnam but agree ( 68%) with the presence of 
42. R. Gould , Convenor , Sydney VAC , Call, f01' an Austmtia-tiri.de Peaoe 
ConfeNnOs of Aotivists Fol! Eazt'Ly 196? , c. December 1966 . 
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43 Auatralian troops there" . A poll of students at the Australian National 
tJnivera ity conducted by their SRC revealed a similar result - i. e. , "A 
majority favours American and Australian involvement" in Vietnam , but "an
equally big majority opposed sending National Servic•en" to Vietnam.
44
The results of atill another survey, this one taken of 1 , 337 acad•ics in
ten Australian universitie s ,  indicated that "Fifty-four per cent of 
45 acadanics oppose the Vietnam War while only thirty per cent support it" . 
Although the Roy Morgan polls consistently revealed during 1966 (February, 
April , July , Septanber , November 12th and Novanber 19th) a landslide
victory for the Liberal-Country Party coalition , the ALP and peace 
movement activists could take comfort fran the fact that the polls had
inaccurately predicted that the 1963 general elections would be close. 
Moreover , on November 19th ,  a poll conducted under the auspices of Mr .  
Don Whitington , the editor of Inside CanbeZTa , disclosed a swinq to Labor 
46 of at least 4% , which would have been enough to defeat the Goverrment. 
Another bit of encouraganent came from an earlier poll sponsored by the 
Liberal Party in the electorate of Ya.rra (Dr . J.F.  Cairns ' seat) which
showed only 37% of the 1 ,000 interviewees supporting the Federal
47 Government ' s  decision to send more troops to Vietnam .
43 . Sydnsy Mo:rning Herald, 28 July , 1966. 
44 .  Sydney Momi.ng HBNUJ. ,  3 November , 1966 . 
45. !l!hs Austztati.an , 10 November , 1966 . This survey , which was conducted
by four N . s . w. lecturers , was highly criticised by some of their
collaaques for being non-professional in its techniques .
46 . Ths Austmtian , 19 November , 1966.
47. PM Austra'Lian , 10 May , 1966 .
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On the basis of the various poll findings , reinforced by the peace 
activists • own experiential impressions of the public ' s  concern and 
aympathy , it did appear that for the first time in fifty years the peace 
movement no longer expressed the views of an alienated and innocuous 
minority . While previously peace movement participation had meant larqely 
a very personal act of camnitment ,  self-immolation , psychological 
purgation or ideological obtuseness , with only the vague hope that 
something- might be done to affect attitudinal changes ,  the situation , by 
1966 , seemed to indicate that the movement had finally moved from 
expressive , protest politics into the arena of popular, power politics . 
If such a view proved to be overly sanCJUine , the movement had 
certainly traversed a long way from the days of isolated dissent that 
pervaded the Melbourne Congress . 
CHAPTER V I I 
POST-ELECT I ON RESPONSE 
To recapitulate the concluding point of the last chapter a amonq its 
supporters the movanent had managed to create a buoyant m-£Zi4u of 
expectation, each protest having a self-regenerati•e and augmentative 
effect that continued right up to the election 4'nouement. Many of the 
activista, like the President of the AICD , "believed that a atrong body 
of opinion exiated in the Auatralhn OClllDUnity which would show itself , 
perhaps deci•ively , at the ballot box" in opposition to the war. 1
When the converse occurred ,  and the movement went down to a reeounding 
defeat at the poll• - the ALP ,  which was the main carrier of the peace 
movement ' s  banner , raqiatarin9 its lowest percentage of the total vote 
aince 1906 - a shocked and di•pirited mov•ent was confronted with the 
prospect of how to r•obilise . Its probl•• seemed endless .  Six months 
after the election an AICD NB111aZstuze discouragingly cOlllllented a 
"Seeminqly , no matter how much we petition, march or demonstrate our 
protests make little impact upon our Governments and the war proceeds to 
2 
escalate regardless . "
l .  A. G . H .  Lawes , R.-poztt to AICD Camri:l;ue Muting , 14 December , 1966 .
2.  AICD NA18t.tttlzt,  Vol .  3,  No. 5,  May 1967 . An aclcnowlad9•ent of 
the peace movement ' s low morale was also expressed in the 
S.oNtaPy 's R11pozet, AICD A.mMaZ. GtmBNZ. Nsating , 9 June , 1967 . 
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The visit to Australia of Air Vice-Marshal Ky in January 1967
t•porarlly reignited a spark of protest from the movement. Afterwards , 
thOUCJh, activity and enthusiasm quickly tapered off . While protests over 
Vietnam were reaching new heights in the u . s .  - an estimated 125 ,000 
marching- in Nw York City and 60 , 000 in San Francisco on the 15th of 
April to produce the largest anti-war denonstratioll8 ever held in America 
- a co-ordinated procession and rally in Sydney drew a meagre 1500 
3 persons. (Preas and T.V. estimate• of the crowd were even lower . )  And 
in Melbourne no organised march was held. 
In Brisbane a sympathy march fram the city to Ipswich in support of 
the o. s .  prote•ters attracted little more than fifty of the young ' hard 
core ' dissenters .  The march , planned by SDA, had received the 
endorsement of the Qld. Peace CoDlllittee , but only two of the latter ' s  
4 officer• and no members actually took part in the march. 
J. AICD officials . explained the poor attendance as being the result of 
"•erioua diversion of time and effort arising from the ALP 
proscription problem which intervened during the critical 
preparatory period of this operation. "  (AICD llewa'Lsttel' , Vol. 3 ,  
No .  4 ,  May 1967 ) . Despite an element of truth in this explanation, 
the movanent' a  d•oralisation - as exprea•ed in the statanents 
BUpl'a - probably comes closer to the underlyinq cause .
4. The Qld . Peace Cmnittee ' s  explanation for only tacitly supporting 
the Ipswich march was the pressure of another project: Vi• . , the 
organisation of the peace contingent that l«>Uld march 15 days later 
in the Brisbane Labor Day parade . Another stated reason centred on 
the Qld. Police Department' s  denial of a permit for the march , 
though this decision was reversed a couple of days before the event 
when a deputation of University staff , mainly fran the Law 
Faculty, made a special plea to the superintendent of Traffic. 
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Perhaps one of the moat emotive yet articulate expressions of the 
helplessness and paralyai s felt by many activists appeared in a public
letter by the historian , Dr. Ian Turner . Noting a remark of The 
AMBtratian • s  political columnist , Douqlas Brass , that it was a aiqn of
" the calloumeas and deep-down despair of our tilllea" that the recent 
intenaif ication of the war in Vietnam had created so little impression in 
Australia , Dr .  Turner tartly replied : "Those of us who do protest , what 
do we get? The back of your band - What Mr. Brass qiveth, he also taketh 
5 away. "
" One reaaon" , raninded Dr. Turner , "why we lost [ the election] Mr. 
Brasa • • • wa s  that , when it came to the moment of decision , you and !I'hs 
AuatmtUin , and every other newspaper in this country , told the voter to 
6 vote for the Government. " 
Dr .  Turner confessed to his own inactivity over the past •ix months , 
" Qui te •1mply , i. t '  • becau.se I don ' t lcDtcN what to do • • •
what are we to do? Pray tha t George Romneg takes the 
Re,PUblioan nominatian and the Republicans take the next 
pres1dent1al election? 
"Come to th1n.k o:L i t ,  tha t ' s  probably wha t we ought to 
be dolng , for there ' s  not much Ml can do here . Pie had 
our chance sJ.x months ago and we lost 1 t .  ,, 7 
5. Ian Turner , 'An O_pen Letter to Mr. Brass ' , Ths Auat:ztati.an , 9 May , 
1967 . For Mr .  Brass ' reply , see his colmnn , ' UJold.ng On ' , !lhs 
AuatJtati.an , 31 May , 1967 . 
6 .  Ian Turner , ibid. 
7. Ibid. Numerous letters were published in ' Letters to the Editor '
Hctions - express ing the futility that peace dissenters felt in 
continuing their opposition to the Government ' s policies - e. g. ,
M. Page , P.  McMahon , and D. Smart ,  T'hs Aust:ra"Li.an , 31 May , 1967 .
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Not only had the movement ' s  morale been gravely affected by the 
s'Uo"tion outaant1 , but it encountered. pressures and defeats fran eociety 
on countless other fronts aa well . The ALP ,  which had served as an 
iaport:ant conduit of protest for the movement , formally modified its 
Vietnam policy at the Party ' s Federal conference in Adelaide on Jlst 
July , 1967 . Whereas the parliamentary wing of the Party under Mr. 
calwell ' a  leaderahip had enunciated a policy of first withdrawing the 
conscripts and then the regulars as soon as it was practicable , the 
modified po•ition of the Conference stipulated that withdrawal would only 
take place if Au•tralia ' s  allie• failed t:o meet three conditiona s 
• (a) cease bombing North Vietnam , (b) recogni•e the National Liberation
Front as a principal party to neqotiationa , (c) transfoxm operations in 
south Vietnam into holding operation• thereby to avoid involvanent of 
civilians in the war , ceue the use of napalm and other obj ectionable 
B materials of war ,  and provide sanctuary for anyone Making it . " To the 
qrowing militant wing of youthful diaaentera , such a policy represented 
a betrayal of principle. Austral ia ' a forcea should be unconditionally 
withdrawn, because its Vietnam policy was legally and morally 
indefeneible , or , as arqued by same militant class dissenters , counter-
revolutionary. 
The peace movement ' s  disillusionment with the ALP had camnenced 
immediately after the election dahacle when the Party ' s riqht-winq 
8. ALP, PZa.tforrm, ConstituUon and Rules , Adelaide , July 1967 , p .  33 .
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gained a11emdancy. Although Mr .  Calwell called for dmtonatrationa against 
the visit of Air Vice-Marshal Xy in January , 1967 , 9 only twelve of hi•
Parliamentary colleagues joined him in the proteat marches and 
dmonstrationa he personally led in Canberra , Sydney ,  Melbourne and 
10 Brisbane. Then , on February 8th , Mr. Calwell resigned as Leader of the 
Oppoaition (keepinq an election pranise if defeated at the polls) , and 
the Federal Parlimaentary Party elected a new leader , Mr .  E.G.  Whitlaa , 
who proceeded to lead an Opposition that confined most of its criticiainq
to dcaeatic issues . When foreign policy was diecussed such as on ABC 
Televi sion ' a ' Pour Corners ' proqramme ,  Mr. Whitlam refused to say he would 
withdraw Australian troops frca Vietnam , even the National Servicemen . 
In the House of Repreeentativea he argued the ALP ' s opposition to 
Australia ' • "camaitment in the foz:a in which the Government made it" and 
particularly in " the use of conscription" , but he insisted that 
"Australian troop• in the field must be fully supported and aided while 
ll they are carrying out" this CODlllitment . ( This last canment , no doubt , 
waa intended as an oblique criticism of the Seamen ' s Union which had 
refused to man the ships , ' Boonaroo ' and ' Jeparit ' , which were carrying
9. Ths AuatN'Li.an , 10 January, 1967 .
lO. The ' lame duck ' Leader of the Opposition ' s  support came from the 
following : senators Ormonde (N . s . w. ) , Murphy (N. s . w. ) , Poyser (Vic . ) ,
Wheeldon (W. A . ) ,  Wilkinson (W.A. ) ,  cavanagh (S.A. ) ,  and O ' Byrne 
(Tas. ) J  and MHR' s A.w. James (N . s . w. ) , T .  uren (N. s . w. ) ,  J.P. cairns
(Vic. ) ,  G.M.  Bryant (Vic . ) ,  and M .  Cross (Qld . ) .  Most of the other
Labor Parliamentarian• diacovered ( conveniently? ) that they had 
camaitments elsewhere on the days scheduled for protest. The 
Deputy Leader , Mr. Whit.lam , for instance , had business in northern 
Queensland. 
ll . CPD, BR ,  Vol. 54 , 28 February, 1967 , p .  205 .
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war carqo to Vietnam. ) With regard to the foxmer Labor Leader , Mr. 
CAlwell , Mr. Whitlam claimed he had •debauched• the Vietnam iaaue. 
The newly elected Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Party, Mr. L.B. 
Barnard , went one •tep further . He was reported to have intimated that 
the peace di•senters themselve s were responsible for the war ' s 
continuation - "makinq Hanoi believe it should hanq on while there was 
evidence of anti war propaqanda in SOllle countriea• .1 2  
Boatila in action a s  well a s  word• , the State Executive of the 
N. s . w. Labor Party att•pted to outlaw the Ala> to its mebera on the 
9Z'ound that an AICD circular had recamnended assisting non-Labor 
candidates in the 1966 eleationa - that ia , independent and Liberal 
Reform Party candidates . Whil•t the charqe was technically correct , 
the same circular had also appealed for the support of aome ALP candidates 
who had reque•ted assistance , and it had very carefully " atrea88d that 
it will be entirely a matter for individuals to make their own selection 
lJ of the cand idates they wish to aaaist" . '!'be expulsion notice waa to 
take effect in twenty-one days , but at the ' eleventh hour ' the Federal 
11. Phs AustJtatlan , 2 June , 1967 . Mr .  Barnard ' s observations were made
during a viait to Vietnam. ·At the same time he was alleged to have 
remarked that the ALP ' a old defence and foreiqn policy "has been 
overtaken by the march of history" . SUbaequently , he denied that 
he meant Labor should alter its Vietnam stand . Spealdnq in
Canberra after hia three-week tour of South-East Asia , he was 
reported as sayinq , "When I said this [ t.hat the Party should take 
a hard look at its Vietnam policy] I was referrinq to our policy
as a whole in South-East Asia , in the light of British moves to 
withdraw from the area. " (Ibid. ) 
1 3. AICD Ciz.cu 'tar , 22 November , 1966 . 
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�ecutive intervened and overruled the proscription by a 10 to 2 vote -
11. s.w. casting the only dia•ntinq votea.
l4 
Behind the N. s . w. Executive' s  attempted proscription lay the belief 
that • uaooiation of member• of the ALP with the AICD has been an4 now 
14. Seventeen N . s . w. trade unions had appealed the 21 day apW.sion
not.ice. With only six day• to qo before the reeiqnation deadline
took effect, the Federal Exeou.tive ' a  President, senator J . B. Keeffe ,
then called a special Executive meetinq to be held on 30th March to
examine tbe N. s .w. Branch' •  decision. By the 10 to 2 vote the
Federal Executive decided that on the basis of a 1963 Federal
Conference decision which vested in the Federal Executive the sole
prerogative for dealing with peace orqaniaations , the N. s . w. Branch
Executive did not have the authority to proscribe the Aia> .  However ,
the Pederal Executive offered the N. s .w. Executive a face-saving
motion s " • • •  it haa a right under the 1963 conference decision to
place before the Federal Executive any ccaplaint it. may have against
the AICD or any other orqaniaation in N . s . w. which became subj ect
to the 1963 decision. "  (Quoted in The Auetzaatian , 31 March , 1967 ) .
Since neither of the two N . s .w. delegates , Mr. C . T .  Oliver , the
State President , nor Mr .  J.  Colbourne , the State Secretary , offered
to refer their information on AICD to the Executive , the matter was
returned to the N . s .w .  State body. There , according to a detailed
article on the episode in the Batton , Mr .  Oliver " finally bur[ ied]
the unfortunate issue by declaring , ' There should be no criticism
of Senator Keeffe for having called the meetinq • • • the decision had
been both sensible and necessary . ' "  Concludes the article s "Had
he [Oliver ] and Mr .  Colbourne not been ' forced to bat' for their
state the decision by the Federal body would have been unanimous. "
(Bric Walah, ' Labor  Forward and AICD ' , Nation , 8 April , 1967 ) . 
Walah attributes the whole affair to the Assi stant. State Secretary , 
Mr .  J. L. AJ:mitage , and hi• entanqlemat with a riqht-winq qroup 
active in both trade union and state politics , known aa ' Labor  
Porward ' , aanpoaed of ALP riqhtists , " stalwarts of the Democratic 
Labor Party and at least one member who has been a full-time 
employee of the National Civic council" .  (Ibid.. ) For additional
comments on the "proscription affair" , see i'he But.'teti.n , 8 April ,  
1967 1 NBIJJB Wesk'Ly ,  5 April , 1967 1 Allan Fraser , 'A  Natter oL Image -
/tlalcing tbJI ALP Free ' , Sydney Sun ,  4 April , 1967 J NBb1CastZe Moming 
BsmZd , 21 March , 1967 1 and The Angtioan , 16 March , 1967 .
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i• damaging to the political image and electoral prospects of the ALP• .1 5 
A aimilarly deprecating view of the effect of peace demonstration• had 
been expreaaed in a apecial report on the 1966 elections prepared by the 
N . s .w. General Secretary , Mr .  W. R. COlbourne , who argued that " the  small 
•action of ALP mmt.bexs who took part in these danonstrations [ against
President Johnson] provided the telwiaion and press with the type of 
propaganda they wanted to support their claim that the ALP was anti-
16 American" • 
As well as its altercatiorus with the Labor Party, the peace movement 
encountered a barrage of critici• fran the press, RSL, qeneral public , 
public officials , and the police. The popular press , together with aome 
� 
of the more liberal journals like Nation ,1 1 uniformly denounced the fury
of the danonstrations and some of the pre-election meetinqa .  Ths C�
Nai'L ' s  reporter , from as far away as Manila , criticised the anti-Johnson 
demonstrations , because they gave "Au•tralia ' s  image • • • another 4rubbin9 
• • • •  Almost every newspaper here" , he wrote , " carried radio pictures of 
the •tudent representatives of Australian culture who tried to hurl 
l B  themselves under Johnson' s  car" . Not one of the major daily newspapers 
supported the Labor Party in its editorial pages . Stated The Austitatlan -
l5. Reomrntmdati<ms b11 ths OfficePs Adopted by the N. s. W. stats
•BaWti.VB of tiul ALP, 10 March , 1967 .
16 . QUoted in �  Auatzta'Li.an , 25 February , 1967 (parenthesis added) .
l7. see iasuea of Nation s 15 October , 1966 1 29 October , 1966 1
3 Dec::•ber ,  1966 1 and 21 January , 1967 . 
18. Gary Barker , rM c�Na(,7, , 24 October , 1966 .
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perhaps the moat liberal of the nation' •  dailies - on the day of the 
elections • • • •  we cut our lot with the Government" because the ALP "i• 
devoid of freah or practical .ideaa" with a "policy throuqh which a CObb
l9and Co. coach could be driven and which quaranteea no aecurity at a11 . •  
At times the opposition of the press to peace mov•ent pol icies becaae so
intensive that newspapers even refused paid advertis•ents .  Tims the
Sytlnay NOJ'f'&ing Heald and the Sydn9Y Dally Ps 'Lsgmph declined to aocept
the Seamen Union ' s advertisement explaining their decision not to sail
the 8hip• ' Boonaroo ' and ' Jeparit ' to Vietnam . 20 
In the cue of the RSL, one official was quoted as sayinq the
demonstrators are " always prepared to support any anti-Australian policy
at all n .  His remedy : 
"A baton behind the blood!/ ear - there ' s  nothJ.ng w1ll 
calm the bloody ardor quJ.clcer than f:hat. !the frogg9 
gendarmes know 1rM to deal w1 th demon.strators. rou 
should have •een them wbalJ.ng into th.ta long haJ.red 
mob dur1ng the Alger1an troubles 1n France a few 
years ago. n2l
Le•• vindictive but equally outraqed were a larqe number of the
correspondent• to the ' Letters to the BdJtor' columns and people holdinq
position• of carmunity influence .  One headmaster a t  a speech night 
19 . !'Its AuatJtatian , 26 November , 1966 .
20. seamen • • Union pamphlet ,  Ws Cannot Su.ppOZ't a rial' Against C1rl Zdzttm ,
a. early 1967 . 'Die ••e ' ad '  was accepted by sane of the other
newapapers ,  includinq 1.'he AuaiJtatian.
2l . William Yeo , President N . s . w. - RSL, quoted in '.the AustztaZi.an ,
7 February, 1967 . 
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ceremony decried • the attention given to those gentry who find it 
entertainin9 to cast themselvea in front of vehicles as a protest aqainst
one thin9 or another • • • •  We see very little aupport these days for the 
22 advocates of honor , truth , and beauty" . Another critic of the peace
demonstrators informed the Student Chriatian Movanent ' a national conference 
that •acts of protest auch as blocking vieitin9 statesmen ' a cars and
23 thrawinq paint bcaba dmnaged democracy" .
24 Responding to (and in some cases fostering ) the society ' s  antipathy,
many goverrment and police official• ti9htened the enforc•ent of 
existin9 laws and , in one inatance , introduced a new law. Prmder Askin
of N. s .w. , who boasted that he told Preaidmt Jolmson to "run over the
bastards" , introduced a bill before State Parliament increas ing the 
penalties for the types of violations incurred at demonstrations. 
Although he had said immediately following the Jolmaon demonstrations 
that the penalties would have to be reviewed , he denied at the time of 
25 the presentation of the bil l  it was aimed at preventing demonstrations . 
The peace dissenters interpreted the matter differently.
22. R. H. Morgan , Headmaster of Pittwater House Preparatory School ,  
quoted in !The AustJtaZi.an , 13 December , 1966 .
23. or. R. Appleyard , Senior Fellow in Demography, A.N.u. , quoted in
J!'M Auatteatian, 9 January, 1967 .
24. see accounts in Nation , 12 November , 1966 1 Brisbane Su.nday !l'ztuth,
11 Septanber , 1966 1 Nationa.'L 'U ' (Publication of National Union of
AU8tralian University Students) , Vol .  1967 , No . 1 ,  and Vol. 1967 , 
Ro .  3 1  and PM Pamph'Lst on Civi'L Rights , Monash University , s . R. c . , 
Novmber 1966 .
as. 2'hs Austm'Lian ,  18 January , 1967 . 
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People attendinq ' peace qatheringa ' claimed they were inevitably 
scrutinised by plain-clothe• police sitting in cars parked outside 
meeting hall s. A national student newspaper alleged that ASIO held 1500 
doaaiera on university staff, administrators and atudents ,
26 and one of 
the peace movement ' s  most energetic and peripatetic campaigners , Mr .  
Francia James , continued to capture newspaper headlines with periodic 
claims that someone had broken into his files . 2 7  
Off •etting to a alight extent these hiihJ.y diaquietinq events for 
the peace movement waa the increasing number of statements from 
26 . Nationat 'U ' ,  Vol.  1967 , No . 1 ,  Melbourne . The information was said 
to come "via a person claimin9 to have seen a number of security 
doaaiera and to have a knowledge of some of the workings of the 
ASIO and the Special Branches in the States" . The article 
maintained that , "Every wiiveraity has a group of paid student 
infonaara , while the Special Branches rely on numbers of amateur 
' James Bonda ' " .  Pollowing the Nationa.t 'U ' disclosure , a couple 
of former student agenta came forth to confini this fact. · At the 
Univeraity of Queensland a ' cause cel8bre ' developed in 1968 when 
fairly reliable accowits of atudenta involved in apying came to 
light . (See SfllflPllZ' P'Loza.at , 27 September, 1968 . ) 
27 . Mr .  James reported nine rODb�riea wit:hin six months . Four times , 
he aaid , · documents had baen stolen , one of the documents allegedly 
containing infoxmation about the Chinese Atomic Energy Commiaaion ' • 
perfecting of a new qaa procesa for separating o-2 35 and lighter 
isotope• from uraniWD . (Briabane !lBUJfP"ll'h,  4 May, 1967 . )  Mr.  
James ,  who was a Vice-President c f  AICD , a Liberal Reform candidate 
in the N . s . w. electorate of Lowe in the 1966 elections , and is now 
llli.e•in9 in China , aaaerted jut prior to the 1966 elections that 
a "ayetery caller" had depoaited in hia car a copy of ASIO ' a file 
on himself . Por a detailed account of this episode and some of 
James ' personal background, see Nation , 26 November , 1966 , and 
nu, AustNZ.ian, 15 November , 1966 ; alao Ian Moffitt, '!'Jae
controver•11 Makers ' , 1.'hs AustM'Lian, 18 February, 1967 . 
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Australian churchmen calling for a moderation of the Vietnam policy. 
Au•tralia ' s  Roman Catholic Bishops issued a call for peace in Vie.tnam and 
eupport for the Pope ' s  pleae for world peace , and coupled it with the 
reminder that uall citizens muat share the reaponsibility of reviewing 
conatant.Ly the moral issues involved in the conduct of the war11 • 28 A few 
day• later the Anglican Primate of Australia , Archbishop Stronq , appealed 
to the Allied Government& " to atop any escalation" of the Vietnam war. 
The Chriatian conscience of the world, he observed , "was deeply disturbed 
by the continuance and intenaifyinq" of the war . " It was wrong to blame 
one aide exclusively where both were to blame1 • • •  an American initiative 
was to be ardently desired , and • • •  all Christiana must by their prayers 
29 be helping the forces of human reconciliation . "  Another Anglican 
leader , the Archbishop of Perth , Dr. George Appleton , proclaimed his 
position unequivocally. He informed an inter-denominational conference 
that he " unashamedly opposed Australian participation in the war" , and 
that the mounting horrors of Vietnam had made him a " full-blooded 
30 
pacifist" . 
Sixty cleZ'9JB'811 of the Australian Branch of the International 
Conmittee of Conscience on Vietnam (in effect , the Committee for Canberra 
Vigil) asked the Federal Government " to aliqn itself with mounting world 
opinion by urqing the u . s .  Government to halt bombing as a prelude to 
28 . Sydney Sun, 13 April ,  1967 .
29 . �d.My Moming Bo:eatd, 17 April , 1967 .
JO. TM Austnztian, 4 May, 1967 . 
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31 negotiation" . In Melbourne , a Catholic Vietn• Study group called
PAX , which waa composed of sane leading Catholic laity ,  announced its
findin9e , declaring •t11at the present American and Australian policy was
WXODJ• . The group •called for the ceeation of the baabinq of Horth 
VietllllBl and offensive operations in the South , a negotiated settlement , 
32 including the Viet COng , and the withdrawal of foreign troop•• . Alao
joininq the church appeals for peace , the N. s . w. General Aaeambly of the 
Pre8byterian Church - after a very etoxay debate - expreased concern that
expaneion of the war could lead to a third world war , and urged the 
Government to provide more civilian aid on a similar scale to its military
commitment. 33 
WhilJlt these and other church statements , in early 1967 , added a 
new dimension to the Vietnam debate , many of the clerqy - especially in
the ecclesiastical churches - were inclined to ' harden ' their postures
in the second half of the year. More consistently gratifying , from the 
point of view of the peace mov•ent , was the qrowing number of
conacientioua obj ectors , inspired , in part , by the success of Williaa
34 
White in defyinq military service . The movement was also heartened by
Jl . P1ul AustJtatian , 20 April ,  1967 .
32. ABC NlltJJB Stll"'IJios , 8 May, 1967 . 
33 . !I'M A�watian , 25 May , 1 967 . 
34. For a thorough record of the conscientious obj ector cases , see 
issues of Peaosma'MZ' , 1966-1968 . William White was the young 
Sydney schoolteacher , who became a ' cause cel8bre ' when ha defied
a court order to take up non-combatant duties in the Army.
Eventually ha was granted another appeal - before a different
jud9e - and won release fran the Anay. Durinq his self-impoeed 
ordeal , he became an issue of heated debate in the election 
campaiqn. A aympathetic account appears in Monty Dennison ' •
' �rl•ls oL Wlll.1.illll Wh1 te '  , !l'hs Bait 'tetin , 26 November , 1966 .
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the defection of the late Senator D . c .  Hannaford (S . A. ) from the Liberal
Party over " the Vietnam iasue" ,  which he claimed , • is very much wider 
than the f ightin9 that is taking place there. It is the policy of the 
United States of America which has been pursued down the years by 
different adminiatrationa and with which I disagree that ia the crux of
the matter • • • • OYer the years it ha• been based on an obaesaive fear of
,.. 
_




A• pleued and surprised a• the peace dissenters were to hear a
foxmer Liberal Parliamentarian speak about "obsessive fear of camnuniam" ,
their moat notable victory was achieved in the election of veteran peace
activist , Dr .  D . N. Everinqham , to the House in the CApricornia by-
election of September 1967 . Not unexpectedly , or .  Everingham ' s  maiden
36 speech dealt with Vietnam and related foreign policy issues . 
Despite the occaaional victory , thoUCJh , the balance weighed very 
much against the peace movement in the aonths succeedinq the 1966
General Elections. External social atricturea , coupled with the low
state of the movaaent ' s morale , not only arrested its growth but helped
to split the movement into two distinct camps - militants and moderates . 
Moreover , when the 80Cio-political climate beqan to improve aliqhtly 
for the movement after 1967 - its poaition somewhat vindicated by events 
- the two divisions did not marqe but hardened their stances . 
35. CPD� S,  Vol. 33 , 9 March , 1967 , P• 418 .
36. CPD, BR ,  Vol . 58 , 14 March, 1968 , pp .  142-146.
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In effect , there dneloped two peace movements , each claiminq a 
reepouible lltake for any vict:ori•• that were achieved . 
Mi l i tant and Moderate Schi sm 
The diviaion first broke into the open during the visit , in January 
1967 , of Air Vice-Marshal Ky. At a demonstration in Sydney aqainat the
south Vietnam leader , the protesters marched to JCirribilli House where 
they were stopped by police barricades . Some of the danonstrator• led 
by Mr. Gould wished to move aqainst the police 1 others were prevailed 
upon by r..bor MHR T. uren to 4iaparae , and the militant• ' confrontation 
waa averted . 
The deep-rooted differences within the peace movement erupted aqain 
at an ' Anti-Vietnmn War , Anti-Conscription Activists ' Conference ' held 
in Sydney from 27-30th January , 1967 to asses s the election result& and 
to plan for the future. Instiqatad chiefly by the convenor of Sydney 
VAC ,  the Conference evinced amonq many of the younger delegates a stronq 
disapproval of the tendency of the old peace qroupa to •retreat• in the 
face of counter pressures from society. Not only were they in •retreat" ,
asserted the critics , but more damaginq in the lonq run wa s  the fact that 
the old peace supporters were intent on pursuinq their " sterile strateqy 
of electoralism" and qaininq influence through the Labor Party .  
In this respect,  the young militants were certainly correct. Only 
a fortniqht after the peace mov•ent ' s election debacla ,  the President
of Ala> had declared that "reliance must rest on the democratic process • • • •
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It i• necessary to have a apecif ic objective and that could very well be
the senate Election in 18 months ' tima11 • 3
7 
In the same statement the
President argued for continued 9ood ties with two of the political parties . 
" file L1beral Reform Group put up a remarkably good 
•bolt1ng with a bare three Mee.ta '  prepara t1on . !'he 
AICD provided the closest co-operation and •up_port 
.nd th.1• should oont1nue w1tbout in any way wakm.ing 
our ao-optrat:Lan w1th our Lr1ends J.ll the ALP. n 38 
At the JamJary post mol'ttlm Conference this same moderate approach was 
reiterated , in contradis tinction to the militants ' proposal for 
" solidarity with the Vietnamese people" - i. e . , the NLP . Whilst the
moderates contended that " the main role of the peace am anti-war moveent
was to form a public opinion which would either elect a Labor Government
pledqed to withdraw our troops or be so strong as to persuade any 
39 Government to bring the boys back" , the " solidarity supportera • • •  claimed 
the vi•• of the• deleqates exhibited a readiness to accept rather than 
to canbat confused and equivocal attitudes in the anti-war movement , an 
overestimation of the strength of the movement , and a preoccupation with 
40 electoral success rather than principle" . What was needed , inaiated 
the militants , were " renewed , decentralised , to the people drives • • •  in 
localities , in univers ities and Church fields • ,  but especially in the 
trade unions - explaininq to the people that their nobjective interests
did not demand aqqresaive wars in Asia , and were threatened by such things 
41 as conacription• .  
31. A. G. B. Lawea , op. oi.t.
38. Ibid. 
39. R-r>oztt of Anti-rial' Aotioists Conf awnce , Sydney , 27-29 January , 1967 .
40. Ibid. 
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Althouqh both factions saw the need for a chanqe in BOCietal 
attitudes and agreed that " the most siqnifioant" reason for the election 
defeat was " the enormous impact on popular thinking of the established 
media• , they stressed different ways of overcc:ain9 • the vicious and 
hysterical campaign in favour of the Vietnam War conducted , on Government 
42 behalf , by every conceivable medium of propaganda." . Moderates , like 
the President of AICD , advocated the necessity of "non-violent and orderly 
procedures in all our activities" , maintaining that " if  a chan9e of policy 
is the objective, then danonstrations are only one part of the many sided 
effort which i• required. On their own they will not achieve the 
4.J obj ective" . 
Whilst not diaputing the point about daaonatrations (if "undirected" ) , 
the militants postulated a strategy which contained few , if any , prOTiaiona 
for the technique• of conventional politic• , and absolutely no intentions 
of retreating because of a hostile eociety ' s pressures and recrimination& . 
The Monash Labor Club , a leading proponent of the new militancy , argued 
that " it was vitally important to re-raise the whole issue of our 
44 involvement in Vietnam and to raise it in a completely new context" . 
Thair proposal was to chock Australians into an awareness of what the 
iasues were. "Accoxdinqly• , explained a pamphlet ,  "we decided • • •  to declare 
42. R. Gould, convenor , Sydney VAC , CaZZ fol' an Austmli.a-wids Peaoe
Confaeenos of Aotivista foze Efl1.'Zy 196? , o. December 1966 .
43. A.G. H.  Lawes , op. oit.
44. COflfllittse fw Aid to t1M Na.ttonaZ Ubsztati.on l11.'ont ,  pamphlet ,
Melbourne , 28 Auqust ,  1967 .
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our full support for the National Liberation Front and prove that we meant 
it by collecting fund• for th• • • • •  [A] lthough the reaction to our actions 
wa• ho•tile there wu a noticeable •hif t towards aupportinq our right to 
take thill po•ition and toward• opPC>ainq the war itHlf . Thu• people who 
were previou•ly unenthusiaatic about the war but did not support an 
immediate withdrawal were now saying that they ccmpletely opposed the war 
but did not wpport the N. L. F .  45 This was now a 'moderate ' position! " .  
In the dmoraliHd atmosphere that hUllCJ over the peace movement in 
1967 , the Oommittee for Aid to the NLF ( aet up on 2lst July, 1967 ) saw 
itself aa a "consensus-breaker" - aa forcinq people to camit thallselvea 
one way or the other and as being non-containable within the existing 
sy•t• . This was in direct contrast to the drift Australian politics ha4 
taken aince the Federal elections , claimed the militanta. "Durinc:J 1967 " , 
recalled one militant newcomer to the movement , " institutional politics 
congealed into one big consensus on all the most important issue• facing 
Auatralia • • • •  Dissent through the normal channels and in the normal arenas 
46 had become proqrammed into the system. • Thus the probl• , as poHd by 
the militants , was to break through the consensus . Yet often when they 
attepted what they thOUCJht might achieve this , they were thwarted by the 
moderates. For in•tance , at a Melbourne demonstration outside the American 
Consulate on 4th July , 1967 , a clash developed between moderates and the 
45. IJ:rl,d. 
46. Michael Hamel-Green , ' V.tetnuu Beyond P.tt9 ' , AustJtaZ.ian Lsft Rni/N , 
Mo .  24 , April-May 1970 , pp .  56 & 57 . 
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ailitant Monash Labor Club when the latter attempted to denounce the u. s .  
u the aggressor in Vietnam and expres s this view aymbolically in the 
burninq of the American fiaq . 
such interdictions from tb• moderates only served to bolster the 
re110lve of the militants to experiment with innovative techniques in order 
to overcome the •taaia of consensus politics. One of the militant• ' moat 
ardent apokasmen ( ironically a former Executive Committee m-i>er of the 
ANZ con;re••) juatif ied the actions of the Committee for Aid to the NLP 
with the followinq argwnenta 
"De•pi te the threats oL the Pr1me N1n1ster and the 
warnJ.ng• of peaceaucrats the onl11 meaning�ul act.tan 1• 
that which Ja consensus-break1ng. A ttempts to change 
the S!/Stem from within 1t.s own framework are absorbed 
J.n thAt pretences and double d-.11ng tha t  are the •tuLf 
oL conaen.sus poli t1a• • • • •  onl9 actions wh1ch dr1ve 
JHtOpl• out oL thelr trad1t1anal modes o� thought can 
produae an awaken.1ng to the real..t t.1.• of 1mper1a1.1sm. 
Onl!I i llegal acts can ezpolle the 1njU11tJ.ce of the law. " 47
Another ailitant attributed the hiatory of peace mov•ent failure 
not only to the acc:cmmodation of peace mov•ent aati.one within the
ayaten but also to the assimilation of its df/llla1'lda into the political 
enviromaent. "'?he peace mov•ent" , he pointed out, "ha• always obscured 
the real iaauea at stake in the struggle for a world without war. It 
has advanced demanda of peaceful co-existence which have aided the major 
imperialist powers , u . s . A. and u . s . s . R. to maintain their status quo 
41. BUmphrey McQaeen , 'A Single Spark ' , AJtena , No. 16 , Greenaborough ,
Vic . , 1968 , pp . 55-56.
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48 avainat the revolutionary workers , atudenta and peasants . • His call 
was for revolution at home . 
There were degreea of militancy expressed hy the militant faction. 
Not all of than were prepared to adopt a revolutionary posture and 
actually challenqe the ideological pinions of the aooiety1 nor were all 
the militants prepared to stand with Brisbane ' •  radical leader , Mr .  B. 
Laver (whose political career ironically beqan as convenor of the local 
VAC group and as an executive •eber of the Qld . Peace Camnittee) ,  and 
proclaia that "the real issues at atake are whether we support socialist
revolutions in the struggle against the exploitation of :imperialism , and 
that the qoal or "way to peace liea in conducting successful socialist.
revolutions in the major illlperiali.8t countries" . 49 Instead , many of the 
militants insisted on defining the issue as o. s .  aggression in Vietnam 
or Russian aqqres sion in CZechoslovakia , and the goal as the unilateral 
withdrawal of all troops from foreiqn soil - positions that were still 
militant by Australian society ' s noxms , but comparatively less so than 
thoae propounded by the super militant ideologues .  What all th e  militants 
did share was a willingness to use militant means if such actions 
conformed with their other beliefs . The common tactics of the militants 
were defined by arch militant, Mr .  A. Langer ,  to be s 
48. Brian Laver , Statllm111&t to authoza , 26 January, 1970 (in reference to
po•ition he was advocatinq in 1967 and holds today) .
49. Ibid. 
"l . Maldng the war as unpleasant a.s possJ.ble for the 
government b11 d1•rupt1ve demo.n.strat.1on.s , resJ.•tance 
to comcr1ptJ.on ,  etc . 
2. llob1 l1•1ng a wl.despread mass movement against the 
war by l1nJd.ng 1t with J.s•ues � direct concern to 
ordJ.m.ry Au.s tra.l.1a.n.s . H SO 
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Heqatively , the militants shared an intenae dislike for the moderate 
wing of the movement - a feeling which could di•eolve into amused di8dain 
whenever they heard. about such bland political activities as the older 
peace supporters '  fonaation of a peace cheaa club (called the "Peaceful 
Pawns " ) to 001Dpete in tournaments around Sydney.
The established section of the movement was ac!optinq a consolidatinq 
and defen•ive atrategy alonq a broad front , what one veteran peace leader 
called "a continuing proqram of activity desiqned to hold what had been 
9ained and to combat the efforts of thoae strivinq to take us back to a 
51 bipartisan 'All the Way' position" . The major public activity conaisted 
of arranging tours and meetings for overseas visitors - at which qreat 
care was taken not to offend Australian populist sentiment . Thus the 
' October Mobilisation' Project ,  which featured as ita quest speaker Briq. 
General HU9h Bester from the United States , adopted the followinq 
defensive sloqana " support OUr Boys in Vietnam - Not Those Who Send Them
50. Albert :t.an;er , Vut Protest NillNB (VCC Newsletter) , No. 19 , Melbourne, 
Decanber 1968 . In this article the author analyses the differences 
between the militants and moderates . Not surprisingly , as a super 
mil itant himself , he places importance (like B .  Laver ) on the 
criterion of a person ' s revolutionary thought. 
5l .  G. a. Anderson, 8•01.'•'/;aey ' s  Rspozet to AnnuaZ Gtmtntal. Mssti.ng ,
19 June , 1967 . 
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There" . Within the old peace qroups themselves , the leadership encouraged
social activities such aa the above mentioned peace chesa club , film
nifJhts , speech leaaons , and dances . The older , moderate winq usually
spoke about the need to d•l tactfully with the militants , but its 
C011Dents &180 revealed traces of impatience of the kind more camnonly
aaaociated with the peace mov•ent ' a  inveterate foes . Thus the Aia>
Secretary observed in hia 1966-67 Annual Report a 
n • • • there has been a natural tendency w1 th1n the organJ.sed 
movemen t to demand a more m1li tant exprea•1on of 1 ts 
revul•ion •g•1nst the barbarous 1mmoralJ.t9 « the war. 
"'.l!hJ..s trend has no doubt also been 1nf luenced b!I the
1.mpect of aspects of the generat1on c;onflict expressing 
youth and •tudent re11 •tance to societ9's  ,Pllternal 
1mpo•1t1on of unacceptable soc1al codes and concept:s 
upon them . 
" However understandable 1 t may be 1n these c.1rcumstances 
for man51 of us to la:pae into outraged f eelJ.ngs of 
1m,P11t1ence and 1ntoler�e there J.s need to guard 
agdn•t pressure• to 1.mpose upon the movement as a whole 
the advanced posit1on of its m1litant CC1Dpanenu. " 52
Virtually , as theae words were spoken , however , the breach between
the factions was vidminq. In Melbourne and in Sydney the militant• were
organising aeparate Vietnam Solidarity Committees ,  and in Brisbane the
Students for Deocratic Action had moved far outside the orbit of the
Qld . Peace Committee . The. canmon conviction of the militants was that
the moderates had becane unwitting instruments of the ' opponents of
peac e '  - that the distinction between the establishlld peace qroupa and
52. Ibid. 
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the peripheral regions of the EstaliLishmsnt was , in fact , becaninq 
increa•in<Jly blurred . As Bumpuoey McQueen of the Vietnam SOlic!arity 
CClllllittee proalaimad z "as long as the Peace Mov•ent calla for 
negotiations it does the work of the United States Information Service" . 
Bather , the task of the movanent is to "call for the defeat of u . s .
Imperialism • • •  identif[ ying ] llllperialism in Vietnam with C&pitaliSll in 
Auatralia• , and "develop[ inq] a new unity between the exploited in this 
53 country and the oppressed in Asia" . 
53 . emaphrey McQueen, Vietnam: tha Faoe of .Dnpezaia.tism , Vietnam
solidarity Committee pamphlet , Caulfield , Vic. , o. 1967 . See 
Appendix G for a list of the aims of the Canmittee . 
CHAPTER VI I I
CONCLUS I ON 
The dissertation has concentrated on three areas of the peace 
m<>Y•ent. l'ir•tly , after tracinq the pre-1960 historical background , it 
has examined in detail a apeaif ic project - the holdinq of the Melbourne 
Peace COnqrea• - Yiewin9 this aa the ' springboard ' of the organised 
movement that evolved in the 1960 ' • , and as a prototype of the kind of 
prea1111rea normally encountered by the peace dissenters fran the macro­
aociety. Ostensibly ,  the purpose of the Conqress was to stimulate 
ccmnunity-wide interest and concern about the qreat peace iasuea. While 
the organisers were moderately successful in attracting a large number of 
delegates from various occupational qroupings to participate in a 
discussion of a wide ranqe of issues related to peace and international 
co-operation , outside the Congress - in Parliament , in the press , and 
amonq the populace - the debate was largely restricted to the question 
whether the Conqress was Communist manipulated and open to free 
discussion. The Liberal-Country Party Coalition made a concerted effort 
to discredit the congress ,  even personally contacting people to diacouraqe 
th• from attendinq . As a result, little public interest was ever 
engendered over the actual peace issues discussed by the deleqatea . Only 
in the end was a minor victory achieved , as the Labor Party manaqed to 
channel the parliamentary debate into a question of Government violation 
of individual civil liberties. 
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In retroapect, the Con gr ess • most signifi cant ach ievement was 
probably the way in which the separate state organising committees laid 
the foWldation for the formal movement that aubsequently emer ged. In 
Queensland and in N.s.w. the continuing Committees served as the 'core •
groups of the movement; and i n  Victoria, desp ite a much more diffused 
movement, the superior resources of the ANZ Congress made it one of the 
more influential groups. The remaining smaller states sustained a much 
lower level of activity in relation to their size - the paci fists 
assuming a more prominent position than in the Eastern mainland states. 
The second section of the thesis has looked at the pe ace g roups 
within two states, Queensland and Western Australia, and described their 
activities and relationship with one another. The groups that existed 
in Queensland between 1960 and 1966 were seen to be dominated by a 'core • 
group , the Qld. Peace Committee, whi ch in turn enj oyed a close tie with 
the class d issenters at the Trades Hall. On the ot her hand, the small 
movement in Western Australia tended to be built around ad hoc committees, 
with the humanitarian, religious, and class dissenters joining forces in 
response to specific issues. The structure of the QUeensland movement 
paralleled that in N. S. W. , thoug h the latter' s ' core' qroup be came·
increasingly less dependent on the class dissenters, while the structural 
pluralism oper ating in Western Australia more closely approximated the 
foxm and modus optll't1.11.di of the movement in Victoria. 
The final section of the thesis has focused on t he broad 
developmental pattern of the Australian movement during the first eight 
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year• of the past decade. Three periods have been abstracted to higbli9ht 
the chanqea that occurred in the nature of issues undertakm , the number 
of peace qroups and types of dissenters canpriainq the movement , and the 
ailitanay of its tactics . Despite an el•ent of overlappinq , the three 
periods have been demarcated into the years that immediately followed the 
1959 Melbourne Congress , the events leading up to the denouement of the 
1966 Federal election, and the post-election response of the mov•ent to 
the overwhelming defeat it suffered at the polls .  
In the early years the mov•ent wa s  inclined to be moderate in 
tactics , in the sense that it made little effort at e•tabli•hinCJ any 
countervailing force of power and directly challenging authority. It 
tended to aqqlomerate and abstract iseuea far r•oved from the immediate 
concerns of moat Australians , and it usually prClllulqated incluaive type 
aolutiona . Except for a few groups like CND ,  the pacificiat section of 
the movement consisted almost entirely of the scions of the 19 59 Melbourne 
Congress whose support continued to be rooted primarily in the left-wing 
trade Wlions . 
The Vietnam and conscription issues aqqravated strains in Australian 
aociety that tended to reverse this earlier paradigm . For sane 
Australians , at least , the old answers no longer seemed t.o work. They 
perceived a " aystem • • • unable to make possible the reliable satisfaction 
l of certain values which are held to be essential" . The strain in the 
l .  Anthony Wallace, CUlt:uzae and Pe1.'eona'Lity , Random House , N.Y. ,
1964, p. 144 . 
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society, as is often the case , led to " large numbers of people • • •  seeking 
answers they do not have , reassurances that the answers they do have are 
right , or waya of implementing answers . • • •  "2 In such a situation it was 
almost inevitable that the peace movement should expand rapidly , for it 
not only provided answers but offered durable and altruistic ideals ,  most 
of which, it was felt, could be i.Diplemented if the Government were 
defc�ated in the 1966 General Elections . 
As the movement approached its election d8nouement ,  it proliferated 
greatly in both number of 9roups and in overall size . Its base of 
aupport widened from an influx of humanitarian , intellectual and youthful 
diasenters ; and it became increasingly more militant under the influence 
of ita growing student and youth aection . In the relatively sanguine 
pre-election atmosphere pervading the movement , militancy was tolerated -
indeed , sometimes even encouraged and engaged in - by the older peace 
�ct:ivists , including the officials of the long standing established 
peace bodies . 
The oruahin9 election defeat was a major set-back to the movement . 
An important avenue for expressing dissent - the electoral process - was 
blocked to the movement for what appeared would be an interminable period . 
Few of the disaenters �ealZ� thought the forthcoming Senate elections
offered any hopeful prospects . Moreover , a victory at the polls was now 
of dubioua value , since the movement ' s electoral conduit , the ALP ,  had 
2 .  c .  Wendell King , Sooiat Movements in the United Staus , Random House , 
N . Y. , 1956 , p .  13 . 
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veered to the right on issues of foreign policy and in many quarters was 
anxious to 4is110Ciate itself frcm any ties with peace movement activities . 
Pinally, in the immediate post election period , the movement faced the 
condamation of the aociety on a wide institutional and popular front. 
Within the mov•ent there was a binary response to the election defeat 
and the antipathy aanifeated by the aooiety. One faction , mostly the older 
dissenters ,  retreated into moderate politics and a mood of quie11eent 
conaolidation1 the second faction assumed a militant stance , hecCJllling in 
same instances so militant as to want to make war to achieve peace. 
Rather than bring the troops hcae from Vietnam , exclaimed the most extreme 
militants , the first step is to brinq the war home. 
For whatever reasons - ideolOCJY , pacific outlook , or simply 
strategical analysis - not all militants subscribed to such a radical 
doctrine as violent revolution for Australia. If they were camnitted to 
revolution it was aa a long term ,  distant proposition1 or perhaps they 
envisaged a different kind of rnolution - e. g. , a cultural or nm-violent 
one. However , what all militants did have in canmon was a willinqness 
to use sane type of militant tactic in the pursuit of their immediate 
peaaa objective - whatever it might happen to be. They were determined 
to hold to their maximum demands ; to foreqo immediate and incranental 
gains for the long tum total pay off 1 to challenqe directly the power 
structure (thus hoping for over-reactions of blatant injustice , aia­
allocations of resources , and exposures of the system ' s own inherent 
23 2 .  
contradiction•) 1  and throughout the entire process to mobilise a popular 
movement capable of threataninCJ and dJmini•hinCJ the pervasive power of 
the ' eatahliahed reqime ' . 
In contradistinction, the moderates advocated , not power 
confrontations but the alterin9 of public opinion and chanc)ing of policy 
by working throuqh the conventional channels of pluralist danocracy. 
The distinction between the two factions i• perhaps beat illustrated by 
the dif f erinq interpretationa they placed on the reaeons for Pre•ident 
Johnson' a decision t:o halt the bambin9 of moat of North Vietnam. Stated 
the President of AICD , the archetype of the moderate peace g%0Up 1 
" • • •  the fact 1s unden.Labl• that the force of pubUc 
opj.n1on generated and dtrected bg the pe•o• movements
around the world bas foroed th1• h:Lator1c event; and 
Ml have pllaiftd our part 1n th1•. Doubtless the Hawks 
and the do-nothing• w.111 all be •crubl1ng now to get 
on the band wagon , bu t we knOll wbue the strength and 
dr1ve for peace bas come from - 1t has come fran 
organ1u t1antJ l.f.lte A . I. C.D. and from peoples oL man9
land.a who have refused to g1ve up. Theg have shown 
aanalus1velg that the teahnlque � democracy oan be 
made to work for peace and the :Loree of public: opinJ.on 
does have 1ts ef'Lect. " 3  
On the other hand , Brisbane ' s  militant SDA interpreted the Johnaon decision 
in this li9hts 
n 2'1x>ugh the Johnaon decitdon m.1.ght be seen as a l••t 
mtnute attempt to ,PUt poor Hum_pt,,-Dumpty together 
a.gain , i t  basically represents a reali•t1a recogn1t:ton 
or the m1. l1 targ  and pol.1.t.1.cal power or the VJ.etname•e 
J. A. G.H.  Lawes ,  AICD NBIMBUtt.ze, Vol .  4, No . 12 , November 1968 . 
geo9le , and the ab1l1ty oL the 'non-cooperat.tve•' at 
home to create w1de-.a.le poli ti.cal chao• - aometh1ng 
no rul1ag elJ. te can long endure. • 4
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The militant/moderate factional sahi• had been precipitated by the
accentuation of •trains within the •oaiety in tandem with a ranqe of 
social controls directed at the movanent. Yet the division can also be 
attributed to a more basic underlying dilemma that has universally 
affected peace movements comp0aed of pacificists . This is that insofar 
aa a movement opposes particular acts and wars it ia a movement of 
resistance , but insofar as it demands peace in the abstract it is a 
movement of revolution. '!he first function , the negative act of opposinq 
organised ,  institutional violence , can usually take a moderate fom 
(assuming the eociety tol erates the exercise of fundamental civil liberties). 
The seoond function , the positive act of trying to create the conditions 
that will foster peace, almost inevitably necessitates the adoption of a 
militant posture . Or ,  expressed in slightly different form , the first 
function can most likely be done without violence ,  while the second 
usually involves the movement, either directly or indirectly , in the use 
of violence . 
5 caught in this basic dilanma , peace •upporters at all times tend to 
stress one or the other of the two functions , yet often they are able to 
4. SDA oil'OU"Laze ,  Brisbane, o. November 1968 . 
5 .  Allan Ashbol t is currently writing a book hiqhliqhting this dilemma 
of peace movements , about which he has written to the author s • 1  
wonder , though, if this paradox should be regarded as insoluble , or 
rather seen as a dialectical unity in which there 111 an interchanqe 
of purpose and vitality between the negative and positive functions. "  
(Letter ,  9 June , 1970. ) 
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work together as the Australian movement did during the 1966 election 
campaign. It i• when the counter pressures exerted by the society are 
perceived to be overly oppressive , as occurred after the election , that 
the dilemma usually reifies into factional entities . 
A P P E N D I C E S
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APPENDIX A 
D ECLARAT I ON OF HOPE 
- adopted by de l ega tes to the Me l bou rne Cong ress , November 1 959 
This Conqress of representative• of Australian and New Zealand 
citizens of diverse interests and opinions believes that another world 
war would be an unlimited disaster to the human race . We , therefore , 
affirm that the objective of all nations should be total disu:mament , 
that the f ir•t steps towards this should be taken at once and should be 
acccapanied at all stagea by an accepted system of inspection. 
In view of the admitted danger to the health and future of the 
human race , we urqe the immediate banning of nuclear teats , for which an 
adequate ay•tem of detection ha• already been proposed. . 
The tran.ition from an armament econany to a peace economy must 
be made on an orderly , planned basis . The money, resources and manpower 
now absorbed in arms production should be used to raise the livinq
standard of people everywhere but especially in under-developed countriea . 
We believe that the attainment of these obj ective• involves the 
increased effectivenes s of the United Nations . To help achieve this , we 
urge the admission of the Chinese Peoples ' Republic and of all other 
non-membar nations . 
We deplore any breach of international peace , and affirm that
there are no differences between peoples which cannot be settled by 
negotiation. 
We believe that the responsibility for war is never one-sided 
and that all nations should forqive past wrongs.  We believe that the 
dwelopnent of peaceful relations , co-operation and respect between all
nations is essential and possible . 
we recommend the pranotion of free , cultural , scientific , 
industrial , sporting and other exchanges between countries , the ra:noval 
of all travel restrictions and the unimpeded flow of infonnation. 
We welcane diaouaaion between the heads of nations culminating
in aqre•ent between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower that a summit 
meetinq auat be held. We believe that this should take place without delay. 
Encouraqed by the public support for the Congress , we believe 
that people everywhere , working to achieve the aims of this declaration 
can ensure international co-operation and disarmament. 
APPENDIX B 
HA I N  PEACE ORGAN I SAT I ONS ( 1 960-67)
AUSTRAL I AN CAP I TAL TERR ITORY 
Pac l f l c l s t 
Australian Pugwash Committee 
Canberra Peace Canmittee 
Vietnam Action Committee 
Pac I f  l st 
conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee 
QUaker Peace Conmittee 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
Pac I f  l c l st
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Assoc iation for International Co-operation and Disarmament 
Cathol ics for Peace 
Committee Against Atcmic Testing 
Committee for Canberra Vigil 
Committee for Peace in Vietnam 
Ex-Services Human Rights Association 
Hiroshima Commemoration Ca.mnittee 
Newcastle CODaittee for International Co-operation and 
Disarmament 
New South Wales Peace Canmittee 
Proj ect Vietnam Committee 
Save our Sons ( Sydney, Ne-wcastle & �llonqong ) 
south Coast Peace Committee 
Sydney Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
University of New South wales Study Group on Vietnam 
Vietnam Action Camnittee (later changed to Campaign) 
Vietnam Solidarity Committee 
Women for Peace 
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Youth CUlpaiqn Against Conscription ( Sydney , Newcastle & 
Wollongong) 
Pac lf  l st
Australian Quaker Peace Canmittee 
Conscientious C1:>j ectors Advisory Committee 
Fellowship of Reconciliation 
Peace Pledqe Union 
* wanen • a International League for Peace and Freedom
Q.UEENS LAND 
Pac l f l c l st 
Bertrand Russell Peace Foun4ation 
Brisbane Professionals for Peace 
Bx-Services Human Rights Association 
Hiroshima Day Committee 
Qgeensland campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
Queensland Peace Committee for International Co-operation 
and Disarmament 
Save OUr Sons 
Students for Democratic Action (later changed to Society) 
Vietnam Action COmmittee 
Youth Campaiqn Aqainst Conscription 
Pac l f  l st 
Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee 
l'ellowmhip of Reconciliation 
QUaker Peace Camnittee 
* Women ' s  International League for Peace and Freedm
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SOUTH AUSTRAL I A  
Pac l f l cl st 
Campaign for Peace in Vietnam 
South Australian Comittee for International Co-operation 
and Disarmament 
SOuth Australia Peace Colmnittee 
Vietn• Protest Committee 
Pac l f  l st 
Conscientious Objectors Advi80ry Committee 
Peace Pled9e union 
Quaker Peace COmmittee 
* Women ' s  International Laaque for Peace and Freedan
TASMAN I A  
Pac l f l c l st 
Hobart Peace Forum 
Launceston Peace Quest Forum 
Vietnam Action Group 
Pac l f  l st 
V I CTOR I A  
ConscientiOU8 Objectors Mviaory Camittee 
gaaker Peace Ccaaittee 
* wanen ' e  Int.8rnational League for Peace and Preedan
Paci  f l c l st 
ANZ COngre•• 
Auetralian Peace Council 
Australian Peace Liaison Committee 
Ballarat Anti-Vietnam war campaign 
CClmittee for Aid to the National Liberation Front 
Congreaa for International c.o-operation and Diaaxmament 
Ex-Services Human Rights Association 
Hiroshima Day Committee 
La Trobe Valley Vietnam Canmittee 
Melbourne Puqwash Seminar 
Pax (Catholic Vietnam Study Group) 
Peace QUeat Forum 
Save our SOna 
Victorian campaign for Nuclear Diaannament 
Victorian Peace COUncil 
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Vietnam Day Canmittee (later chanqed to Vietnam Co-ordinating 
Comnittee ) 
Vietnam solidarity Committee 
Vietnmn Study Group 
Women for Peace (Blackburn) 
Youth Campaign Against Conscription 
Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee 
Federal Pacifist Council of Australia (the Australian Section 
of War Resisters ' International) 
QUaker Peace Committee 
Pacif iat Movement of Victoria 
* WOmen ' s  International League for Peace and Freedca
WESTERN AUSTRAL I A  
Pac I f  l c l  st
Church and Community Committee on Vietnam 
save Our sons 
We•t Auatralian Campaiqn for NUclear Disummnent 
West Australian Peace Council 
Pac i f i st 
Conscientious c»>j ectors Advisory Camnittee 
Pellowahip of Reconciliation 
QUaker Peace Ccmmittee 
* Wcmen ' •  International League for Peace and Freedom
* Not •trictly a pacifist organisation.
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APPENDIX C 
FOUNDAT I ON MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRAL I AN PEACE COUNC I L  (19�9) *
W.P. Allen (Federation for Resistance to War) 
Mrs . R. Bell (President , Nev Housewives' Association)
Mrs . D.  Blackburn (M. H . R. )  
G.B.  Burchett (Communist journalist) 
J.P.  cairns (University lecturer ) 
C . B .  Christessen (Editor , MsanJin) 
A.J. C!regan (President , Vic . A . R. U. ) 
P .  Dalby Daviaon (Author) 
Rev. A.M.  Dickie (Presbyterian ) 
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Brian Fitzpatrick (Historian , Journalist and Secretary of Australian 
Council for Civil Liberties) 
T.M. Gleeson (President , Vic. Clerks ' Union) 
Rev. F . J. Bartley (Methodist) 
Rev. v. James (Unitarian) 
J.W. Leqge ( Scientist) 
Miss Judith Lyell (Student Christian Movement)
Leonard Mann (Author)
Miss Rachel McLaren (Presbyterian Youth organisation) 
M. C. Nunan (Vice-President , Vic. League of Ex-Servicemen) 
J. Rogers (Director , Australia-Soviet House) 
N. Rothfield (President , Jewish Council) 
canon w.G. Thanas (Church of England) 
or . a. c. Traill (sc ientist) 
Miss Valerie Wadsworth (Uni . International Co-op. Club) 
Mias Heather Wakefield ( Student Christian Movanent) 







Uga 1. advisett: 
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APPENDIX  D 
A I CD EXECUT I VE COMM I TTE E  ( 1 966) 
Dr. A.G.H.  Lawes 
Mrs .  P .  Latona 
Mr. w. Rigby 
Mr .  F .  James 
Mr .  D. Allen 
Mr .  G.R. Anderson 
Rev. A.D.  Brand 
Mr. R. Bruqgy 
Mr. E .  Boatswain 
Mr. A. C&rey 
Mi•• J .  CUrthoyll 
Mr .  w. Gollan 
Mr. R. Gould 
Mra. M. Hill 
Mrs. P. Hopwood 
Mr .  D .  Hancock 
Bishop J. s .  Moyes
Mrs. A. Michaelis 
Mr .  J. Mackay Sim 
Dr. I.V. Ne11111an 
Miss H. Palmer 
Mr. Barry Robinson 
Mr. I. SWords 
Prof. E . L. Wheelwriqht 
Prof. s . E. Wright 
Mr. W. L. Brown 
Mr. M. Isaacs 
Dental SUrgeon 
Housewife ,  Women for 
Peace , WILPF 
Fonner state parliamentarian, 
now official in Miscellaneous 
Norkers '  Union 
Publisher and Managing Editor 






Buildinq Workers ' Industrial 
Union off icia.l 
Paycholoqy lecturer , University 
of New South Wales 
Student,  Sydney University 
Vietnam Action Ccmaittee 
FoJ:'lller headmaster 
Bookseller and convenor of 
V'AC 
Housewife , Women for Peace 
Housewife ,  waaen for Peace , 
union of Auetralia Wanen 
Miscellaneous Workers '  Union 
official 
Pormer Billhop of Armidale 
Paycholoqist, Secretary of 
WILPF , New South W&lea 
Representative 
Botany lecturer , Univereity 
of Sydney 
Teacher and Editor of Outlook 
Secretary of YCAC , New South 
Wales 
Engineer 
Associate Professor of 
Econanics ,  university of 
Sydney 
Prof easor of Phumaceutical 






GENERAL POL I CY STATEMENT ADOPTED BY CONT I NU I NG STATE COMM I TTEES 
OF 1959 ME LBOURNE PEACE CONGRESS , AT MEET I NG ,  I N  SYDN EY ,  
1 8  FEBRUARY, 1 961
Changi ng Worl d Si tuati on 
The Australian nation is becoming more and more deeply involved in 
dangerous preparations for world war , by the Government ' s  adherence to 
old policies which do not take account of the rapid changes in the world 
around us . 
In recent years , the arms race has led to the pileup of nuclear and 
rocket weapons of auch enormous destructive power and expenditure that 
agreement for general disarmament has become an urgent necessity . 
The increasing economic difficulties of many sections of our community 
today are being aggravated by the diversion of great sums into non­
productive military expenditure , and away from the needs of our people and 
the useful development of our country . 
It has become understood by the majority of people and governments 
that countries of different social systems must find the way to live side 
by side without aettling their differences through war - they must build 
their future in peaceful co-existence . 
The recent years have been marked by the emerqence into independent 
statehood of many of the people of Asia and Africa previously subjected 
to the control of foreign imperial powers . 
Some of these are building strong societies ,  while those yet unfree 
are fast movinq to claim their independence . 
These historic changes are of special significance to Australia as 
a European nation in Asia , and have been reoognised in the decisions of 
the General Assembly of the U.N . calling for universal , general disarmament, 
the prevention of war and the abolition of colonial regimes . 
Today the peace of the whole world depends not merely on the almost 
univeraal desire of people for peace , security and friendly international 
relations , but on the degree to which people and their governments , 
aotivsZy d•olazes t1iemsetvss through policies and actions that strengthen
peace and offset trends towards war . 
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Present Foreign Pol icy Dangerous 
An exaination of the policies of the Australian Government •how• that,
far from taking such a poeitive position , it has in general followed
policiu making for international diacord and tension , reliance on
umaments , military paota and even ailiUry actione , and an attitude of 
c!iacouraganant or repression of national liberation movements abroad . 
These and other Government foreign policies have drawn wide critici•
frca many sections of the cc:maunity because of their subordination to the 
policies of the u . s .  and the U. IC. 
The following principal aspects of Australian foreiqn policy are all
negative , out of step with world daveloiaenta and dangerous to the security 
of Australia and to world peace & -
1. Maintenance of a high rate of arms expenditure , while making no 
independent contribution to international discussion of possible
ways to cliaamament.
2 .  Handing over of part of Australia for use a s  bases and teetinq
grounds for the war machines of the United States , Britain and
poaaibly other powers .
3 .  Participation in the South East Asian Treaty Orqaniaation, a
military pact not repraaentative of the main nations of Asia and
in general servin9 the interests of nations outside Asia and not
the national intereats of the Aaian peoples.
4 .  In the name of "defence" , gearing of Australian military forces and
planning to pacts and alliances such as s. E.A.T.o. , thereby
separating us from the aspirations of the peoples of south East
Asia.
s .  Oppoainq the eatablishment of normal relations with the Chinese
People ' •  Republic , despite the awellinq danand in the o.N.  for 
such relations.
6 .  Failing consistently to associate Australian policy with that of
the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world in the
condemnation of colonialism , and in particular , abstaininq from
the resolution to end colonialism in the recent U.N . Assmbly . 
such policies have brought upon Australia the criticism of other
nations because of their Cold War character , to which Australian Government 
leaders apparently see no alternative.
Critici• has struck also at those Australian policies based on race 
di8Crimination towards the Aboriginal people and the New Guinea people . 
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The time has cane to end this dependence on the policy dictates of 
other govermnents , thi• reliance on armed forces and the threat of force 
in relations with our nearest neighbours , and this resistance to the 
qreat liberating movements of many countries . 
We call on all sections of the Australian people - the people working 
in production and those directin9 it J the men and women of the professions , 
the sciences , the arta 1 the people of different religious beliefs and 
ideoloqiea 1 the younq and the older - to discuss now , and actively aeek 
independent Australian foreiqn pol icies for peace and friendly relations . 
Future Pol i cy Must Be Pos i tive 
In our opinion such policies , devised to serve the interests of peace 
and alao of our own nation , must include -
o Public support of the principle of peaceful co-existence .
o Positive proposals for disarmament, including the cessation of
nuclear weapons testinq ,  manufacture and stock-piling.
o Clear support ,  in principle and in deed , of the u .N .  Assembly
decision on the abolition of colonial req.imes and immediate
action to encouraqe the independence movement of the Congolese ,
Iaotion and other peoples , and the emancipation of the New Guinea
and Aboriginal peoples of Australia .
o Withdrawal from existing pacts and alliances based on interference ,
including aimed intervention , in the danestic affairs of South
East Asian peoples.
o l'riendly and normal relations and exchanqes ,  based on equality and
mutual respect , with all nations , particularly the Chinese People ' s
Republic and other Asian nations .
o vastly .increased technical and econcmic assistance to underdeveloped
countries , without political conditiona .
o Repeal of all le«Jislation (such as sections of the Crimes Act) which
may , in any way , be used to restrict or discourage public discussion
of foreign policy and the strugqle for peace .
What You Can Do 
Almost every Australian has good reaaons for needing changes of 
policy , along such lines , to secure a peaceful future . 
we confidently call , then , for deliberate discussion of these issues 
- in the places of work and the places of study , in hanes and in 
neighbourhood• , in organisations of trade , profession , sport or civic life . 
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We call , further , for the recognition that the active defence of 
peace is the responsible business of every citizen , to be expressed in 
deputationa , in written protests and propoaals , in meetings , marches 
and a hundred other waye , particularly when action• occur that damaqe 
peace and international relationa . 
We urc.ie support for any organisation that pranotes public discussion 
and activity for peace , whether Australian or international in character , 
since we are convinced that , despite the great danger of war from some
quarters , public action on a world scale is capable of securing peace . 
APPENDIX  F 
MEMBERSH I P  OF COMM I TTEE FOR CANBERRA V I G I L , HAY 1965* 
Rev. Ivan w. Alcorn (Methodist ,  Qld. )
Rev. Geoffrey Barnes (Presbyterian , Vic . ) 
Rev. D . G.  Brimacombe (Methodist , Vic . ) 
Canon F . W . Coaldrake (Church of England , N . S . W. )
Rev. Norman Faiclmey (Presbyterian , Vic . )  
Rev. John Garrett (Congregationalist, N . S .W . ) 
Rev. s .  Henshall (Congregationalist , W . A. )
Rev. W. J .  Bobbin (Methodist , N . S . W . ) 
Rev . Dr . Arnold Hunt (Methodist , S .A. ) 
Mr. David Hodgkin (Quaker, A . C . T . ) 
Rev. K. B .  Leaver (Congregationalist , W.A. ) 
Rev. Rex Mathias (Methodist , A. C . T . )  
Bishop J . s .  Moyes (Church of England , N . S . W . ) 
Rev. Gordon Powell (Presbyterian, N . S . W . ) 
Rev. Harry Rowe (Baptist , N .  s .  W. ) 
Rev. C . R. Sprackett (Presbyterian , N . s . w . ) 
Rev. Ralph Sutton (Methodist , w .A . )
Rev. M . C .  Trenorden (Methodist, S.A. ) 
** Rev. Alan Walker (Methodist , N . s . w . ) 
Rev. Lyle Williams (Church of Christ ,  Vic . ) 
* Office located at 139 Castlereagh Street , Sydney .
** Convenor 
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APPENDIX G 
A I MS OF THE V I ETNAM SOL I DAR I TY COMM I TTEE* 
Givan this past and present (history of Vietnam) , and the nature of 
u . s .  imperialian we de• our reapouibilities to be :  
(1) Oppoaition to American and Australian aqgresaion in 
Vietnam. 
(2) To vork for the withdrawal of all Australian and 
foreic)n troopa from Vietnaa. 
(3) Recognition of the National Liberation Front as the 
authentic representative of the people of Vietnmn , 
reaiating foreiqn invasion and striving for a social , 
econaaic and political revolution in Vietnam. 
(4) support only for those negotiatioD8 acceptable to the 
NLF . 
(5)  To arrange medical and civil aid for the Vietn•eae 
people. 
(6)  Distribution of documen t.  and information concerninq 
the aims , canpoaition and history of the NLF .  
* Vutnan: ths Faoe of Impsnatian , Vietnam Solidarity canmittee
pamphlet ,  Melbourne , o. 1967 .
SELECT I VE AND ANNOTATED B IBLI OGRAPHY 
Nothing of scholarly riqour and non-advocacy has been written about 
the Australian peace movement (1960-67 ) , with three possible exceptions z 
Henry S .  Albinski 
J . W. Berry 
J . W. Berry 
Ralph V. SUlllly 
Potitios and FOHign Potloy in AuetNti.a: 
PM Iinpa.ot of Vietnam anti Conatntipti.on,
Duke University Presa ,  Durham , North 
Carolina , 197 0 , Chapa .  5 ,  6 5 7 .
: ' flbo  Are t:he lfarohers? ' , Po ti tioe , 
Vol .  III , No .  2 ,  November 1968 . 
a ' The V1etnam Marchers ' ,  Henry Mayer (ad. ) , 
Austmti.an Politi.as: A Ssoond Rsadtll' , 
Cheshire , Melbourne , 1969 . 
1 'M1l.1tancg and the Australian Peace 
Movement, 1960-67' , Potltioe , Vol . v ,
No .  2 ,  Novanber 197 0 .  
The f irat work only deals with the role of the peace movement in the 
context of the Australian debate over the issues of Vietnam and 
oonacription, and is limited primarily to a collation of press clippings 
and other st:atanents about the peace movement. Albinski sorely lacks 
first-hand and detailed knowledge of the modus opattmdi. of the movement. 
On the other hand , my own article , which is a hiqhly cor.:lensed version 
of Chapters S ,  6 and 7 of this thesis , while it may benefit from personal 
contact and ' inside ' knowledge of the movanent , is restricted in its 
perspective to an analysis of issues undertaken , tactics eaployed and 
personnel involved . Even more limited in aspect is the survey conducted 
by Berry on the social backqrounds and political aff iliationa of 
participants in a few of the Sydney mass marches . 
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The raaaining material that apecif ically analyses the peace 
movement qua movment deals exclusively with the issue of communiat 
penetration , and , for the most part, ia very pol•ical. Takinq the 
anti-canamist position are : 
Anonymoua 
Garfield Barwick 
Harold Crouch, James 
Jupp , Leon Glezer , 
Peter Samuel (eda . ) 
P . T .  Findlay 
J . P .  Forrester 
Harold Holt 
Peter Kelly 
R. G .  Menzie• 
J. Normington-Rawling 
B . A. Santamaria 
B . N .  Snedden 
Deni• Strangman 
a ' Who Are the Demonstrator•' ,  %'M BuZ.t•tin ,
26 March , 1966 .  
a CPDa BR ,  Vol . 25 , 10 November , 1959 ,
PP• 2524-28 . 
1 !'hs Peace NOl)emsnt , 2nd edition , Dissent 
Pamphlet , Melbourne , 1964. 
1 PJtotsst Potltioe and P1111o'ho7,ogloat 
flazefattQ - !'ha Connuniet Ro'UI ln ths
Ant;i.-Yi11tnam fiaJt and Antl-ContloPlpUon
Nout1111tmt in AustJtatia ,  Hawthorn Pre•• , 
Melbourne , 1968. 
1 Piftesn YtJaZts of P•ao• Fl'Onte , McHuqh 
Printery , Sydney , o. 1966 . 
1 CPD. BR ,  Vol . 56 , 17 Auqust, 1967 ,
PP• 241-243 . 
a 'Peace Movement. in Australia ' ,  
T'M Butt.tin , 23 ..Tune , 1962 . 
1 CPD. BR ,  Vol . 25 , 27 October , 1959 , 
pp. 2345-46 . 
: 'Recollections 1n Tranqui 111. ty ' , QMadrant ,
Sydney , September 1961 . 
1 ,,.,,. PBao• Game , National Civic Council , 
Fitzroy, Vic . , November 1959 . 
a CPD� HR ,  Vol . 43 , 3 Septaaber , 1964 ,
pp. 969-97 2 .  
a ' rbe Peace Movement ' ,  Social Su:z-rJsy , 
Vol.  XIII , October 1964 1 Vol .  XIII , 





a !fhs Peaos Raokst , Ambas sador Press ,
Sydney , 1964 . 
s 'A Comment on Hr. Guyatt ' s Chapter ' ,
Roy Forward and R. H . C .  Reece (eds . ) ,
Coneonption in Austmt.i.a ,  university 
of Queensland Presa , st. Lucia , 1968 . 
Since the pro-movement force s do not particularly relish adopting a 
defensive posture , only two fairly ayatematic attempts have been made to 
refute the communist manipulation charqe (and they have been by non-
peace officials ) .
A . G .  Platt 
Ralph V .  Summy 
a A RepOZ't to t'hs Pl-•r/.dsnt and Mtllfil:J"1.'B of 
ths N. S. w. State &x:eautive of ths ALP on 
t'he ANZ C011(1NBB f oze Intsma:t:tonal 
Cooptnta,tion and I>lsarrmament� hs ld  i.n
Me t� - ?th to 14th N(Jf)embsr, 1969 , 
adopted by the N. s .w. Executive of the 
ALP ,  22 January , 1960 , reprinted in 
Peaoe Aotion , Vol . 6 ,  No .  2 ,  Sydney , 
March , 1964 . 
'A Reply to Fred Wells ' , Roy Forward and
R.H . C .  Reece (eds . ) ,  op. ait. 
The National organising Committee of the Australian Congress for 
International Co-operation and Disarmament ( 1964 Sydney COnqrees) , in a
full paqe advertisement in rful Auetmtian , 8 Septanber , 1964 , undertook
to deny the camnuniat domination charges issued by the Federal Attorney-
General , B.N.  Snedden ,  in Parliament ( see supzta) . For a similar denial 
aimed at other detractors , see Rev . Alan Brand , Statlilmtmt Issu.sd to 
BiJdn.y 'PztBss , 4 March , 1964 , reprinted in Peaos Aati.on , Vol.  6 ,  No .  2 ,
March 1964 . 
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A larqe part of the material for this thesis has been obtained from 
the following four sources : 
( 1) The author ' s  personal experiences in the movement ( I  was 
an Executive CCmmittee member of the Qld. Peace Committee , 
a member of the Brisbane Professionals for Peace , and a 
founder of the Students for Daaocratic Action) . 
( 2 )  Access to the files of the following orqanisationa : 
N. S . W. Peace Committee , AICD , W.A. Peace COuncil , W.A. CND ,
Qld . Peace Camnittea , Brisbane Professionals for Peace , 
SDA ,  ANZ Conqress , VCND , VDC ,  and Australian Peace Council 
(material on the activities of APC , 1952-58 , has been 
deposited in the archives at A. N . U . ) .  
(3 ) collection of circulars , constitutions , newsletters , pamphlets , 
eto. of the main peace bodies . ( I  shall continue to hold 
the se in my personal files . ) 
(4)  Informal talks with the major personalities involved in 
the movement. 
Most of the other data and ideas have come from the below listed 





R. H .  Bainton 
H .  B lumer 
Crane Brinton 
Vera Brittain 
Gertrude Bus sey and 
Margaret Tims 
Francis G. Castles 
Vere Gordon Childe 




2 54 . 
: 'flhy Hitler- Came Into Power- , Prentice-Hall ,
New York , 1938 . 
Fzaom Bob to Bung les I sun Books , Melbourne ,
1970 . 
' Party Youth Groups 1n Australia ' , Henry 
Mayer ( ed .  ) , Austr-a lian Po li tios : A Second
Reader- , Cheshire , Melbourne , 1969 . 
CJutistian Attitudes TOtJJard Wal' and PQQ.Ce , 
Hodder and Stoughton , London , 196 0 .  
' Collecti ve Behaviour ' , A.M.  Le e  (ed . ) , NeriJ
Out'Li.ne of the &incip tss of Soaiotogy , 
Barnes and Nob le , New York , 1951 . 
Anatarry of Revo lution , Rev . edition , Vintage 
Books , New York , 19 65 . 
'l!he Rebe l Passion , Blackfriars Press , 
Leicester , 1964 . 
WILPF (1 91 6-1 965) - A Recor-d of Fifty Yea:l's ' 
Woztk , Allen and Unwin , London , 196 5 . 
ITesBUl'e Gzt0ups and. Political Cu ttuPe ,
Routledge and Kegan Paul ,  London , 19 67 . 
Bor.v Uibour GOlJezens : A Study of Woztker-s '
Repztesentation in Austzta lia ( 19 23 ) , Melbourne 
Univer sity Pres s , Melbourne ,  1964 . 
Ths Po liti<JB of English Dissent , New York 
University Press , New York , 19 56 . 
Class and Class Conftict in Industl'ial 
Society , Routledge and Keqan Paul , London , 
1959 . 
The Carmunist Party of Austl'alia: A Shoztt 
Histoey , Hoover Institution Press , Stanford , 
Cal . , 1969 . 
An Econanic Ths01'y of DemoCl'<ZCy ,  Harper and 
Row ,  New York , 1957 . 
Christopher Driver 
Barry Eckstein
s .  Piner 
Roy Forward and R. H . C .  
Reece (eds . ) 
Robin Allenby Gollan 
Richard Gordon ( ed .  ) 
C&rl I .  Hovland and 
Milton J.  Rosenberq 
( eda . ) 
Douglas Hyde 
L . C .  Jauncey 
Georqe ICateb 
c.  Wendell ICing 
Arnold Kaufman 
G. L. ICri•tianson 
Harold Lasswell 
Kathleen Lonsdale (ed . )
Kar 1 Mannheim 
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1 PM l>lsamtRs: A Study in 'Pztotest , Hodder
and StoWJhton , London , 1964 . 
: 'PzteBB'Ul'e GJtoup Politias , Allen and unwin ,
London , 1960 . 
1 Anonymous »npi.1.'e , Pall Mall Press , IDndon , 
1958. 
1 ConsOPlpti.on in AustJtalia , University of 
Queensland Pres s , St. Lucia , 196 8 .  
z Radioa Z  and Woi-king Class Po ti.tios : A Study 
of Eaatf/Pn AustN1:la. 18�0-1910 , Melbourne 
University Press , Melbourne , 1960. 
a Ths Austl'alian NB'bJ Left , Heinemann , Melbourne ,
1970 . 
: Attitude Oztgani.sation and Change , Yale 
University Pre ss , New Haven , 1960 . 
: 1!'ns PB<ZOefuZ Assault: Ths Pattwn of 
Subvesion , Bodley Head , London , 1963 . 
1 T'hs Stln!y of Conaonption in Austmtia ,
Allen and Unwin ,  London , 1935 . 
Utopia and Its Bnfllllies , Free Press of Glencoe , 
New York , 1963 . 
: Soaia.1, Movements i.n ths United statBB , 
Random House , New York , 1956 . 
1.'he Radioal Ubezta.l : NBtJ Man in Ameri.oan
Politi.as , Atherton Press , New York , 1968 . 
'l!1w PoZ.itios of Patriotism , Australian
National University Pr ess , Canberra , 1966 . 
1 Psyo'liopathotogy and Potitios , University of
Chicago Press , Chicago , 1930 . 
QMa]uJn Visit Russia , East-West Re lations
Group of the Friends ' Peace Committee , 
London , 1 952 . 
Idso'Logy and Utopl,a , trans . Louis Wirth and 
Edward Shila , Harcourt , Brace & Co. , New 
York , 1936. 
David A. Martin 
Peter Mayer (ed. ) 
Eleanor M. Moore 
J . P . Nettl 
H . R. Niebibr 
G. F .  Nuttall 
M. Olsen ,  Jnr . 
Martin Oppenheimer 




Trevor R. Reese 
L. L. Robson 
John Rorke (ed . )
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a Paoifism� An Biatozttoa'L and Soolotogioa'L
Btua,J ,  IU>utledge and Xeqan Paul , London , 1965 .
a The Paoi.fi.st Conaoilmae , Pelican , 
Harmondsworth , England , 1966 . 
a 2'hs QM•st f oze Peaae - A• I Have Known It in
AustNZia ,  Wilke & co . , Melbourne , 1949 . 
a Politioat Mobi.lisati.on: A Soolologioa'L 
Ana"Ly•i.• of Methods and Concepts , Faber and
Faber , London , 1967 . 
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